Risk-Based Decision Support Model for Planning Emergency Response for Hazardous Materials Road Accidents by Hamouda, Ghada
 
Risk-Based Decision Support Model for Planning 
Emergency Response for  
Hazardous Materials Road Accidents 
 
by 




presented to the University of Waterloo 
in fulfillment of the  
thesis requirement for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
in 
Civil Engineering  
 
 
Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, 2004 




I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. This is a true copy of the thesis, 
including any required final revisions, as accepted by my examiners. 







Hazardous Materials (HazMat) are transported throughout Canada in a great 
number of road shipments. The transportation of HazMat poses special risks for 
neighboring population and environment. While HazMat accidents are rare events, they 
could be catastrophic in nature and could result in substantial damage to nearby 
communities. Effective emergency response plays an important role in the safe 
transportation of HazMat.  
Transportation of HazMat involves different parties, including shippers, 
regulators, and surrounding communities. While the shipping party is responsible for safe 
delivery of HazMat shipments, it is the responsibility of local emergency service agencies 
to respond to accidents occurring within their jurisdictions. In this research, the 
emergency response to HazMat transport accidents is assumed to be delegated 
exclusively to specially trained and equipped HazMat teams.  
This research proposes a new comprehensive systematic approach to determine 
the best location of HazMat teams on regional bases utilizing HazMat transport risk as a 
location criterion. The proposed model is the first to consider emergency response roles 
in HazMat transport risk analysis, and was intended as an optimization tool to be used by 
practitioners for HazMat emergency response planning.  
Additionally, the proposed model can be used to assess risk implications in 
regards to current locations of HazMat teams in a region, and to develop effective 
strategies for locating HazMat teams, such as closing and/or relocating teams in the 
region. The model investigates how HazMat team locations can be tailored to recognize 
the risk of transporting HazMat and would provide a more objective set of input 
 iv 
alternatives into the multi-criteria decision making process of regionally locating HazMat 
teams. 
The proposed model was applied to the region of southwestern Ontario in effort to 
illustrate its features and capabilities in the HazMat emergency response planning and 
decision making process. Accordingly, the model provided very useful insights while 
reviewing several HazMat team location strategies for the southwestern Ontario region 
and investigating tradeoff among different factors. This research contributes to a better 
understanding of emergency response roles by reducing HazMat transport risks, and will   
greatly benefit both researchers and practitioners in the field of HazMat transport and 
emergency response.  
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“Behold! in the creation of the heavens and the earth; in the alternation of 
the night and the day; in the sailing of the ships through the ocean for the 
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kinds that He scatters through the earth; in the change of the winds, and the 
clouds which they Trail like their slaves between the sky and the earth;- 
(Here) indeed are Signs for a people that are wise.” 
      The Quran, English interpretation  
Chapter 2, Verse 164 
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• BLEVE Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion. A container 
failure with a release of energy, often rapidly and violently, 
accompanied by a release of gas to the atmosphere, followed 
by ignition (fireball) and propulsion of the container or 
container pieces. 
 
• Consequence the direct effect of an event. It is expressed as a health effect 
(e.g., death, injury, exposure), property loss, environmental 
effect, evacuation, or quantity spilled. 
 
• Containment Those procedures taken to keep a material in a specified area 
such as a dyke surrounding a tank or a temporary boom 
surrounding a spill etc. 
 
• Contamination The process of transferring a hazardous material from its 
source to people, animals, the environment or equipment 
which may act as a carrier. 
 
•                       
Dangerous Goods 
(Hazardous 
• Office of Fire Marshal: Hazardous material is any 
substance or form that may pose an unreasonable risk to 
health, safety or property. In Canada, the term “dangerous 
 xix
Materials, HazMat) goods” is used to describe hazardous materials in transport 
and/or storage.  
• Transportation of Dangerous Goods Act: dangerous 
goods/hazardous materials are any substances that pose an 
unreasonable risk to life, the environment or property 
when not properly contained.  
• Transportation of Dangerous Goods Regulations: 
Dangerous Goods: means a product, substance or 
organism included by its nature or by the regulations in 
any of the classes listed in the schedule to the Act (see 
Schedule to the Act).  
• NFPA: Hazardous Material A substance (solid, liquid, or 
gas) that when released is capable of creating harm to 
people, the environment, and property. 
 
Schedule to the Act, Transportation of Dangerous Goods 
Regulations. 
Class 1 




Gases: compressed, deeply refrigerated, liquefied or 
dissolved under pressure 
Class 3 
Flammable and combustible liquids 
Class 4 
Flammable solids; substances liable to spontaneous 
combustion; substances that on contact with water emit 
flammable gases 
Class 5 
Oxidizing substances; organic peroxides 
Class 6 
Poisonous (toxic) and infectious substances 
Class 7 
Nuclear substances, within the meaning of the "Nuclear 





Miscellaneous products, substances or organisms 
considered by the Governor in Council to be dangerous to 
life, health, property or the environment when handled, 
offered for transport or transported and prescribed to be 
included in this class 
 
  
• Distance to the 
endpoint 
The distance a toxic vapor cloud, heat from a fire, or blast 
waves from an explosion will travel before dissipating to the 
point that serious injuries from short-term exposures will no 
longer occur. 
 
• Dose The concentration of pollutant to which people are exposed, 
taken to a power, multiplied by the period of time that it is 





A structure or a portion of a structure that houses emergency 
response agency equipment or personnel for response to 
alarms. 
 
• Fireball The burning of a flammable vapor cloud which is mostly 
above UFL. The whole cloud appears to be burning forming a 
 xxii
mushroom shaped fire. The hazard is manly thermal. 
 
• Flash fire The burning of a flammable vapor cloud at a very low flam 
propagation speed. The fire expands easily without significant 
overpressure. The hazard is only due to thermal effect.  
 
• Frequency The rate at which events occur. It may be expressed as 
event/year, accidents/km, and so on. 
 
• Hazard A chemical or physical condition that has the potential for 










A group of trained response personnel operating under an 
emergency response plan and appropriate standard operating 
procedures to control or otherwise minimize or eliminate the 
hazards to people, property, or the environment from a 
released hazardous material. 
 
• IDLH Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health. The maximum 
level of concentration from which one could escape within 
 xxiii 
thirty minutes without any escape impairing symptoms or 
health effects. 
 
• Incident An occurrence or event that requires action by emergency 
service personnel to prevent or minimize loss of life or 
damage to property and/or natural resources. 
 
• Individual risk The relationship between a given level of harm from the 
realization of a specific hazard and the frequency at which an 
individual may be expected to sustain that level of harm. 
 
• Leak A small, sporadic discharge, emission or escape of product 
from means of containment.  The release of product usually is 
of a long duration. 
 
• Likelihood A measure of the expected probability or frequency of 
occurrence of an event. This may be expressed as frequency 
(e.g. events/year), a probability of occurrence during some 




Petroleum gases which can be liquefied under moderate 
pressures. Common LPGs are butane and Propane. 
 
 xxiv
• Lower Flammable 
Limit (LFL) 
The lowest concentration (lowest percentage of the substance 
in air) that will produce a flash of fire when an ignition source 
(heat or flame) is present. At concentrations lower than the 
LEL, the mixture is too “lean” to burn. 
 
• Mitigation time Time to apply mitigation measures at the site, mainly 
containment and evacuation. 
 
• Quantitative Risk 
Assessment 
Incorporates numerical estimates of frequency and the 
consequence in a sophisticated but approximate manner to 
estimate quantitative measure of risks. 
 
• Release A release of HazMat load excluding any spill or leak from the 
vehicle fuel tank. 
 
• Response time Consists of three components; dispatch time at the emergency 
response facility, travel time from the emergency response 
facility to the release site, and time to start mitigation at the 
site (mainly containment and evacuation).  
 
• Risk A measure of potential economic loss, human injury, or 
environmental damage in terms of both the incident likelihood 
and magnitude of the loss, injury, or damage.  
 xxv
 
• Risk (transport 
risk) 
The expectation of fatalities that results from the transport of a 
certain volume of different types of HazMat on different links 
of the road network. This risk consists of two fundamental 
components: the frequency of HazMat accident induced 
releases and their consequent damages during transport 
 
• Risk Assessment An assessment of the likelihood, vulnerability, and magnitude 
of incidents that could result from exposure to hazards. 
 
• Societal risk the relation between frequency and the number of people 
affected by a specified level of harm in a given population 
from the realization of specified hazards 
 
• Spill A spill is defined as an immediate or continuous discharge, 
emission or escape of product from means of containment.  
Typically the release of product is of a short duration.   
 
• Upper Flammable 
Limit (UFL) 
The highest concentration of a vapor or gas that will produce 
a flash of fire when an ignition source (heat or flame) is 
present. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  
In recent years, the industrial part of our society has experienced rapid growth. 
However, while industries such as chemical, nuclear, electrical and petroleum, benefit the 
world, they also come with complications. Industries consume hazardous materials in 
their production and generate hazardous substances as byproducts or waste.  As a result, 
great amounts of hazardous materials are transported over highways and mass-transit 
networks in order to be disposed of in proper facilities.  
 
Office of the Fire Marshal (2003) defines Hazardous Material as “a substance that 
poses a risk to life, the environment, or property, when released from its container.” The 
terms “Dangerous Goods,” “Hazardous Materials” and “HazMat,” essentially, refer to 
this same category of substances. In Canada and Europe, the term “Dangerous Goods” is 
used in transport-related situations, while the words “Hazardous Material” or “HazMat” 
are used in activities related to emergency response.  In the USA, the term “Hazardous 
Materials” or “HazMat” is widely used for both transport and emergency response 
activities. Accordingly, this thesis will henceforth use the terms “HazMat” to refer to 
“Dangerous Goods” and “Hazardous Materials” (see Glossary for additional definitions 
of these terms). 
 
1.1 Background 
There are approximately 500,000 hazardous commercial products transported in 
Canada (U.S. Department of Transportation et al. 2000), about 3,000 of which are 
Chapter 1  
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regulated under the Transportation of Dangerous Goods Regulations (TDGR), including 
flammable, corrosive, radioactive, toxic and poisonous substances (Transport Canada 
1992). 
 
HazMat are transported throughout Canada in a large number of road shipments 
and amount of tonnage. According to Transport Canada (2003), there are approximately 
30 million shipments of HazMat every year that are subject to the TDGR.  Moreover, 
about 93% (25 million) of all HazMat shipments are made by road—a tonnage totaling 
over 128 million—with the province of Ontario coming second only after Alberta in 
HazMat road tonnage transported. Among the four modes of transport (road, rail, marine, 
and air), 90% of reportable accidents occur on road, an average of 156 HazMat road 
accidents per year while in transit. Appendix A gives an overview of HazMat movements 
and accidents in Canada.  
 
1.1.1 HazMat Transportation Risk 
Transportation of HazMat poses special risks for the neighboring population and 
environment. While HazMat accidents are rare events, they can lead to catastrophic 
consequences.  For instance, on July 11, 1978, a Propane cargo tank passing near a 
campground in Spain exploded killing an estimated 200 people and badly burning 
another 120 (US Department of Transportation, Research and Special Programs 
Administration 1997). The following are two examples of HazMat road accidents: 
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• US Department of Transportation, Research and Special Programs Administration 
(1997): On July 27, 1994, in White Plains, New York, tractor cargo-tank 
semitrailer struck a column of an overpass and ruptured, releasing 9,200 gallons 
of Propane (a liquefied petroleum gas) which was later ignited. The driver was 
killed, 23 persons were injured and an area within a radius of 400 feet was 
engulfed in fire.  
• National Transportation Safety Board, US (1991): In 1991, a tractor-semitrailer 
carrying 8,800 gallons of Gasoline overturned on a main urban roadway in 
Carmichael, California. Gasoline from the cargo tank spilled into the drainage 
ditch which extended under the roadway and behind private residences nearby. 
About 15 minutes after the overturn, the Gasoline ignited and the subsequent fire 
engulfed the overturned cargo tank. Four homes were heavily damaged by the 
fire, and the residents from a 2-mile-square area were evacuated. The total 
property damage and cleanup costs were estimated at nearly $1 million and three 
minor injuries were reported. 
 
Ironically, certain HazMat are transported on the road network in quantities that 
would exceed the threshold for safety if stored in a fixed facility. Moreover, recent 
analyses as well as historical events have shown that risks arising from the transportation 
of HazMat are often of the same magnitude as those resulting from fixed facilities 
(Fabiano et al. 2002). A search of the literature covering the time span 1926 through 1997 
revealed reports of 3,222 accidents related to the handling, transportation, processing, 
storage of chemicals involving different types of HazMat, of which 54% were related to 
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fixed facilities, 41% were transportation accidents and 5% miscellaneous accidents (Khan 
& Abbasi 1999). In a study based on the 1983 Commercial Vehicle Survey, Gorys (1987) 
found that about one third of all HazMat releases in Ontario resulted from transportation-
related incidents. As a result, given that transportation activities take place beyond the 
control of fixed facilities, there is a justifiable concern that HazMat be transported in the 
safest possible manner.  
 
1.1.2 Definition of HazMat Risk 
The National Fire Protection Agency (2004) defines “risk” as the measure of 
probability and severity of adverse effects that result from exposure to a hazard. As a 
result, HazMat risk is commonly defined as a function of HazMat release frequencies and 
the subsequent damages resulting from such releases (Rhyne 1994, Center for Chemical 
Process Safety 1995). Frequencies of HazMat releases depend on many factors including 
the probability of an accident, the conditional probability of release given an accident, the 
probability of a certain release size taking place, and the volume of HazMat movements 
(Rhyne 1994).  
 
Consequences of a HazMat release depend on the type of transported HazMat, the 
amount released, meteorological conditions, ignition probabilities, potentially exposed 
population, and the time interval between the initial release and the initiation of 
mitigation procedures. At the road network level, HazMat transport risk is commonly 
expressed as the summation of risk over all likely accidents and possible damages for 
different HazMat types, transportation/accident scenarios, and release locations.  
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HazMat accidents near highly populated areas pose the largest risks due to the 
considerable number of potentially affected people. Also, areas prone to high frequencies 
of HazMat releases have greater risk levels. Delays in response to HazMat incidents can 
result in appreciable consequent damages to people and property. For example, the 
release of toxic chlorine from a bulk tanker can continue for up to 24 hours and may 
result in a higher threat if left unattended. The response time factor is especially 
significant for the transport of HazMat, which includes a strong possibility that releases 
may occur at considerable distances from the nearest emergency response unit. Releases 
that take place in remote areas can cause higher damages, since emergency response to 
such areas depends on facilities located at some distance in larger municipalities. 
 
1.1.3 HazMat Emergency Response 
The transportation of HazMat involves many different parties, including the 
shippers, the regulators, and the communities the materials must pass through. While the 
shipping party is responsible for the safe delivery of HazMat shipments, HazMat accident 
response emergency response is the responsibility of local emergency services based on 
their respective jurisdictions. In this research, the response to accidents involving HazMat 
is assumed to be delegated exclusively to specially trained and equipped HazMat teams 
performing the needed duties. The National Fire Protection Agency (2004) defines the 
HazMat team as an organized group of trained response personnel, operating under an 
emergency response plan and appropriate standard operating procedures, who handle and 
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control actual or potential leaks or spills of hazardous materials requiring possible 
approach to the material.  
 
Providing efficient emergency response measures throughout the road network 
can substantially reduce HazMat transport risks. As recommended by the US Federal 
Emergency Management Administration, US et al. (1989), emergency response to 
minimize the consequence of HazMat releases generally involves the following 
procedures1:  
 
1) Plugging/stopping of leaks 
Completely or partially plugging a leak source is often the first step to effective 
control of HazMat release. The most widely available means of plugging holes or leaks 
involves the use of conical, cylindrical, square or wedge shaped pieces of wood rubber or 
metal sheets, and clamps of various types. Many incidents are brought to a rapid end 
simply by having the proper tools to close a valve or tighten some bolts. However, in the 
absence of these tools, other means of reducing the spillage of HazMat can sometimes be 
employed.  For example, if feasible, the outflow of HazMat may also be reduced by 





                                                 
1 See also United States Fire Administration Hazardous Materials Response Technology Assessment, 
undated manual. 
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2) Containment of spilled liquids or solids on land 
Specialized equipment has been developed to construct dikes of foamed concrete 
or plastic materials in the event of a land spill. However, earth, sand, clay and plastic or 
rubber sheeting are widely available and generally adequate to use.  
 
3) Removal of spilled liquids or solids on land 
Once the spilled substance has been contained, removing it from the environment 
is the next task. Pumps, hoses, and tanks, drums, or vacuum trucks might be used to 
collect pools of accumulated liquids, while shovels, loaders and other earth moving 
equipments may be used to remove contaminated soil. 
 
4) Suppression of hazardous gas or vapor releases 
The following list represents several response measures that may be used to 
reduce the rate or mount of airborne contamination, either direct or via evaporation from 
pool: 
• Physical restriction of liquid pool surface areas: Evaporation rate from pool is 
directly related to pool surface area. Thus, reducing pool surface area by means of 
building dikes or digging trenches reduces the evaporation rate. 
• Use of specialized foams on liquid pools: Once the pool area has been confined, 
a thick foam blanket may further reduce evaporation even from pools of liquefied 
gases.  
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• Dilution or coverage of liquid pools with water or other compatible and safe 
liquids: If feasible, diluting liquid pools with water or other safe liquids helps 
reduce evaporation.  
• Use of water sprays or fogs: Water sprays or fogs from fire hoses and nozzles 
could be used to knockdown, absorb, or disperse hazardous vapors in the air. 
• Neutralization of spilled liquids: Several HazMat can be neutralized via a 
chemical reaction to other substances that pose lesser threats to public health or 
the environment.  
• Cooling of spilled liquids or leaking containers: Using ice, dry ice, or, if 
possible, liquid nitrogen to cool down spilled liquids or leaking containers could 
reduce the evaporation rate.  
 
Responding to accidents involving HazMat requires a high level of training and 
special equipment. The National Fire Protection Agency (NFPA) 472 Standard (1997) 
defines different levels of training and competencies for the HazMat team’s personnel. A 
HazMat team typically consists of many specially trained firefighters equipped with body 
protection suits, containment, decontamination equipment, and expertly trained in the 
following duties:  1) analyzing a hazardous materials incident and collecting hazard and 
response information; 2) identifying the potential action options (defensive or offensive); 
planning and implementing response operations; and 3) evaluating the progress of the 
planned response.  
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Emergency response systems tend to be multi-purpose in nature. Thus, responding 
to HazMat releases represents only one of the many tasks involved in emergency 
response. The location of HazMat teams based solely on proximity to potential release 
sites is impractical since this distribution could result in high service and infrastructure 
costs. As a result, hosting HazMat teams within existing fire stations is a more common 
and cost effective practice. Such multitask teams can respond to HazMat accidents when 
needed, or otherwise carry out ordinary fire fighting responsibilities, keeping initial costs 
to practical limits. A description of typical HazMat team may be found in Appendix B. 
 
HazMat emergency response planning has traditionally been the responsibility of 
local authorities.   In Canada, it is the municipalities’ responsibility to assess the need for, 
as well as provide, different levels of HazMat emergency response capabilities (Office of 
the Fire Marshal 1998).  In its 1998 Public Safety Guidelines, Office of the Fire Marshal 
provides the following guidelines for HazMat emergency response planning: 
1. Identify the nature and extent of HazMat risks.  
2. Establish service levels needed.  
3. Provide resources and identify the most effective use of them to obtain the desired 
service level.  
4. Project HazMat locations and re-locations. 
5. Determine staffing levels and assignments. 
6. Implement a management evaluation system to review the effectiveness of the 
implemented plan. 
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The US Federal Emergency Management Agency (1998) and the US 
Environmental Protection Agency (1990) provide similar guidelines in the Unites States. 
Among the activities eligible for funding from the U.S. Department of Transportation, the 
USA Code of Federal Regulations 49 CFR part 110.40 includes, “the assessment of the 
need for regional hazardous materials emergency response teams” and “the assessment of 
local response capabilities” (US Code of Federal Regulations 2003).  Establishing the 
number and location of HazMat teams is among one of the most important aspects of 
HazMat emergency response planning. Hence, effectively locating HazMat teams on the 
transportation network can reduce consequent damages from HazMat releases by 
reducing the time of damage propagation.   
 
1.2 The Problem  
HazMat accidents can result in substantial damage to nearby communities if they 
occur in areas lacking emergency response capabilities (Rowe 1983). Thus, effective 
emergency response plays an important role in the safe transportation of HazMat. 
Facilities that produce and use HazMat are often well equipped with appropriate 
emergency response capabilities. However, communities might have large amounts of 
HazMat transported over their road networks, despite their lack of industries that use or 
produce HazMat. Accordingly, HazMat transport-related accidents can occur away from 
established facilities and, as a result of their remoteness, insufficient response time to 
such incidents is usually the outcome.   
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Currently, planning HazMat emergency response is carried out at the local level 
with no standardized systematic method for the planning process. Moreover, many 
smaller municipalities find establishing their own comprehensive HazMat teams to be 
financially challenging. The high cost of establishing a well-equipped and trained 
HazMat team necessitates careful planning; however, little coordination among different 
municipalities exists when planning HazMat emergency response.  The following points 
elaborate on different aspects of this problem: 
 
 
1. There is a lack of systematic integrated method for locating HazMat teams on a 
regional bases. Existing guidelines for HazMat emergency response planning have 
recognized the importance of effective HazMat team locations. However, no specific 
regulations or recommendations that govern the location of HazMat teams are 
present, nor is there a systematic procedure for locating them. Moreover, a maximum 
acceptable response time role for responding to HazMat accidents has never been 
decided upon. Thus, as Champlain (1999) affirms in his research, technical advisors 
and industry response teams have been given no standards, regulations, or guidelines 
in relation to the minimum acceptable response time in case of HazMat emergencies.  
Currently, HazMat team location decisions are carried out through intuition and 
educated guesses that depend mainly on the availability of funds, the potential 
population exposure, and the history of HazMat accidents in the area—a practice that 
usually favors highly populated areas. However, while many communities have 
neither the population nor industrial activities needed to justify the placement of 
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HazMat teams, they might be situated in proximity to routes where large amounts of 
HazMat are transported.  
 
2. There is a lack of coordination among different municipalities in planning HazMat 
emergency response services. In many jurisdictions, decisions concerning the 
establishment and management of HazMat teams are undertaken at the local level 
(Office of the Fire Marshal 1998). However, local authorities usually work separately 
from each other with no or minimal co-operation on team location decisions.  
From large urban communities to rural townships, local municipalities may vary 
considerably.  While large municipalities, with high population concentrations and 
well-established industrial facilities, can foresee and meet their HazMat emergency 
response needs, many smaller municipalities may not have such resources. Moreover, 
when one considers that HazMat teams are usually located at existing fire stations—a 
feature of large municipalities—the idea that smaller municipalities have insufficient 
coverage becomes even more apparent. More importantly, no guarantee exists that 
this approach will lead to an efficient allocation of resources in regards to minimizing 
the risks from HazMat transport or ensuring that all communities in the region are 
served to some minimum acceptable standard.  
 
3. Lack of coordination in locating HazMat teams results in a miss-allocation of 
valuable resources and may lead to insufficient coverage and unacceptably long 
response times for the majority small municipalities (low populated, remote areas). 
Moreover, since much of the road network lies within these rural areas, the result is 
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poor service for much of the HazMat travel distance. Conversely, larger 
municipalities have the potential to over-compensate by stationing too many HazMat 
teams in close proximity.  Smeby (1997) indicated that during since the 1980’s there 
has been an explosion in the number of HazMat in some parts of the United States. 
Furthermore, since the formation of these teams, many have rarely been called to 
duty, with the average dispatch number being “once every year.” Given this statistic, 
and also due to limited resources, many jurisdictions have begun to question the need 
for separate HazMat teams at specific locations and instead suggest a consolidation of 
teams in larger communities.  
 
4. Given the high level of training and the special equipment needed for HazMat 
emergency response, the cost of providing HazMat teams is relatively high. 
According to the San Bernardino County Fire Department (2004), initial training for 
emergency responders can exceed 200 hours of instruction, with specially outfitted 
vehicles ranging in cost from $50,000 to $250,000 or more. The Vancouver fire 
department estimated that $326,400 worth of new specialized equipment is needed to 
improve its existing two HazMat teams (Howell 2004).  
Furthermore, resources to provide the HazMat emergency services are often limited. 
According to the Office of the Fire Marshal (1998), most fire protection agencies are 
currently experiencing escalating demands for emergency response, including 
HazMat accidents. Many departments are scrambling to meet increased training needs 
and to purchase equipment and supplies necessary for the safe handling of HazMat 
accidents.  
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Such high costs and limited resources necessitate careful planning when deciding 
how many HazMat teams should be provided, and where they should be stationed. A 
better utilization of available resources is needed so that regional bases can be assured 
efficient coverage; yet, this coverage is even more significant for the road network.  
Facilities that produce and/or use HazMat within communities are usually well 
equipped and ready to deal with events in case of an emergency. On the highways, 
however, response time to an incident may not be prompt enough or sufficient.  
 
5. Enhanced HazMat team locations are of crucial importance for effective response to 
HazMat transport-related accidents. HazMat accidents while in transport may occur at 
considerable distances from the nearest emergency response unit. Thus, locating 
HazMat teams near major population concentrations, or locating teams close to sites 
with high potentials for transport-related HazMat accidents, is a dilemma that must be 
considered.  Unfortunately, these objectives run counter-productive to each other in 
many cases. In Ontario, for example, much of the population is located in the 
southern part of the province near Toronto, whereas the bulk of the regional highway 
mileage is located in sparsely populated and remote northern areas. 
There are many important factors that should be considered when planning HazMat 
emergency response, including population at risk, accident and release frequencies, 
the type of HazMat, level of hazard associated with it, as well as the time needed for 
response. These factors are all associated with HazMat risk.  However, while the US 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (1989) acknowledges the need for a 
comprehensive HazMat response plan to ensure that risk to the entire region (all 
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communities) is taken into account in locating of HazMat teams, current practice in 
stationing HazMat teams considers only some of these factors. Thus, the need to 
utilize risk minimization on regional bases as a criterion for locating HazMat teams is 
necessary to provide a platform that accounts for all risk factors. HazMat emergency 
response coverage should also include a maximum acceptable response time and 
maximum acceptable level of risk on the entire network.  
 
1.3 Research Objectives 
HazMat emergency response planning is a multi-criteria decision making 
(MCDM) process. The decision of where to locate a HazMat team depends on the need 
for HazMat emergency response services as well as many other criteria including 
physical, legal, financial, managerial, and political considerations. In multi-criteria 
decision making processes, given a set of alternatives and a set of decision criteria, 
different alternatives are to be evaluated according to the different evaluation criteria 
(Triantaphyllou 2000).  Each alternative has its own strengths and weaknesses and 
usually no one alternative outperforms the others in all areas. The proposed model will 
help to provide a more objective set of input alternatives into the multi-criteria decision 
making process of regionally locating HazMat teams. 
 
This research aims to achieve the following objectives: 
1. To develop a risk-based optimization location model that can be used as an effective 
procedure to determine the optimum number and location of HazMat teams on a 
regional road network. The proposed model adopts a risk-based optimization 
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technique with the objective of efficiently locating/relocating HazMat teams on a 
regional road network using HazMat risks as a location criterion.  
The proposed model consists mainly of two components: a) a Time-Dependant 
Quantitative Risk Assessment (TDQRA) module that considers the temporal behavior 
of HazMat releases and accordingly estimates the risk for the entire road network and 
at its specific nodes; and b) a location optimization module for locating HazMat 
teams on the network based on the risk involved. The Time-Dependant Quantitative 
Risk Assessment (TDQRA) module can be used to assess HazMat transportation 
risks, to identify parameters that influence the level of risk, to develop new 
emergency response risk reduction strategies, and to evaluate new HazMat 
transportation policies.  The location module would seek the most efficient locations 
of HazMat teams on the network such that network risk is minimized region wide, 
while ensuring that the response time at more remote locations does not exceed some 
preset thresholds.  
The proposed model can be used to assess the risk implications of the current location 
of HazMat teams in a region, assess the sufficiency of the current teams, and identify 
areas lacking coverage on a regional basis. The model can be used to develop cost 
effective strategies for locating HazMat teams, including closure or relocating of 
some teams in the region. The model would help investigate how HazMat team 
locations can be tailored to recognize the risk of transporting HazMat and would help 
provide a more objective set of input alternatives into the multi-criteria decision 
making process of regionally locating HazMat teams. 
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2. To apply the proposed risk-based location optimization model to a case study (i.e. 
southwestern Ontario region) to illustrate its features and capabilities in the HazMat 
emergency response planning and the HazMat team location decision-making 
process. The HazMat team locations model would be used to review several HazMat 
team locations strategies and investigate tradeoff among different factors. The model 
would be applied to the investigation of the following issues: 1) The risk implications 
of the existing and the optimal location of the HazMat teams in the region, 2) The 
effectiveness of this system as compared to a system comprising of fewer HazMat 
teams, 3) The impact of the number of HazMat teams on the network-wide risk, 4) 
The difference in emergency response needs for different types of HazMat, 5) The 
effect of different HazMat routing strategies on planning HazMat emergency 
response, and 6) The environmental impact of HazMat releases and how different 
emergency response strategies affect the severity of such impacts.  
 
3. To perform sensitivity analysis to test the robustness of the model to uncertainty and 
errors in input data and model parameters, such as HazMat traffic volumes, HazMat 
accident data, and travel time. 
 
4. To implement the above model as user-friendly software tool that can be used by 
planners to meet their HazMat planning needs.  
 
The system will help provide a set of best feasible HazMat team location solutions 
as a support in the multi-criteria decision making process of choosing HazMat team 
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locations. The system will help answer such questions as: Are current HazMat teams 
sufficient to provide emergency response coverage?  Will implementing certain 
recommendations, such as increasing or relocating certain teams, significantly reduce 
risks? Which design alternatives will minimize risks at acceptable costs? Moreover, the 
system will allow local and regional authorities to allocate resources in an effective way 
toward areas that pose the most significant risks as well as provide a better means to plan 
emergency response efforts.  
 
1.4 Research Scope  
The scope of this research is limited to the following five aspects: 
 
1. Road transportation: This research is limited to road transportation of HazMat. 
Rail, marine, and air transportation of HazMat are not considered. The analysis 
focuses on HazMat accidents while in transport, excluding incidents while 
loading/unloading, at stop or in storage.  
 
2. Regional network: Given the increasing need for HazMat emergency response 
services and the limited availability of resources, regionally optimized location of 
HazMat teams will ensure the efficient coverage of the whole region, and at the 
same time accounts for the economics of providing these services. Hence, this 
research focuses on the regional aspect of emergency response to HazMat 
accidents while in transit.  
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3. Locating HazMat to basic units (existing fire stations): HazMat teams are 
usually hosted within existing fire stations to keep initial and operational costs 
within practical limits. Establishing fire stations solely on the basis of response to 
HazMat accidents is impractical and costly since responding to HazMat incidents 
accounts for only a small part of the total emergency response service. The 
candidate locations for HazMat teams are therefore restricted to current fire 
stations. It should be noted that such restriction might result in insufficient 
coverage, especially for remote areas. Thus, additional analysis will be performed 
to examine this potential problem and how the relaxation of this location 
restriction might affect HazMat risks in the region. 
 
4. Limited HazMat types and release events: The model to be developed aims at 
providing a means to study those risks associated with the road transportation of 
HazMat that have the potential to present major hazard accidents, such as fire and 
toxic releases within a certain region.  
There are more than 3000 regulated HazMat substances in Canada, most of them 
either toxic or flammable. Button (1999) stated that 65% of road kilometers by 
trucks carrying HazMat loads are flammable liquids, and 24% are toxic liquids 
while the remaining 11% accounts for all other types of HazMat. Although 
different types of HazMat have different risk attributes in terms of the danger 
level and propagation speed after release, a full consideration of all HazMat types 
is time consuming and impractical since each HazMat type requires a 
corresponding different risk model. As a result, this research will be limited to 
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those HazMat types judged to result in significant hazard. The four selected 
HazMat classes are, toxic liquefied gas (represented by Ammonia), flammable 
liquefied gas (represented by Propane), flammable liquids (represented by 
Gasoline), and toxic liquids.  
Ammonia and Propane are selected because they are considered to be potentially 
the most hazardous, as confirmed by historical analysis (Fewtrell, and Siddique 
1998). Gasoline is selected on the basis that it is transported in significantly large 
quantities over the road network, and toxic liquids are considered for their 
potential high environmental hazard. These selected types of HazMat are intended 
to be representative of other similar hazardous materials.  
 
5. Discrete location problem: The HazMat transport accidents and the demand for 
HazMat emergency response services can occur at any point on the road network. 
However, considering all possible accident locations is both time and resource 
consuming as well as practically unachievable. To simplify the formulation of the 
problem, the continuous demand on road segments is substituted with a discrete 
set of demand nodes. Accidents occurring on links are aggregated to the nearest 
nodes, and HazMat team locations are restricted to a pre-defined set of candidate 
nodes (existing fire stations).  
 
6. Deterministic modeling: In developing the model, a large number of input 
parameters will be used. Many input parameters are stochastic in nature, assuming 
a range of values with some probability distribution. This stochastic nature of the 
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problem will not be addressed in this model and only point estimates will be used 
for different input parameters.  
 
1.5 Thesis Organization 
This thesis is organized into the following chapters. Background and related literature 
is discussed in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 introduces the proposed risk-based HazMat team 
location optimization model with its components, the TDQRA module and the location 
optimization module. The frequency and consequence analysis calculations are discussed 
in Chapters 4 and 5, respectively. A description of the southwestern Ontario case study is 
covered in Chapter 6 with a sensitivity analysis to determine its robustness to uncertainty 
in input parameters. Chapter 7 illustrates the model features and potential application 
through the investigation of several HazMat team location policies. Finally, conclusions, 
recommendations and future work are stated in Chapter 8. 
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CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE 
REVIEW 
The problem of locating HazMat teams in a region involves many study areas 
including transportation of HazMat, quantitative risk assessment and location 
optimization techniques. This Chapter provides an overview of these related topics, with 
more detailed background provided in subsequent chapters.   
 
2.1 Research Topics in HazMat Transport 
Much of the academic research in the area of transportation of HazMat has focused 
on the problem of HazMat logistics and facility site location. Research topics in HazMat 
logistics include routing and scheduling of HazMat movements such that risk, exposed 
population, travel time, or accident frequency is minimized. In the facility siting problem, 
the best location for a new facility that produces, uses or stores HazMat is addressed. A 
review of various research topics associated with the transportation logistics of HazMat 
can be found in Erkut and Verter (1995) and List et al. (1991). Kara and Verter (2004), 
Zografos and Androutsopoulos (2004), Leonelli et al. (2000), Frank et al. (2000), 
Marianov and ReVelle (1998), and Sivakumar et al. (1995) illustrate some of the recent 
research carried out in these areas. Although much research has been devoted to 
transportation of HazMat, little has been done to incorporate emergency response into the 




2.2 Current Practice in Locating HazMat Teams  
HazMat emergency response planning has traditionally been the responsibility of 
local authorities. According to the Office of the Fire Marshal (1998), the responsibility to 
assess the need for HazMat emergency response services and accordingly provide 
different levels of response capabilities lies with respective municipalities. In 1998, the 
Office of the Fire Marshal published “Public Fire Safety Guidelines” to provide 
municipalities with guided options and assistance when determining the level of 
hazardous materials response capability provided to the public. The US Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (1998) and the US Environmental Protection Agency 
(1990) provide similar guidelines for HazMat emergency services in the United States. 
 
Currently, the practice of locating HazMat teams is carried out through guidelines, 
intuition and educated guesses, and depends mainly on the availability of funds, potential 
population exposure, and the history of HazMat accidents in the area. There are no 
known Federal or Provincial regulations governing the number and/or location of 
HazMat emergency response teams. Moreover, there are no standards for the minimum 
acceptable response time that HazMat teams should follow. Champlain (1999) found that 
there were no standards, regulations, or guidelines dealing with the minimum response 
time acceptable in case of HazMat emergencies which technical advisors and industry 
response teams should abide by. However, he noted that “some” police departments, fire 
stations and ambulance services set their own standards separately. Frequently HazMat 
teams are located in areas of high population concentration (larger communities in the 
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region), at the expense of under-serviced marginal locations that are also exposed to 
HazMat risks. 
 
Both fire stations and HazMat teams are usually located through subjective studies 
with minimal or no co-operation among different communities. Given the subjective 
nature of the current practice in HazMat teams planning, the location in a given region 
can lead to a miss-allocation of resources and higher risks.  An example of one such 
subjective study is the 2001 report conducted by TriData Corporation of Arlington, 
Virginia, US (2001). TriData performed an analysis of the consolidation options for the 
HazMat teams in the two cities of South Milwaukee and Cudahy, Wisconsin. The study 
was based on interviews, observations, and comparisons with other communities, and 
recommended full consolidation of the two fire departments, specifically identifying 
“Hazardous materials response” as one of the components recommended in the case of a 
partial consolidation.  
 
Some attempts have been done to regionally assess HazMat emergency response 
teams. For example, the State of Wisconsin, Legislative Audit Bureau (2002) conducted a 
comprehensive state-wide study to evaluate the activities and expenditures of 
Wisconsin’s regional hazardous materials response teams. Most Wisconsin communities 
are served by volunteer or part-time fire departments that cannot afford to maintain 
specialized teams. Therefore, the Division of Emergency Management at the Department 
of Military Affairs contracted with ten municipal fire departments to provide regional 
coverage for incidents requiring the highest level of response. The study was subjective 
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in nature, applying a survey methodology to assess the currently available HazMat 
emergency services. 
 
2.3 Planning of HazMat Teams and Emergency Response  
HazMat emergency planning is mainly carried out for post-accident management. 
In North America, governmental agencies provide handbooks, manuals, and telephone 
hotlines to help emergency response in post accident emergency response. Examples 
include the North America Emergency Response Guide Book (Transport Canada et al. 
2000), the Canadian Transport Emergency Centre of the Department of Transport 
(CANUTEC) which provides emergency response information and assistance on a 24-
hour basis for the responders to hazardous materials incidents, and the equivalent US 
Chemical Transportation Emergency Center (CHEMTREC). 
 
Past research on HazMat team planning has mainly focused on several areas, 
including the development of decision support systems for hazardous materials 
emergency response operations (Zografos et al. 2000), the assessment of HazMat 
response preparedness (Aini  et al 2001, Cannon et al. 1998, and Hancock et al. 1993),  
the evaluation of the efficiency of HazMat programs (US Department of Transportation 
2000),  HazMat emergency response training (Zeimet & Ballard 2000), as well as the  





However, the enhancement of HazMat emergency response capabilities has gained 
little attention when compared to other HazMat transport research issues in general, with 
the HazMat team locations problem in particular addressed very rarely.  List and 
Turnquist (1998) stated that siting models in the hazardous materials area have mostly 
been applied to the problem of locating treatment or disposal facilities, the “obnoxious 
facility” problem. Conversely, the emergency response siting problem is relatively 
different and is more related to siting fire stations or emergency medical facilities. 
 
To address the problem of insufficient emergency response coverage for rural 
remote areas, Saccomanno and Allen (1988) proposed a model for locating emergency 
response capability on a road network.  The process is treated as a minimum set covering 
problem, in which a minimum acceptable level of response (maximum allowable 
response time) is assigned to all nodes on the network.  Accordingly, their model was 
applied to the southwestern Ontario region.  
 
Parentela and Sathisan (1998) presented a methodology for evaluating emergency 
preparedness for hazardous materials transportation. Emergency preparedness is 
measured in terms of response times, number of response units, and capabilities of initial 
responders. The analysis involves identification of emergency response units, their 
locations, determination of service zones, and evaluation of response capability. Results 
of the analysis permit development of strategies for allocation of resources, such as 
establishing locations for new response units, improving the capabilities of existing ones, 




In some cases, research in the area of HazMat teams location is dedicated to the types 
of HazMat with unique characteristics. For example, research by List and Turnquist 
(1998) addressed the combined problem of routing and siting emergency response teams 
for high-level radioactive waste shipments and have formulated the combined routing-
siting model as a multiobjective problem with three major elements: 1) identification of 
the nondominated routes for each origin-destination pair, 2) assignment of the flows to 
those routes to calculate link volumes; and 3) selection of emergency-response-team sites 
based on the assigned flows and other link characteristics. List and Turnquist constructed 
these models with the following objectives: 1) minimizing total shipment distance (truck 
miles), 2) minimizing total accident probability, 3) minimizing total population exposure, 
4) minimizing the risk-and-volume weighted average response distance, and 5) 
minimizing the maximum response distance among all links.  
 
Despite List (1993) acknowledgment of risk as a potential criterion for locating 
HazMat teams, the objective of his model was to minimize a generalized cost function, 
which is defined as the sum of weighted values of total response time, maximum 
response time, total risk, and maximum risk. The risk measure in that model was defined 
as the average number of injuries (total number of injuries/total exposed population). As 
a result, the model and its physical interpretation were not clear. Furthermore, the risk 
model resulted in a linear relationship between risk and response time (but a non-linear 
relationship was anticipated by List). The model was applied to an urban area with the 
results the same for the objective of minimizing average response time and minimizing 
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average risk due to the risk model being linear in response time as well as the scaled risk 
measure. 
 
2.4 Fire Station Location Problem 
Although research on the HazMat team location is limited, research in locating 
emergency response units in general (fire station, ambulances, etc.) has gained greater 
attention. The fire station location problem has been extensively modeled as a Set 
Covering Location Problem (SCLP) with many variations. In the SCLP (Toregas et al. 
1971 as cited in Aytug and Saydam 2002), the objective is to minimize the number of 
facility stations required to cover demand points within a specified response time. In the 
maximal covering location problem, MCLP (Church and ReVelle 1974 as cited in Aytug 
and Saydam 2002) the coverage constraint is relaxed by allowing some demand points 
not to be covered. Researchers have used minimum distance (Chen and Ren 2003), 
minimum response time (Erkut et al 2001), or both (Badri et al. 1998) as location criteria. 
An extensive survey of location covering problems is given in Schilling et al. (1993). 
 
Most fire station location studies are primarily conducted for a certain urban area, 
such as the “Fire Station Location and Fire/Ambulance Study for City of Toronto’ 
(KPMG Canada 1999), the “City of Chattanooga Fire Department Management Study” 
(MTAS Consultants 1997), and the “Fire Station Location Study for the City of Melrose” 
(Firescope INC. 1996). However, these limitations are major concerns since these studies 
were restricted to a certain urban area and did not consider the regional aspect of 
emergency response coverage.  
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2.5 Location Models 
The problem of locating emergency response units in general is frequently solved 
using location models and optimization techniques. Optimization is used to find the 
location that will minimize (or maximize) one (or more) objective function(s) under a set 
of constraints. Usually the basic objective is to assign emergency response units in a 
region so as to either maximize the covered areas or minimize the cost, time, or distance.  
 
Location methods can be classified into location on a plane or location on a 
network. Also, location models could adopt a continuous (or spatial) approach, where all 
points on the plane or network are considered candidates for locations, or a discrete 
approach where only a set of points of the plane, or on links, are considered as location 
candidates.  
 
The plane-based models tend to be used for urban areas and require substantial 
information regarding types of calls for service, responses times, population, land uses, 
and other variables. Network-based location models, conversely, have addressed urban 
issues, but they are also suitable to larger rural areas and warrant consideration in this 
vein.  
 
Discrete Models are commonly used for locating emergency response facilities. 
The problem can be defined as follows: given a set of points j = 1,…., nd, representing the 
demand locations, and another set i = 1,…, nf, denoting the possible locations of facilities, 
Chapter 2 
 30 
determine the locations of np units among the candidate nf locations at which the 
objective function is minimized (or maximized). 
 
The choice of the objective function to optimize depends mainly on the definition 
of the facility location problem in concern. Objective functions for these type of problems 
may be represented by one of the following examples (Rushton 1979): 
 
1. Minimizing total cost (distance/travel time) for a known number of facilities. This 
objective function considers efficiency of the system but does not consider equity of 
coverage for different demand points. Such a problem is called the P-median 
problem. 
2. Minimizing maximum cost (distance/travel time) at nodes for a known number of 
facilities. In this case equity for different demand nodes is considered but not the 
efficiency of the system. This problem is known as the P-centre or MinMax problem.  
3. Minimizing total cost (distance/travel time) on the network subject to a maximum 
cost (distance/travel time) constraint at each node for a known number of facilities. In 
this case both efficiency and equity are considered to some level. Trade-off curves 
could be obtained by varying the maximum acceptable cost level (Hansen et al. 
1983). However, the solution might not be feasible under certain number of facilities-
maximum cost combination.  
4. Minimizing the number of facilities to be located so that each point on the network is 
within a critical cost (distance/travel time) value from the closest facility. In this case, 
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the number of facilities is seeked. This problem is known as a set-covering problem 
and considers equity among demand nodes. 
5. Maximizing the number of nodes within a certain acceptable cost level given a known 
number of facilities. Such a problem is called a Maximal covering problem. 
6. Multi-objective function where the different objective functions might be some 
combination of previously discussed objective functions, such as, minimizing total 
cost and minimizing maximum cost. 
 
Much research has been done to provide enhancements to the aforementioned 
problems, such as consideration of multiple response units coverage (Batta and Mannur 
1990), the stochastic nature of the problem (Berman et al. 1990) and the problem of 
server congestion (Desrochers, et al. 1996). However, researchers have mostly used 
minimum distance (Chen and Ren 2003), minimum response time (Erkut et al 2001), or 
both (Badri et al. 1998) as location optimization criteria. Conversely, providing services 
for areas with the largest populations is the main concern for planners. Thus, while 
“minimizing response time” and “maximizing population covered” are some of the 
criteria used to define the optimal solution, they do not consider all factors associated 
with the movement of HazMat.   
 
2.6 Quantitative Risk Assessment  
While planning HazMat emergency response, HazMat transport risks posed on 
nearby communities must be considered. Generally speaking, HazMat risk is a function 
of HazMat release frequencies and the consequent damages resulting from such releases. 
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The frequency of HazMat releases is a function of vehicular accident rates, breach of 
containment, release conditional probabilities, and traffic exposure in terms of HazMat 
traffic volumes. Consequent damage, on the other hand, is a function of the type of 
HazMat, amount and rate of released quantity, hazard area, exposure or response time, 
meteorological conditions, ignition probabilities, and exposed population (Center for 
Chemical Process Safety 1995). At the network level, HazMat risk is commonly 
expressed as the summation of risk over all likely accidents and possible damages for 
different HazMat types, transportation/accident scenarios and release locations.  
 
Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) methods are commonly used to assess 
HazMat risk during transportation. A QRA consists of identifying the accidental events 
and combining the expected frequencies and consequences to obtain a proper risk 
measure while taking into account both the likelihood and the magnitude of the hazard. 
Ang et al. (1989) suggested the following three-stage framework for risk analysis in 
transportation:  
1) Determine the probability of an undesirable event (an accident involving the 
release of a hazardous material). 
2) Estimate the level of potential exposure, given the nature of the event. 
3) Estimate the magnitude of consequences (fatalities, injuries and property damage) 
given the level of exposure. 
 
These three stages produce one or more probability distributions, with the last two 
producing conditional distributions. In practice, the process is seldom carried all the way 
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through (List et al. 1991). Frequently, the conditional probability distributions are ignored 
and the product of the probability of a release accident, and the extreme consequence of 
the accident, are used to estimate the risk. The extreme consequence is often represented 
by the potentially impacted population.  
 
2.6.1 Methodologies Used in HazMat Transport Risk Assessment 
Unlike fixed HazMat facilities in which HazMat types, sources, and accident location 
conditions are all known, HazMat transportation risk assessment is associated with a road 
network and contains an element of uncertainty in regards to the expected location and 
condition of the accident site. The common approach to transportation risk analysis is to 
divide the HazMat route into portions where different parameters can assume the same 
value. The average length of each route portion should be set according to the scope of 
the analysis and to the extent of accuracy and reliability of the available data. The smaller 
the portion, the greater the accuracy will be. However, this enhanced accuracy will lead 
to larger computational efforts.  
 
The rarity of HazMat accidents makes calculating HazMat accident probabilities for 
each link difficult. General truck accident rates are sometimes used to estimate such 
probabilities.  Furthermore, the characterization of the release scenarios with regard to 
escape rate and duration are usually based on scarce historical accident and release data, 
engineering judgment, and literature information, hence, different research uses different 
assumptions regarding the rate and amount of release (Spadoni, et al. 1995). Due to 
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limited data on historical accidents and releases, release amounts and rates are usually 
highly uncertain.  
 
For transportation QRA, the common practice is to draw a band of fixed width along 
each link and to use the number of people living within this band as the consequence 
measure (see ReVelle et al. 1991). This calculation assumes that all people within the 
band will be impacted equally and that no one outside of the band will be impacted at all. 
Yet, estimates made by drawing a band of fixed width along the road may be quite 
inaccurate because the probability of a consequence depends on the concentration of 
contaminant. 
 
Rhyne (1994) and the Center for Chemical Process Safety (1995) explain quantitative 
transport risk analysis and how it can be applied to the surface transportation of 
hazardous material. Nicolet-Monnier and Gheorghe (1996) highlighted the main 
procedures for assessing the regional risks resulting from HazMat storage, and 
transportation by means of different systems (i.e., road, rail, ship, and pipeline). 
 
An example of Transport QRA model development is the “Transport of Dangerous 
Goods through road tunnels Quantitative Risk Assessment Model” software package 
written by Institut National de l'Environnement et des Risques (France), WS Atkins 
(U.K), and The Institute of Risk Research, IRR, at the University of Waterloo (Ontario, 
Canada). It was first released in 1998 and the latest version with substantial 




Brown et al. (2001) detail a quantitative risk assessment process conducted for 
transportation of selected hazardous materials in the USA on a national basis. The final 
report entitled “A National Risk Assessment for Selected Hazardous Materials 
Transportation” is the result of a multi-year research effort sponsored by the US Office of 
Hazardous Materials Safety. The study objective was to provide an approximation of 
overall societal risk associated with the transportation of selected hazardous materials on 
national bases. The authors claim that their work is the first comprehensive application of 
these techniques in this arena for this purpose. However, in 1991 a similar study was 
conducted by the UK Health and Safety Executive (1991) to assess the national level of 
risk in the UK from different modes of HazMat transport.  
 
2.6.2 Uncertainty in Risk Estimates 
A major issue of concern in the process of HazMat quantitative risk assessment is the 
level of uncertainty associated with it.  Analysts use detailed and sophisticated models to 
describe HazMat accidents; however, identifying all of the factors that may contribute to 
an accident is impossible. In many cases certain input data is imprecise. Furthermore, 
consequence models are often a mathematical approximation to limited experimental data 
(Arendt et al. 1989). Accordingly, many factors contribute to the level of uncertainty in 
QRA, including ambiguity in HazMat routing and volumes data, the under-reporting of 
the HazMat accidents and releases, and uncertainties in regards to conditions at the time 




  Moreover, QRA models may give different results if different assumptions about 
release conditions and/or site conditions are used.  Also, poor appreciation of input 
factors such as accident rates, travel time, traffic volumes, as well as population 
characteristics, are likely to result in a risk assessment insensitive to such factors. The end 
result is the over or under-estimation of risk levels. 
 
Many analysts criticize the usage of absolute values of HazMat risk estimates in 
decision making processes. Rhyne (1994) argued that the accuracy of absolute risk results 
depends on whether all the significant risk contributors have been included, the realism of 
the models, and the uncertainty associated with the input data.  However, the limitations 
of HazMat QRA become less significant in cases of comparing risk estimates among 
different alternatives. The US Environmental Protection Agency (1999) suggested that 
even under such uncertainty, QRA could be used for comparison purposes. For example, 
local emergency planning committees can use relative differences in risk estimates to aid 
in establishing chemical accident prevention and preparedness priorities among facilities 
in a community. In our opinion, despite such limitations, it is safe to assume that QRA 
can provide a rational basis for making decisions regarding comparing different 




This chapter introduces a background and literature review on different issues related 
to HazMat transport and emergency response. The current practice as well as the 
academic research in locating HazMat teams was reviewed. The problem of locating fire 
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stations and location models in general was discussed. Finally, an introduction to 
quantitative risk assessment was provided. 
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CHAPTER 3: RISK-BASED HAZMAT TEAM LOCATION 
OPTIMIZATION MODEL 
This chapter presents a model for planning HazMat team locations specifically for 
handling HazMat transport accidents on a regional road network. Different from 
conventional methods, the proposed model adopts a risk-based optimization approach. 
Using risk as a location criterion accounts for not only population distribution, travel 
distance or response time, but also for many other risk-related factors including HazMat 
traffic volumes, HazMat routes, and release frequencies.  
 
This approach provides a practical platform for evaluating the trade-offs between 
system costs (in terms of the number of fatalities), total network risk and individual node 
risk, and response time.  The proposed model can be used to assess the current location of 
HazMat teams in a region and the risk implications associated with their placements. 
Furthermore, the model can help investigate how HazMat team locations can be tailored 
to recognize the risk of transporting HazMat and will provide a more objective set of 
input alternatives into the multi-criteria decision making process of regionally locating 
HazMat teams. 
 
3.1 Road Network Representation 
The HazMat transport-related accidents and the demand for HazMat emergency 
response services can occur at any point on the road network. However, considering all 
possible accident locations is both time and resource consuming, not to mention 
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practically unachievable. Thus, to simplify the formulation of the problem, the 
continuous demand for HazMat emergency response services on links is substituted with 
a discrete set of demand nodes (a network node that represents a small part of the 
network to which HazMat emergency service must be delivered). Without loss of 
generality, we assume that both populations and highway activities (accidents) can be 
aggregated to such individual nodes, with each node representing, as much as possible, a 
homogeneous zone around it. Also, the assumptions stands that HazMat teams would 
only be assigned to a pre-defined set of nodes, representing current locations of fire 
stations, with no locations permitted on links. Network links serve only as connections 
between nodes and have been assigned appropriate travel times.  
 
 
Figure 3-1: Schematic of highway network and HazMat team locations 
 
Consider a regional highway network as shown in Figure 3-1. The road network is 
represented as a directed graph with nodes and links, G (N, A), where N is a set of 
network nodes, { }dnjjN ,...,3,2,1, ==  and A is a set of network links, 
{ }mnllA ,...,3,2,1, == . The nodes represent population centers as well as highway 
Fire station (i) - 
potential site for 
HazMat team 
Network node (j) - 
potential demand 




intersections and intermediate points on long links. All network nodes, nd, are considered 
potential demand nodes that may experience a HazMat accident-induced release. The 
released material escapes to the surrounding environment forming a hazard area. Within 
the hazard area there are different levels of HazMat concentrations, starting with the 
highest concentration near the release node and decreasing outwards.  Populations within 
this hazard area will experience varying degrees of health impacts, ranging from 
negligible injury to death.  
 
Over the network, there exists a set of nf HazMat team candidate locations, denoted 
by F, where { }fniiF ,...,3,2,1, == .  The HazMat team candidate locations are assumed to 
exist only on a subset of network nodes (i.e., F ⊂ N), with these HazMat team candidate 
locations designated as the only sites that can host a HazMat team. From the nf candidate 
locations, only np HazMat teams are actually located on the network. The set of np 
HazMat teams is denoted by H, where { }pnkkH ,...,3,2,1, == . The relationship among 
different sets is as follows: H ⊂ F ⊂ N.  
 
3.2 The Model  
The HazMat team location model consists of two components: a Time-Dependant 
Quantitative Risk Assessment (TDQRA) module that estimates the risks for the network 
and at its specific nodes depending on response time to each node, and a location 
optimization module for locating HazMat teams on the network based on the risk 






Figure 3-2: Model framework for locating HazMat teams. 
 
The risk assessment module that forms the basis of the HazMat team location model 
is time-dependent. There is a specific response time, ijt , from each candidate HazMat 
team location node i to each demand node j. In case of a HazMat accident, response time 
ijt  affects the level of risk at the accident scene j. In general, the longer it takes for the 
HazMat team to reach an accident location, the more severe the consequences will be.  
 
The HazMat accident risk at node j associated with an emergency response from 
HazMat team at node i with response time ijt , is denoted by ijR . The risk set for all 
“demand node-candidate response location” combinations is defined as: 
{ }ndjnfiRR ij ,...,3,2,1;,...,3,2,1; ===   (3-1) 
Calculate response times from 
potential HazMat team locations 
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Estimate risk for each “potential 
team location-demand node” 
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total network risk is 
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Response to a demand node j will be from the nearest candidate node i that actually 
hosts a HazMat team, hence, risk at node j is defined as:  
( ),min ijij RR =  Hi ∈∀  (3-2) 
   
The TDQRA technique is proposed to estimate the risk set, R, and hence the total 
network risk associated with different HazMat team location strategies.  
 
The HazMat team location problem involves locating a given number of HazMat 
teams, np, at pre-defined nf candidate locations to meet the demand for emergency service 
resulting from HazMat accidents at different network nodes. There are C(np, nf) possible 
solutions, with each HazMat team to provide emergency response to a certain number of 
nearby nodes for each location solution. Different location solutions of np HazMat teams 
on the network result in different response times, hence, different risk levels for the 
network nodes. The location optimization module uses risk estimates , ijR , from the 
TDQRA module to find the best HazMat team location set, H, that would minimize total 
network risk while assuring response time at different nodes is within a minimum 
acceptable threshold. The problem is formulated as a multi-facility location problem on a 
network, with the module framework given in Figure 3-2. 
 
The proposed model recognizes the importance of minimizing the total risk on the 
network and at the same time the need to maintain a minimum acceptable level of service 
for all nodes to ensure a minimum level of equity among all communities. This balance is 
accomplished by establishing minimum acceptable level of service at remote locations 
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regardless of lower levels of population concentration.  If few people live at the marginal 
nodes, risk will be low and these nodes will likely not receive HazMat response service 
under the total risk minimization objective. However, the maximum response time 
threshold constraint overcomes this problem by considering response time, thus allowing 
marginal nodes to receive a minimum coverage despite lack of population.   
 
This approach has the advantage of finding the most efficient solution by minimizing 
the total risk on the network (maximum savings) while accounting for a maximum 
acceptable response time for all nodes. On the other hand, a clear definition of the 
maximum acceptable level of risk and response time at nodes is required—a figure which 
might not be easy to determine.  
 
The suitable number of HazMat teams to be located is yet unknown and needs to be 
determined iteratively. However, this problem may not be feasible under a certain 
number of HazMat teams and the maximum acceptable response time, Tmax. Basically, if 
too few HazMat teams exist, providing acceptable service to all marginal locations 
becomes difficult. The minimum number of HazMat teams required to maintain the 
minimum level of service can be obtained through the following iterative steps: 
1. Calculate the response time ijt , using the shortest response time from each 
candidate location node, i, to each demand network node, j.  
2. Calculate the risk, ijR , from each candidate location node, i, to each demand node, 
j, using previously calculated response times. 
3. Assume np HazMat teams. 
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4. Using ijR  locate np HazMat teams among HazMat teams candidate locations, nf, 
so as to minimize total network risk while assuring response time at different 
nodes is within a minimum acceptable threshold. 
5. If solution is feasible, stop, otherwise increase np and go to step 4. 
 
The model with its two modules is developed as a Windows-based user-friendly 
software that allows HazMat emergency response planners to investigate different 
emergency response policies. A user manual for the software is given in Appendix D. 
 
3.3 The Time-Dependant Quantitative Risk Assessment (TDQRA) 
Module 
This section introduces the Time-Dependant Quantitative Risk Assessment (TDQRA) 
module that quantitatively assesses the risks of HazMat road transport with the 
consideration of emergency response to HazMat accidents. Although the bases of risk 
assessment analysis allows for the time element to be considered, it is a common practice 
in traditional QRA techniques to assume the worst case scenario (or other alternative 
scenario) in order to keep analysis in a practical range (US Environmental Protection 
Agency 1999). In the proposed TDQRA, a more realistic approach is used where risk 
estimates will vary for different locations of HazMat teams depending on associated 
response time. HazMat release is assumed to continue until a response occurs from the 




HazMat team response time is a function of various factors including, but not limited 
to, the distance between the team locations and accident sites, the layout of the region, 
weather conditions, road and traffic conditions, notification and dispatch time. Fire 
departments have used two different methods to calculate response time, with many 
departments adopting the Office of the Fire Marshal method.  This procedure is defined 
as "the elapsed time between receipt of the call by the department and the arrival of the 
first unit at the occurrence location." Other parties, such as NFPA, have adopted 
"response travel time" which is considered to be the time that begins when units are en 
route to the emergency incident and ends when units arrive at the scene. 
 
This research adopts a response time definition that differs from the previous two. 
We defined response time as the time elapsing from the release occurrence until 
mitigation measures are applied at the release scene.  Following this definition, response 
time has three components: dispatch time at the station, travel time from the station to the 
site, and mitigation time (time to apply mitigation measures at the site, mainly 
containment and evacuation). Response time from the nearest HazMat team to the release 
location  is calculated using a “fastest route” algorithm, based on the label-correcting 
shortest path algorithm (Abuja et al. 1993).  
 
 
The risk estimates for HazMat releases can account for short-term health effects (i.e. 
fatalities and injuries), containment and decontamination expenses, environmental 
damage and rehabilitation expenses, or long-term heath problems. QRA models usually 
use the number of fatalities and/or injuries as a measure of risk, assuming that other 
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consequences will be proportional to fatalities and injuries (Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development 2004, UK Health and Safety Executive 1991).  In the 
proposed TDQRA module, estimated number of fatalities will be used as a risk measure; 
however, the impact on the environment in the vicinity of release will also be 
investigated. 
 
In this research a regional societal risk measure is used (Nicolet-Monnier & Gheorghe 
1996). Regional societal risk is defined as the expectation of fatalities that result from the 
transportation of different types of HazMat on the road network of a region. Regional 
societal risk is expressed as the summation of risk over all likely accidents and possible 
damages for different HazMat types, transportation/accident scenarios and release 
locations.  
 
The proposed TDQRA includes the following principal considerations in modeling 
HazMat transportation risk: 
1) Within the scope of this research we are only interested in transport related 
accident-induced risk. Non-transport related or non-accident related releases are 
not considered in this research. 
2) We adopted a discrete node system instead of a link-based approach frequently 
used in HazMat transport risk assessment.  
3) Risk estimates depend directly on time elapsing until mitigation takes place. The 
frequency aspect of HazMat release does not depend on release time; however, the 
consequence part is directly related to it. Longer release times result in larger 
Chapter 3 
 47 
quantities released, higher concentrations of hazardous substances in the vicinity of 
the release, longer exposure times for toxic materials, and higher ignition 
probabilities for flammable materials.  
4) Frequencies of release scenarios are to be estimated at the selected potential release 
nodes by aggregating release frequencies over the links to the nearest potential 
release location. Moreover, the selection of representative potential release nodes 
and the level of aggregation will have an effect on the risk estimate. Thus, careful 
choice of the level of aggregation will result in better risk estimates.  
5) Consequence estimates at the selected potential release nodes are carried out in a 
way similar to fixed facility risk assessment models with the fundamental 
difference of considering the response time effect on severity of damage to the 
nearby population.   
 
3.3.1 Formulation of Risk Expression for HazMat transport 
Consider a network with potential HazMat team locations as shown in Figure 3-1. 
For different types of HazMat, k, and different types of releases, r, each (k,r) pair 
represents a different release scenario.  For a given HazMat type, k, the frequency of 
release of type r at node j is given by krjFrq . 
kr
ijCsq  denotes the number of fatalities at 
node j that would result from release scenario (k,r) when the nearest HazMat team 
located at node i responds to the release.  The two risk components are combined to 
calculate krijR , the expectation of fatalities at node j from a release type r of HazMat type 








ij CsqFrqR *=  (3-3) 
Note that, krjFrq  depends only on the node location, j, but not on HazMat team 
locations. In contrast, krijCsq  depends on response time and, hence, on both node location j 
and HazMat team location i.  
 
The risk estimate from equation (3-4) is combined for all types of HazMat and release 
scenarios, (k, r), to yield the total risk at location j where the nearest HazMat team is 




ijij RR  (3-4) 
Release frequency, krjFrq , can be estimated either by statistical prediction models or 
from analysis of historical HazMat accidents and release trends. Similarly, consequences, 
kr
ijCsq , can be determined using certain consequence models, depending on incident 
scenarios. Note that both frequency and consequences in Equation (3-3) depend on 
HazMat type k and release type r. Detailed calculations of krjFrq  and 
kr
ijCsq  are discussed 
in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 respectively.  
 
To restrict our analysis to points of major significance, the following assumptions are 
introduced in the proposed TDQRA: 
• A limited number of representative HazMat; 




• HazMat release consequent damage for off-road population only is considered 
; and 
• Limited weather conditions. 
 
3.3.2 Choosing Representative HazMat Types (k) 
To quantitatively assess the risk of HazMat movements, identifying and defining 
typical accidental release scenarios are needed. In Canada, there are more than 3000 
regulated HazMat classified into 9 major classes (Transport Canada 1992). A full 
consideration of all HazMat types is time consuming and impractical. However, HazMat 
may be classified into major classes of substances for which quantitative risk assessments 
are feasible. The TDQRA module was limited to HazMat types that are transported in 
significant amounts and represent a large proportion of the overall HazMat traffic, i.e. 
flammable liquids (Button 1999), and those are considered to be potentially the most 
hazardous as confirmed by historical analysis, i.e. toxic liquefied gases, and flammable 
liquefied gases  (Fewtrell and Siddique 1998).  Toxic and corrosive liquids were also 
considered for their potentially high impact on the environment, although we assumed 
that these substances had no impact on the population. Other classes of HazMat are 
usually transported in smaller amounts or pose little risk to the nearby population.  
 
Furthermore, specific HazMat were chosen to represent other similar hazardous 
materials in the same category: Gasoline to represent flammable liquids, Propane to 




At atmospheric pressure and temperature, Ammonia, Propane, and other LPG 
exist in a gas state. However, they are usually transported at atmospheric temperature but 
liquefied under pressure, thus making a release likely to result in the formation of a gas 
cloud based on the vaporization of much or all of the liquid. Concentration levels at 
different locations could be calculated using gas dispersion models.  
 
Propane is an extremely flammable substance that is easily ignited by heat, 
sparks, or flames, and can form explosive mixtures with air. The vapors from liquefied 
gas are initially heavier than air and spread along ground. Additionally, vapors may travel 
to the source of ignition and flash back thus causing the original container to explode. 
Emergency response measures for Propane release include eliminating ignition sources, 
stopping leaks if possible, positioning leaking containers so that only gas escapes rather 
than liquid, using water spray to reduce vapors or to divert vapor cloud drift, and 
preventing the spread of vapors through sewers, ventilation systems, and confined areas 
(Transport Canada et al. 2000). 
 
Ammonia is a toxic substance that may be fatal if inhaled. Emergency response 
measures for Ammonia release are similar to Propane, including stopping leaks if 
possible, turning leaking containers so that only gas escapes rather than liquid, preventing 
entry into waterways, sewers, basements or confined areas, and using water spray to 




Although Propane and Ammonia have different consequence damage, they both have 
the same release and dispersion mechanism, resulting in a dense gas cloud formation that 
is heavier than air. The behavior of dense gas clouds depends mainly on the released 
material, the nature of the release, and meteorological conditions.  
 
According to the type of release, Britter and Griffiths (1982) classified the 
formation of dense gas clouds as 1) instantaneous: as in the catastrophic failure of a 
container, 2) continuous: such as a release through a small hole in the container, and 3) a 
combination of these two extremes: such as in the spillage of liquid transported at low 
temperatures onto land, in which case there will be an initial rapid boiling off followed by 
a more steady evolution of vapor. The overall effect of the release is a rapid formation of 
a dense cloud with the concentration varying according to the distance from the source. 
Concentrations are normally higher near the source and become lower as the gas 
disperses with distance.  
 
For Ammonia and Propane releases, air movements can move, disperse, or trap 
the vapor cloud.  Wind speed and atmospheric stability, are the primary meteorological 
conditions that influence dispersion or direction of the cloud. Other factors include 
ground roughness, and temperature inversions (US Environmental Protection Agency and 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 1999).  
 
Gasoline is a highly flammable substance that is easily ignited by heat, sparks or 
flames. Gasoline is usually transported at atmospheric temperature and pressure. 
Chapter 3 
 52 
Although below its boiling point, when Gasoline is released the liquid partially 
evaporates forming a flammable cloud above the released surface. Depending on the 
atmospheric conditions, the cloud might spread in the downwind direction to the source 
of ignition and flash back. Emergency response measures for Gasoline release include 
eliminating ignition sources, stopping leak if possible, preventing entry into waterways, 
sewers, basements or confined areas, use of vapor suppressing foam or water spray to 
reduce vapors, absorbing or covering released material with dry earth, sand or other non-
combustible material, and transfer to containers. Also, dikes might be used for large 
spills.  
Depending on the HazMat type, each release has a distinctive impact and 
associated consequence formulation. The liquefied toxic gases, represented by Ammonia, 
are the most difficult to model and affect the largest area. Moreover, though flammable 
clouds are no longer dangerous when diluted to about 2% by volume, toxic clouds may 
be dangerous even at very low concentrations. Thus, under equal release conditions, toxic 
clouds may be dangerous at much greater distances than flammable clouds. In case of 
flammable liquids, the distance to the endpoint is relatively small compared to other 
HazMat types. 
 
3.3.3 HazMat Release Scenarios (r) 
When considering release scenarios, releases are classified into two types—
namely spill and leak—according to their duration (Transport Dangerous Goods 
Directorate 2004). Dangerous Goods Accident Information System (DGAIS) identifies 
spill as a release of short duration, while leak is a release of long duration. Unfortunately 
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“short duration” and “long duration” were not defined in the DGAIS and no time value is 
given for the terms. Furthermore, the respective release types “spill” and “leak” are 
additionally classified into high and low release according to the amount released. Large 
release is defined as release over 1000 liters, while a small release is a release less than or 
equal to 1000 liters.   
 
3.3.4 Summary of Considered HazMat Types and Release Scenarios  
In this research, the following four representative HazMat types (k) are considered: 
1. Toxic liquefied gases (Ammonia) 
2. Flammable liquefied gases (Propane) 
3. Flammable liquids (Gasoline) 
4. Toxic/corrosive liquids 
 
The release types (r) are classified into, 
1. Large spill  
2. Small spill 
3. Large leak 
4. Small leak 
 
With four HazMat types and four release types, there are a total of 16 release 
scenarios as shown in Table 3-1. These release scenarios are similar to those proposed by 
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3.3.5 Release Amounts and Discharge Rates 
For this research, the DGAIS data (Transport Dangerous Goods Directorate 2000) 
for the years 1988 to 2000 was used to identify default values for discharge rates of 
different releases scenarios. The DGAIS is a database maintained by Transport 
Dangerous Goods Directorate, Transport Canada and consists of all reported2 accidents 
                                                 
2 A report is filed if the accident involving a dangerous good results in a release that presents a danger to health, 
life, property, or the environment. Reports are also filed for accidents involving death or injury, or damage to the 
means of containment. 
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involving the transport of HazMat. The data is presented on an annual basis and is 
available for the years 1988 to 2000.   
 
DGAIS accident records from trucks in transit on roads were used for this study, 
with accident records for truck that are loading, unloading or in storage not considered. 
The database includes approximately 1,800 relevant HazMat accident records. Numbers 
of relevant reported accidents for each HazMat type are as follows: 1044 flammable 
liquids, 655 toxic/corrosive liquids, 69 flammable liquefied gases, and 32 toxic liquefied 
gases. Table 3-2 lists number and percentage of relevant releases reported by DGAIS as 
well as their percentage for each of the assumed release scenarios.  
 
Table 3-2: DGAIS number and percentage of relevant releases for different HazMat and release types 







# of releases 331 525 149 39 Flammable liquids 
 
 % 32% 50% 14% 4% 
# of releases 316 83 240 16 Toxic/corrosive 
liquids 
 % 48% 13% 37% 2% 
# of releases 6 15 28 20 Flammable gases 
 
 % 9% 22% 41% 29% 
# of releases 3 5 17 7 Toxic gases 
 






A high level of detail is available for each accident, ranging from the date, time, 
and location of the accident to the emergency response personnel who responded to the 
scene of the accident. Moreover, the database consists of 3 files—Accident, Commodity, 
and Comment. Additionally, relevant DGAIS data fields include: 
• SHIPNAME: The shipping category (type) for the HazMat, e.g. Gasoline, 
Propane, Anhydrous Ammonia. 
• CLASS:  The class assigned to each HazMat. 
• MODE:  The mode of transport and whether the accident occurred on transit 
or not. 
• TYPE:  Whether an accident involved a spill, leak, fire or explosion. 
• VEHICLE:  The type of vehicle involved. 
• DGLMASVOL: The mass/volume released from the shipment. 
 
Table 3-3 shows the minimum, maximum, and average release values for the four 
types of HazMat. The observed maximum release amounts are consistent with a 
maximum truck capacity of 63.5 ton (total weight) set by the Canadian standard (Ministry 
of Transportation of Ontario, Carrier Safety and Enforcement Branch 2001) as well as a 
report3 from “Shell Canada” in regards to their tanker truck loads. However, in the UK, 
the Health and Safety Executive (1991) reported very different tank capacities for the 
different types of HazMat, as stated in Table 3-4. It should be noted that, when using a 
TDQRA module to evaluate HazMat transportation risks for countries other than Canada, 
some modifications might be needed to account for different discharge rates and 
amounts.  
                                                 




Table 3-3: Minimum, maximum and average amounts for HazMat releases  
Release amount (Kg)  
HazMat type Minimum Maximum Average 
Flammable liquids 0.75 45,450 5,483 
Toxic/corrosive liquids 1 47,000 1,572 
Flammable liquefied gases 0.51 33,303 5,544 
Toxic liquefied gases 0.64 16,440 1,676 
 







Liquefied flammable gases  Propane 15 
Liquefied toxic gases Ammonia 15 
Flammable liquids Gasoline 20-25 
 
 
Figure 3-3, Figure 3-4, Figure 3-5 and Figure 3-6 show the cumulative distribution of 
HazMat released amount for flammable liquefied gases, toxic liquefied gases, flammable 
liquids, and toxic liquids, respectively as reported by DGAIS.  As expected, HazMat 
releases follow a distribution and are not limited to discrete categories. A study by Button 
(1998) used the DGAIS data as a primary source of information to estimate the 
probabilities of release for the presented 16 release scenarios in case of a truck accident 










































































































For the DGAIS data, the classification of release into “large” and “small” covers a 
wide range of released amount. The average values of the total amount released are used 
to estimate discharge rates for the four types of HazMat with the average released amount 
for different release scenarios presented in Table 3-5. Furthermore, an assumed average 
spill duration of 15 minutes and average leak duration of 60 minutes are used to calculate 
different discharge rates. Table 3-6 lists estimated discharge rates for different release 
scenarios.  
 
Table 3-5: Average release amounts4 (kg) by HazMat type and release type 
 Average release amount (kg) 







Ave small spill 71 136 192 94 
Ave large spill 9680 5039 9388 10757 
Ave small leak 36 3.4 112 56 
Ave large leak 7259 2113 5531 5891 
 
 
Table 3-6: Discharge rate for different scenarios (kg/min) 
 Discharge rate (kg/min) 








Ave small spill  4.7 9 12.7 6.3 15 
Ave large spill  645.3 336 626 717.1 15 
Ave small leak  0.6 0.06 1.9 0.9 60 
Ave large leak  121 35 92 98.2 60 
 
 
                                                 




The HazMat releases for different scenarios are modeled as a constant discharge 
rate for the whole duration of the release; yet this might not be accurate since release 
usually begins at a high rate only to taper off with the reduction of the amount of HazMat 
material in the tanker. However, the adopted fixed discharge rates would be good enough 
and consistent with the level of analysis details through out the module.  
 
3.4 The Location Optimization Module 
In the proposed location optimization module, the objective is to find the optimal 
location of the np HazMat teams among the nf possible candidate nodes so as to minimize 
the total network risk using the ijR estimates from the TDQRA module. At the same time, 
we ensure that response times to any marginal nodes do not exceed some pre-set 
threshold (Tmax).  
 
The nearest HazMat team located at node i is assumed to respond to the release at 
node j in a time equal to response time tij.  For each node j, we introduce a set of 
candidate HazMat team locations, jN , that fulfills the maximum response time 
restriction, that is: 
 { }max; TTiN ijj ≤=  (3-5) 
For a given location solution of the np HazMat teams on the network, a unique 
measure of total network risk over all nodes is defined as follows:  
ij
j i
ij zRR *=  (3-6) 
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Where zij is a decision variable that equals 1 if node j is covered with HazMat team at 
node i; and zero otherwise.   
 
The location problem of our interest can now be formally stated as, 
ij
j i
























node j must be covered with one location                
within jN  set 
(3-10) 
 











iij yz ≤≤0  
 
no coverage from i to j unless a HazMat team 










In the objective function (3-7), the summation over j ensures that total risk is 
minimized over all demand nodes j. The second summation over i ensures that risk at any 




It should be noted that for a given demand node j, minimizing risk over i means 
response will be from the nearest unit, since response time is the only risk variable that 
depends on the location i. Constraint (3-10) ensures that every demand node j is covered 
by one team within the allowable response time thresholds. Constraint (3-12) ensures that 
no response will be initiated from i unless a HazMat team exists at i. Constraint (3-13) 
ensures that the number of teams located equals np.  
 
The optimization problem could be further simplified by pre-processing the input 
risk estimates, with the maximum response time constraint achieved by assigning a large 
value “M” for Rij’s that does not satisfy the Tmax constraint. In this case, constraint (3-9) is 
eliminated and the summation in constraint (3-10) would be over all i’s. 
 
The problem belongs to the category of NP hard problems, which means that no 
exact polynomial algorithm is yet known to solve this type of problem. Thus, an optimal 
solution could only be obtained through algorithms with exponential execution times. 
These algorithms are convenient for small problems, but they are inefficient, and 
practically useless, for larger problems. Heuristic algorithms are commonly used to reach 
a reasonable near-optimal solution for large problems; however, the HazMat location 
problem is relatively small since candidate locations are limited to a pre-defined set of 
nodes representing current fire station locations. The restriction of HazMat team locations 
to a pre-defined set of nodes (nf) limits the size of the optimization problem, where the 
number of decision variables for zij equals nf * nd, and the number of decision variables 
for yi equals the nf variable. Moreover, the problem could be solved using complete 
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enumeration. Other heuristic algorithms to solve the problem include neighborhood 
search, branch and bound, and Lagrangian relaxation techniques.  
 
Chapter 6 illustrates the application of this module and the associated solution 
method using the southwestern Ontario region. The problem we are interested in is 
expected to be relatively small since the number of potential locations is limited to the 
existing fire stations; therefore a solution will be found using complete enumeration.   
 
3.5 Summary 
This chapter introduced the risk-based HazMat team location optimization model 
with its two components: the time-dependant quantitative risk assessment module 
(TDQRA) and the location optimization model. Four representative types of HazMat are 
considered, namely: toxic liquefied gases (represented by Ammonia), flammable 
liquefied gases (represented by Propane), flammable liquids (represented by Gasoline), 
and toxic/corrosive liquids. Four release scenarios are presented (large spill, small spill, 
large leak, and small leak) and correspondent discharge amounts and rates are estimated.  
Detailed calculations of frequency and consequence estimates are discussed in Chapter 4 
and Chapter 5, while the application of the model is illustrated in Chapter 6 through a 
southwestern Ontario case study. The model with its two modules is developed as a 
Windows-based user-friendly software that allows HazMat emergency response planners 
to investigate different emergency response policies. A user manual for the software is 




CHAPTER 4: ANALYSIS OF HAZMAT RELEASE 
FREQUENCY 
A major component in the TDQRA module discussed in the previous chapter is the 
frequency calculation of different release scenarios. In developing the TDQRA, only 
accident induced releases are considered since they dominate the risk of HazMat 
transport (Center for Chemical Process Safety 1995). The purpose of this chapter is to 
determine the accident induced release frequencies for the 16 release scenarios described 
previously ( krjFrq  in Table 3-1).  
 
4.1 Estimation of Release Frequencies 
In traditional QRA analysis, the transportation network is represented by a set of 
links with related transport attribute estimates. However, in the proposed TDQRA 
module, a discrete approach is used where release frequencies are estimated at nodes. The 
release frequencies are first estimated on links in the same way as traditional 
transportation risk assessment techniques. Then, link release frequencies are aggregated 
to adjacent nodes. At node j, frequency of release of type r for a given HazMat type k, 
kr
jFrq , is calculated by summing half of release frequencies on all adjacent links 






j  node oadjacent t  links allfor     *5.0=   (4-1) 
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Here krlFrq  is the annual frequency of occurrence by particular release r, of a given 
type of HazMat k, on a given link l.  krlFrq  is estimated by combining the annual rate of 
trucks carrying HazMat being involved in an accident, the annual rate of a specified 
release scenario (kr) taking place given an accident, and the annual traffic volume of a 
given type of HazMat (k) on a given link (l). Figure 4-1 shows the process for estimating 
release frequencies for different release scenarios. 
 
 
Figure 4-1: Estimating releases frequencies for different release scenarios 
 
The annual frequency of occurrence of scenario kr on link l, krlFreq , can then be 
estimated by combining release rates and HazMat traffic exposure as follows:  
( ) 610*365***|* −= lklkrkrl LAADTARLPARFrq  (4-2) 
Here: 
AR  is the truck accident rate, measured in accidents per Million 
Vehicle-Kilometers (MVKm) traveled and assumed to be the same 





Specific HazMat Accident Rates  
(per MVKm) 
Release Probabilities for different 
scenarios (per MVKm) 
Frequency of release for different HazMat release scenarios along road section 
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( )ARLP kr |    is the probability of a type r release for a given HazMat type k 
taking place given a HazMat accident.  
k
lAADT  is the average annual daily traffic of HazMat type k on link l. 
lL   is the length of link l in km. 
 
In the following sections, we introduce estimates for the input parameters required 
for frequency analysis.  
 
4.2 HazMat Truck Accident Rates ( lAR ) 
Truck accident rates depend on a number of features, such as road type and 
conditions, posted speed, and environmental conditions. However, estimates of truck 
accident rates are normally based on characteristics of broad classification or road type 
(e.g. urban versus rural) of which useful data is available.  Accident rates can be 
expressed differently according to various measures for exposure, with examples ranging 
from accidents per shipment, to accidents per ton, …per route, …per month, …per year, 
etc. In this module, accident rates are reported in terms of the number of accident 
involvements per Million Vehicle-Kilometers traveled (MVKm). 
 
A review of various studies revealed a difference in estimating truck accident rates. 
In an early work, Saccomanno et al (1989) used statistical models calibrated on Ontario 
highway data to estimate truck accident rates (Table 4-1). Conversely, Russell and 
Harwood (1993) provided a set of truck accident estimates based on data from three US 
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states, namely, California, Illinois, and Michigan. The results of their analysis are 
provided in Table 4-2 and show a great difference in truck accident rate estimates. 
Table 4-1: Truck accident rates by highway type for Ontario /MVK 






Table 4-2: Truck accident rates by highway type for California, Illinois and Michigan combined 
Area Highway class 
Truck accident rate 
(/MVMile) 
Rural Tow-lane 2.19 
Rural Multilane, undivided 4.49 
Rural Multilane, divided 2.15 
Rural Freeway (limited access) 0.64 
Urban Tow-lane 8.66 
Urban Multilane, undivided 13.92 
Urban Multilane, divided 12.47 
Urban One-way street 9.70 
Urban Freeway (limited access) 2.18 
 
Saccomanno et al. (1998) proved that estimates for truck accident rates vary for 
different countries. They obtained truck accident rates by highway class for different 
North American and European jurisdictions. Three classes of surface routes were 
considered: urban, rural, and non-primary highways (national non-freeways). Table 4-3 
provides a breakdown of truck surface highway accident rates for Ontario as reported by 
Saccomanno et al. (1998). These rates were obtained using reportable road accidents 
from Ontario Accident Data System (ADS) for the period 1988 to 1992. Saccomanno et 
al. (1998) also reported different values for truck accidents in California, The 




Table 4-3: Truck accident rates by highway type for Ontario (per MVKm) 
Highway Type Ontario Global Rate 
Urban  1.023 















Urban  0.99 0.492 0.973 1.431 
Rural  0.33 0.164 0.324 0.477 
Arterials 1.548 0.768 1.522 2.238 
 
 
A comparison of Ontario truck accident rates estimates in Table 4-3 and Table 4-1 
for urban and rural highways shows little difference, mainly because the figures were 
based on the same accident data system. However truck accident rate estimates differ 
significantly for different countries (Table 4-2, Table 4-3, and Table 4-4). The Ontario 
truck accident rates estimates by Sacommanno et al. (1998) are used in the TDQRA 
analysis (Table 4-3). 
 
4.3 HazMat Release Probabilities Given an Accident ( ( )ARLP krl | ) 
The accuracy of HazMat risk assessment would be greatly improved by better 
estimates of HazMat release rates. However, HazMat release data are scarce, giving rise 
to great uncertainty. Thus, after investigating different release probability estimates, we 
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found considerable variance in release probability estimates, depending on assumptions, 
methodology, and data used.   
 
In Canada, Saccomanno et al. (1989) reported road transport release probabilities 
given an accident for different HazMat types (Table 4-5), and probabilities for different 
release types (high, medium, and low) given a release for both instantaneous and 
continuous releases5 (Table 4-6).  
 
Table 4-5: Release probabilities given an accident for HazMat road transport (Saccomanno et al. 1989) 
HazMat type Total # of release/yr 
Probability of release 
given accident  
Chlorine 0.5 0.016 
LPG 0.8 0.037 
Gasoline 3.5 0.12 
 
 
Table 4-6: Conditional probabilities (%) of different release volumes given a release (Saccomanno et al. 
1989) 
 Release probability (%) Released quantity 





High  Med Low High  Med Low High  Med Low High  Med Low 
Chlorine 18 22 31 12 8  9 95 80 60 14.5  3.9  0.10  
LPG 10 20 20 10.5  5.2  1.3  95 80 60 4 16 30 
Gasoline 40 - 60 - - - 95 80 60 - - - 
*Tanker capacity: chlorine 20 ton, LPG 26 ton, Gasoline 20 ton. 
 
                                                 
5 Instantaneous release is the sudden loss of HazMat in a short period of time, while continues release is the 
loss of HazMat in a constant or near constant rate over a long period of time (US Environmental Protection 
Agency & National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 1999).  
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In the UK, the Health and Safety Executive (1991) gave estimates for release 
frequencies regardless of HazMat type, as shown in Table 4-7. 
 








*Large spill is over 1500 kg, medium spill is between 150 kg and 1500 kg, and small is less than 150 kg. 
 
 
Finally, a more recent study by Button (1999) reported release rate estimates by 
HazMat type (toxic liquefied gases, flammable liquefied gases, flammable liquids, and 
toxic liquids), load type (large load and small load), and accident outcome (collision and 
overturn, only collision, only overturn, and no collision with no overturn). These 
estimates (Table 4-8) were used in this research since they are based mainly on DGAIS 
data and are consistent with using the discharge rates estimated from DGAIS data in 
Section 3.3.5. An event tree of different releases for a certain type of HazMat is shown in 









Table 4-8: Release probability estimates (%) for different Hazmat types, load type, and accident outcome 
(Button 1999) 
Release probability* by release 
type (r) 













1 y y y 1 22.09 2.98 1.75 1.45 71.73 100 
2 y y y 2 24.04 3.24 1.91 1.57 69.25 100 
3 y y y 3 37.32 12.85 2.96 2.44 52.25 100 
4 y y y 4 14.03 1.9 1.11 0.92 82.05 100 
5 y y n 1 9.58 12.3 1.04 5.35 71.73 100 
6 y y n 2 10.45 13.35 1.14 5.84 69.25 100 
7 y y n 3 16.21 20.73 1.76 9.05 52.25 100 
8 y y n 4 6.1 7.79 0.66 3.41 82.05 100 
9 y n y 1 22.09 2.99 1.75 1.45 71.73 100 
10 y n y 2 24.04 3.23 1.91 1.57 69.24 100 
11 y n y 3 37.32 5.04 2.96 2.44 52.25 100 
12 y n y 4 14.03 1.89 1.11 0.92 82.05 100 
13 y n n 1 9.58 12.29 1.04 5.36 71.73 100 
14 y n n 2 10.45 13.35 1.13 5.83 69.24 100 
15 y n n 3 16.22 20.55 1.76 9.05 52.25 100 
16 y n n 4 6.09 7.79 0.66 3.4 82.05 100 
17 n y y 1 0.3 0.04 0.02 0.02 99.62 100 
18 n y y 2 0.53 0.07 0.05 0.04 99.32 100 
19 n y y 3 0.31 0.05 0.02 0.02 99.61 100 
20 n y y 4 0.19 0.03 0.01 0.01 99.75 100 
21 n y n 1 0.13 0.17 0.01 0.07 99.62 100 
22 n y n 2 0.23 0.3 0.02 0.13 99.32 100 
23 n y n 3 0.13 0.17 0.01 0.07 99.61 100 
24 n y n 4 0.09 0.11 0.01 0.05 99.75 100 
25 n n y 1 0.3 0.04 0.02 0.02 99.62 100 
26 n n y 2 0.53 0.08 0.04 0.03 99.32 100 
27 n n y 3 0.31 0.04 0.02 0.02 99.61 100 
28 n n y 4 0.2 0.03 0.02 0.01 99.72 100 
29 n n n 1 0.13 0.17 0.01 0.08 99.62 100 
30 n n n 2 0.23 0.3 0.02 0.13 99.32 100 
31 n n n 3 0.14 0.17 0.01 0.08 99.61 100 
32 n n n 4 0.09 0.1 0.01 0.05 99.75 100 
*Original estimates were aggregated to give combined fire and non-fire release probabilities  
**HazMat type:  1 = toxic liquefied gas (Ammonia) 
2 = flammable liquefied gas (Propane) 
3 = flammable liquid (Gasoline) 













































































The probability of release type r for HazMat type k given an accident, 
( )ARLP kr | , is calculated as follows: 









oA  accident outcome (overturn & collision, overturn, collision, no overturn no 
collision) 
sL  load size (large, small) 
( )sokr LARLP |  probability of release type r for HazMat type k given accident outcome oA  
and load size sL  
( )AAP o |  probability of accident outcome “ oA ” given an accident 
)( sLP   probability of load size “ sL ” 
 
The following equation is an example of how to calculate an Ammonia large spill 
release probability: 
  P (Ammonia large spill) = 
  P (Ammonia large spill | overturn & collision, large load) * P (overturn & collision) * P (large load) 
+P (Ammonia large spill | overturn, large load)  * P (overturn)   * P (large load) 
+P (Ammonia large spill | collision, large load)  * P (collision)   * P (large load) 
+P (Ammonia large spill | no overturn & no collision, large load) * P (no overturn & no collision) * P (large load) 
+ P (Ammonia large spill | overturn & collision, small load) * P (overturn & collision) * P (small load) 
+P (Ammonia large spill | overturn, small load)  * P (overturn)   * P (small load) 
+P (Ammonia large spill | collision, small load)  * P (collision)   * P (small load) 
+P (Ammonia large spill | no overturn & no collision, small load) * P (no over turn & no collision) * P (small load) 
 
Saccomanno et al. (1998) provided Ontario estimates for the probability of 
different accident outcomes, oA , and load types, sL . Accordingly, they estimated that 
48% of the shipments in Ontario carry large loads, while 52% carry small loads. Table 
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4-9 shows the accident outcomes probability estimates for trucks on Ontario highways, 
with different HazMat release probabilities estimated by applying the Ontario load type 
and accident outcome probabilities to Button’s release estimates for different scenarios. 
Table 4-10 lists the resulting release frequencies.  
 
Table 4-9: Accident outcome probabilities ( oA ) for accidents on 400 level highways. 
 Collision & 
Overturn 
Collision Overturn No 
Collision/Overturn 
Total 
Percentage  0.016 0.843 0.027 0.115 1 
 
 
Table 4-10: Release probabilities (%) by HazMat type  







toxic liquefied gas 0.87 0.44 0.08 0.19 1.58 
flammable liquefied gas 1.09 0.55 0.10 0.24 1.98 
flammable liquid 1.34 0.73 0.12 0.30 2.49 
toxic liquid 0.56 0.28 0.05 0.12 1.02 
  
 
4.4 HazMat Traffic Movements 
HazMat release frequencies are obtained by applying truck accident rates and 
HazMat release rates to the HazMat traffic volumes on links. However, obtaining reliable 
information on HazMat routes and volumes is not an easy task since such information is 
not readily available for planners. As a result, different approaches have been used to 
estimate HazMat traffic volumes with the US Environmental Protection Agency (1990) 




• Using truck traffic surveys. The “1999 National Roadside Study” (Canadian Council 
of Motor Transport Administrators Coordinates 2002), and “Canadian Vehicle 
Survey” are two examples of such surveys. An example of using data from these 
surveys to estimate HazMat movements for risk assessment may be found in Brown 
et al. (2001). 
• Information could be obtained from the police and fire department personnel 
regarding what hazardous materials pass through a community, the routes most 
frequently used, and the frequency of transport.  
• Truck weighing stations in or around the jurisdiction may be a source of information 
on the number of placarded loads moving through the area.  
• Directly contacting a carrier’s or shipper's office regarding movements and load 
contents.  
• Reviewing of permit records. Companies that handle HazMat usually require a 
variety of permits which might provide useful information on HazMat types and 
movements within communities. 
 
In this research, the percentage of HazMat volumes for total truck traffic in 
Canada was estimated using data provided by the 1995 National Roadside Study 
(Canadian Council of Motor Transport Administrators coordinates 1997). The study 
collected data at 148 survey sites spread across the 25,600 kilometers of the Survey 
Highway System. Two types of information were collected at each site: a 7 day count of 
trucks passing the site, classified by day, time and truck type, and interviews of a random 
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sample of the passing trucks (80 questions in interview). In total, the 148 sites counted 
1,040,163 trucks and interviewed 36,242 trucks (3.5%). 
 
For this research, the percentage of HazMat movements in total truck traffic for 
different HazMat classes was estimated based on the “1995 Road Side Survey” data6. 
Table 4-11 shows that HazMat accounts for 9.85% of all truck movements by ton on the 
survey roads. Although these estimates are based on truck movements on survey roads, 
we can generally assume they are applicable for all truck traffic in Canada. The 
percentages of different HazMat types in the total HazMat traffic were obtained from 
Transport Canada (2002) as shown in Table 4-12. 
 
Table 4-11: Estimated percentage of different HazMat types transported on Canadian roads (by ton) 










Cargo includes HazMat, but 
unable to determine class 1.12 
Total HazMat 9.85 
Total Non-HazMat 90.15 
Total  100.00 




                                                 




Table 4-12: Percentage of top HazMat transported by road (by tonnage), reported by Transport Canada. 
Classification Shipping name percent Total percent  
Gasoline 22.97 
Fuel Oil 17.53 
Tars 7.82 
Petroleum Crude Oil 6.69 
Ethanol 2.92 
Aviation fuel 1.58 
Flammable Liquids preparations 1.51 
Flammable Liquids n.o.s. 1.36 
Paint 0.92 
Resin Solutions 0.88 
Flammable liquids 








Corrosive Liquids n.o.s. 10.44 
Caustic Soda 2.18 
Sulphuric Acid 1.60 
Corrosive liquids 





Petroleum Gases 1.15 





Toxic liquefied gases Ammonia 0.98 0.98 
Total 83.79 
Other HazMat material (do not fall under 
the previous 4 classification of HazMat 
and/or transported in small amounts) 
  16.21 
 
 
4.5 Summary  
In this chapter we presented a method for estimating release frequencies, in terms 
of expected number of releases, for different release scenarios and HazMat type. Only 
accident-induced releases were considered since they dominate the risk of HazMat 
transport. Frequencies were first estimated on links and then aggregated to adjacent 
nodes. Methods for estimating accident rates, release probabilities, and HazMat 
movements were discussed. Frequency estimation is the first component of quantitative 




CHAPTER 5: ANALYSIS OF HAZMAT RELEASE 
CONSEQUENCES 
This chapter discusses how to estimate the magnitude of damage associated with a 
given release of HazMat. Consequence damage, hence consequences analysis, differs for 
different types of HazMat. The analysis starts with defining outcomes of different 
HazMat releases: a toxic cloud is the only outcome for the release of toxic liquefied gas; 
while, in case of flammable liquids ignition for both immediate and delayed ignitions, the 
final outcome is a pool fire with potential radiant heat effects7. Ignition of released 
flammable liquefied gases will have several possible outcomes (US Environmental 
Protection Agency 1999), namely,  
 
• Vapor cloud fires (flash fires): flammable vapor clouds when ignited could flash 
back creating a severe heat radiation hazard to anyone in the area of the cloud. 
Hazard area includes the whole region within the lower flammability limit (LFL) 
of released HazMat.  
 
• Vapor cloud explosions (VCE): For a vapor cloud explosion to occur, rapid 
release of a large quantity, turbulent conditions, and other factors are generally 
necessary. Vapor cloud explosions generally are considered unlikely events.  
 
                                                 
7 ARCHIE gives the equivalent radius for the fatality zone. 
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• BLEVE: A boiling liquid, expanding vapor explosion may occur if a tanker truck 
containing flammable materials ruptures explosively as a result of exposure to 
fire. Heat radiation from the fireball is the primary hazard, while fragments and 
overpressure from the explosion can also pose hazard. BLEVEs are generally 
considered unlikely events. 
 
• A jet fire resulting from the puncture or rupture of a tank containing a compressed 
or liquefied gas under pressure. The gas discharging from the hole can form a jet 
that "blows" into the air in the direction of the hole, with the jet possibly igniting. 
Jet fires could contribute to BLEVEs and fireballs if they impinge on tanks of 
flammable substances. 
 
The UK Health and Safety Executive (1991) assumes 90% of flammable vapor 
clouds that ignite will result in flash fire with a 100% lethality within LFL and 0% 
lethality outside the LFL. In the case of the other 10%, VCE is assumed to occur.  
 
Since the occurrence of VCE will hardly result in more fatalities than a flash fire, 
and due to BLEVE and jet fire considered as unlikely events, we chose to model all LPG 
ignition outcomes as flash fire. However, in future enhancement of the system, detailed 




Figure 5-1 illustrates possible incident outcomes in the case of a HazMat release. 




Figure 5-1: Possible outcomes of HazMat releases 
 
 
Table 5-1: Modeled release outcomes for the TDQRA module 
HazMat type Release outcome 
Liquefied toxic gas Toxic cloud 
Liquefied flammable gas Vapor cloud fires (Flash fire) 
Flammable liquids Pool fire 
 
 
5.1 Consequences of Release of Toxic Liquefied Gas (Ammonia) 
This section discusses consequences from a toxic liquefied gas (Ammonia) release. 
The following steps represent the progress in case of an Ammonia release: 
Accident 












Jet fire VCE Flash 
fire 





1) Release occurs. The amount of release and the discharge rate determine the 
classification of the release as a spill or leak, large or small. 
2) The released substance starts to evaporate and a vapor cloud starts to form. The rate 
of evaporation depends on many factors including atmospheric temperature, and wind 
conditions. 
3) Different levels of concentrations of the gas develop, starting with high concentration 
from the release site and decreasing outwards depending on the meteorological 
conditions. These levels of concentration are usually referred to as isopleths, or 
hazardous envelops.  
4) Population is exposed to different concentration levels of HazMat for a period of time 
resulting in fatalities and/or injuries. 
 
5.1.1 Release and Heavy Gas Dispersion 
Consider a release of pressurized liquefied gas, such as Ammonia or Propane, at a 
given location (node j) as shown in Figure 5-2. The liquefied gas will normally be 
released in liquid form but will start to evaporate into the surrounding atmosphere, 
forming a hazardous cloud. With time, and depending on atmospheric conditions, the 
cloud is diluted further by air entrainment and disperses as a plume. Next, the gas 
dispersion results in different levels of concentration starting with higher concentration 
near the point of release and decreasing outwards.  Boundaries of different levels of 
concentration are usually referred to as hazard envelopes, or isopleths. Lastly, the size of 
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different hazard envelopes depends on many factors, e.g. discharge rate, meteorological 
conditions, and release duration.  
 
In this research, the continuous space of the hazard area is transformed into a 
discrete one by modeling it as a mesh grid associated with a Cartesian coordinate system 
as shown in Figure 5-2. Careful choice of grid size is of great importance since it will 
affect risk estimates. The tradeoff between accuracy and computational efficiency should 
also be considered since finer grid cells will result in better risk estimates, but will also 
increase computational effort.  
 
 
  (x,y) 







Figure 5-2: Illustration of hazard cloud and dispersion process 
 
At point (x, y) within the hazard area and after release duration, tij, the 
concentration level of release type r for HazMat type k, ( )yxC krtij , , could be obtained 
using a gas dispersion model. A wide range of atmospheric dispersion models is 
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available. Mazzola et al. (1995) provided an overview of available gas dispersion models 
with a compilation and description of 94 computer-generated atmospheric dispersion 
models. Many of these models were initially investigated.  
 
After a careful comparison, the two widely used models ALOHA (Areal 
Locations of Hazardous Atmospheres) and ARCHIE (Automated Resource for Chemical 
Hazard Evaluation) were chosen for closer investigation. Eventually, the conclusion was 
made to use ALOHA since it gives both concentration level and dose at any point (x,y) 
associated with a release duration, tij. Appendix C gives a brief discussion of ALOHA. 
 
ALOHA requires different parameters for modeling gas dispersion such as 
HazMat type, discharge rate, release duration, immediate danger to health and life 
(IDHL) level for toxic materials (or Lower Flammability Level for flammable materials), 
as well as weather and terrain conditions. ALOHA uses the information about the type of 
HazMat released, rate of release, and weather conditions to provide the concentration 
level (in ppm) at any point (x,y) as well as a gas dispersal “footprint”. Accordingly, 
ALOHA’s footprint for a certain concentration level corresponds to hazard envelop for 
that concentration level.  
 
ALOHA was run separately for different release scenarios (kr) and weather 
conditions, with the results then incorporated in the TDQRA module. The following 
example illustrates an ALOHA run for a large spill of Ammonia at a rate of 336 kg/min 




SITE DATA INFORMATION: 
   Location: TORONTO, CANADA 
   Building Air Exchanges Per Hour: 0.74 (sheltered single storied) 
   Time: April 15, 2003  1513 hours DST (user specified) 
 
 CHEMICAL INFORMATION: 
   Chemical Name: AMMONIA       Molecular Weight: 17.03 kg/kmol 
   TLV-TWA: 25 ppm              IDLH: 300 ppm 
   Footprint Level of Concern: 1120 ppm 
   Boiling Point: -33.43° C 
   Vapor Pressure at Ambient Temperature: greater than 1 atm 
   Ambient Saturation Concentration: 1,000,000 ppm or 100.0% 
 
 ATMOSPHERIC INFORMATION: (MANUAL INPUT OF DATA)  
   Wind: 4.87 meters/sec from w at 3 meters 
   No Inversion Height 
   Stability Class: D           Air Temperature: 21° C 
   Relative Humidity: 50%       Ground Roughness: 50 centimeters 
   Cloud Cover: 5 tenths 
 
 SOURCE STRENGTH INFORMATION: 
   Direct Source: 335.9647 kilograms/min 
   Source Height: 0 
   Release Duration: 30 minutes 
   Discharge rate: 336 kilograms/min 






Figure 5-3: ALOHA footprint for a release of Ammonia at a rate of 336 kg/min for a duration of 30 
minutes 
 
5.1.2 Vulnerability and Lethality for Toxic Gases  
Concentration levels obtained from gas dispersion models are used to calculate 
Lethality (or vulnerability) levels at a given point (x,y) within the hazard area.  
Vulnerability is defined as the probability that an individual will experience a certain 
level of an undesirable consequence as a result of a release. Lethality is the vulnerability 
when the undesirable consequence is death. Lethality level, ( )yxLLkrtij , , is defined as the 
probability of a person residing at point (x,y) being killed after exposure to a release type 
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r of HazMat type k for a time tji. In case of the release of toxic liquefied gases such as 
Ammonia, ( )yxLLkrtij ,  is a function of the concentration level, ( )yxC krtij , .   
 
Referring to Figure 5-2, we define X as downwind distance from release point to 
the 1% lethality level and Y as maximum crosswind distance to 1% lethality level.  
ALOHA is used to calculate ( )yxC krtij ,  for x = 0 to X and y = 0 to Y.  Once ( )yxC krtij ,  at 
point (x,y) has been calculated, its combination with the exposure time, tij, gives the 
“toxic load” or “absorbed dose”, ( )yxD krtij , , usually referred to as “dose”. The following 
equation gives ( )yxD krtij , after release time tij when the concentration level ( )yxC krtij ,  is 
constant over time: 
 
( ) ( ) ijmkrtkrt tyxCyxD ijij *],[, =  (5-1) 
Where m is a HazMat specific parameter 
 
Due to the dynamics of gas dispersion, the concentration level at a given location 
is likely to vary over time.  For a variable concentration over time, the dose could be 
calculated by integrating ( )yxC krtij ,  over time t from t =0 to t= tji according to the 
following equation: 
 













Figure 5-4 shows the variation in dose with the release duration along the 
centerline downwind of the release site for a large spill of Ammonia for a duration of 30 
minutes 
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The absorbed dose could be linked to the damage on an average individual using a 
“probit” (probability unit) function (TNO 1992). The probit value at (x,y) for an exposure 
time tij, ( )yxkrtij ,Pr , can be generally defined as: 
 















                                                       (5-3) 
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The terms a, b and m are model parameters that can be calibrated through 
empirical analyses. For Ammonia, Technica Ltd (1985) suggested values for a = – 9.82, b 
= 0.71, and m = 2. 
 
The probit has a normal distribution with a mean value of 5 and a standard 




























Probit values corresponding to 10%, 50% and 90% lethality levels are 3.72, 5.0, 
and 6.28, respectively. 
 
Figure 5-5 shows the variation in lethality levels with time along the centerline 
downwind of the release site for a large Ammonia spill.  The lethality level at the source 
is shown as 100% regardless of the release duration. Moving away from the release site, 
release duration becomes more significant. Effect of the release duration is greatest at 
about 100 meters downwind of the release site. As distance from the release point further 
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Figure 5-5: Variation in lethality level distribution with time along centerline downwind of release 
site for a large Ammonia spill 
 
5.1.3 Consequence Calculations for Toxic Clouds 
Combining the level of lethality at each point (x,y) with its population density 
produces the number of consequence at that point, ( )yxCsq krtij , , according to the 
following equation: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )yxyxpopyxLLyxCsq krtkrt ijij ∆∆= ,*,*,,  (5-5) 
Where: 
),( yxpop   population density at point (x,y) 
x∆   grid cell length 




The consequences at node j when emergency response is initiated from location i, 
kr














,  (5-6) 
Where: 
X  is maximum downwind distance from release point j to the 1% lethality level  
Y  is maximum crosswind distance to 1% lethality level. 
 
Population density is assumed to be homogeneous for the whole hazard area 
around the release site, and thus a single population density value is used for each 
individual node. Initially we considered having different population densities for different 
points within the hazard area around release node j. However, given that release 
frequencies on links were aggregated to the nearest node, this approach might not yield 
better risk estimates. Many nodes represent population centers where population density 
is higher than that on transportation links. Hence, considering detailed population density 
at nodes might overestimate HazMat risk at these locations. Using an average population 
density is consistent with the level of aggregation used for estimating release frequencies 
at nodes.  
 
Using ALOHA, the Ammonia release was modeled as a toxic dense gas release. 
A lethality level threshold of 1% was used to determine the hazard area (i.e. X and Y 
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values). Intervals of one minute were used to calculate lethality levels at different 
response times.  Figure 5-6 and Figure 5-7 show the expected consequences for different 
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Figure 5-7: Expected consequences for different rates of Ammonia large spill 
 
 
5.2 Consequences of Release of Flammable Liquefied Pressured Gases 
(LPG) 
The release of flammable liquefied pressurized gases ( LPG, e.g. Propane) results 
in a rapid evaporation of the released liquid and the formation of vapor cloud. In this 
research, vapor cloud fire (flash fire) is the outcome considered for modeling the ignition 
of flammable vapor cloud following dispersion. Ignition of the cloud depends on the 
concentration of the flammable gas: if the vapor cloud is too rich (above Upper 
Flammability Level, UFL) there may not be enough oxygen for it to ignite; if the cloud is 
too diluted (below Lower Flammability Level, LFL) there may not be enough flammable 
substance for the cloud to ignite. Furthermore, if a cloud within flammability levels 




Gas dispersion modeling of flammable LPG is the same as for toxic liquefied gases 
(Section 5.1.1). As in Ammonia consequence analysis, the continuous space of the hazard 
area is transformed into a discrete mesh grid. ALOHA is used to calculate concentration 
levels at different grid cells. Cells with concentration levels within the LFL are 
considered as hazard area ( krtijHA ) as shown in Figure 5-8. Unlike toxic gases, we are only 
interested in concentration levels equal to the lower flammability limit (LFL)8 since the 
assumption is made that once ignition occurs, the whole hazard area within the LFL will 
ignite regardless of concentration levels.  
 
  (x,y) 
  j 
 y 
 x 




Figure 5-8: Hazard area within the LFL of flammable cloud 
 
5.2.1 Ignition Probabilities, an Overview 
Ignition probability estimates for flammable clouds have great uncertainty 
associated with them. Many QRA models rely on either experts’ guesses or sparse 
                                                 




historical data for ignition probability estimates. Cox et al (1990) and Center for 
Chemical Process Safety (1995) give a review of the subject. Approaches used to 
estimate ignition probabilities include, 
 
• Estimates based on cloud area: 
Simmons (1974) did one of the earliest studies on ignition probability. His model 
estimates the cumulative probability of ignition as a function of cloud area for LPG and 
LNG (Liquefied Natural Gas) releases, based on 59 incidents. Table 5-2 gives the model 
cumulative ignition probabilities for different cloud areas.  
 
Table 5-2: Cumulative ignition probabilities based on cloud area (Simmons 1974) 
Area (m^2) cumulative ignition 
probability, EA 








• Estimates based on location of cloud at ignition: 
U.K. Health and Safety Executive (1991) estimated values of the conditional 
delayed ignition probability given that prior ignition has not occurred. The estimated 





Table 5-3: U.K. Health and Safety Executive estimates of delayed ignition probabilities 
Type of ignition  Conditional probability 
Edge of the cloud is at edge of population area when 
ignition occurs 0.7 
Cloud is right over population area at time of ignition 0.2 
No ignition 0.1 
 
 
• Estimates based on discharge rate: 
Cox et al. (1990) suggested a correlation for the probability of ignition based on 
discharge rate. The probability of ignition (immediate and delayed) was assumed as a 
function of a power of the discharge rate as follows: P = a mb, where P is the ignition 
probability, m is the discharge rate (kg/s), and a and b are model parameters.  
 
• Estimates based on detailed consideration of ignition sources: 
Rew et al. (2000) developed an ignition probability model that is based on the 
distribution of likely ignition sources at the release site and considers (among other 
factors) the release duration. The model requires detailed data related to types and 
densities of different ignition sources within the release site. This model was developed 
for use in the UK; however, such data was unfortunately not available for use in Canada.  
 
• Estimates based on release size  
Brown et al. (2001) found that the ignition probability strongly depends on release 
amounts, as shown in Table 5-4. On the basis of these results, the ignition probability for 
small, medium and large LP gas releases is 0%, 18%, and 52%, respectively. For large 




Table 5-4: Ignition Probabilities (%) for Small (less than 5 gal), Medium (5–100 gal), and Large 
(greater than 100 gal) Highway LP Gas Releases* 
  Fire Explosion and Fire 
Spill 
Size  
Total # of 
incidents No. % No. % 
Small  6 0 0 0 0 
Medium  11 2 18 0 0 
Large  21 11 52 4 19 
Total  38 13 34 4 11 
* As determined from HMIS database incident records from 1985 to 1995. Only those records that included 
comments are included in this table. 
 
The UK Health and Safety Executive (1991) estimated ignition probabilities for 
rail transport of Gasoline and LPG based on release size as shown in Table 5-5. They 
suggested a much lower ignition probability of 3.3% for road transport of Gasoline and 
LPG based on 23 release observations with no ignition event combined with Poisson 
analysis at a 50% confidence level.  
 
Table 5-5: Ignition Probabilities for rail transport of Gasoline and LPG (UK Health and Safety 
Executive 1991) 
Substance Type of ignition Small spill Large spill 
Gasoline Immediate 0.1* 0.2* 
Gasoline Delayed 0 0.1 
Gasoline None 0.9* 0.7 
LPG Immediate 0.1 0.2 
LPG Delayed 0 0.5 
LPG None 0.9 0.3 
The ignition probabilities indicated by * are derived from “Actual” incidents, 





5.2.2 Proposed Ignition Probabilities 
Rew et al (2000) argued that ignition probabilities of flammable gas clouds 
depend on the duration of the cloud. Some sources are intermittent in nature and other 
sources, such as hot surfaces, might become a potential ignition source only after a period 
of time. For example, if a steady state plume with roughly constant area within the 
flammability limits contains an ignition source that becomes active every 15 minutes, 
then the cumulative probability of ignition increases with time even though the cloud area 
does not increase.  Finally, there is always the probability of an ignition source entering 
the cloud from outside its boundary.  
 
None of the previously reviewed models demonstrated usefulness for application 
in our TDQRA module since they either did not consider the time element in estimating 
the ignition probability or require unavailable detailed information about ignition sources 
at the accident site. For this module, we propose a simple applicable approach to estimate 
ignition probability that takes into account release duration. Defining ktP  as the 
probability of a cloud igniting at a particular time, t, then ktP  is equal to the probability of 
a cloud igniting in the tth time interval given that it did not ignite in the past t-1 time 
intervals. Assuming independency between the events, ktP  is assumed to follow a 









where Ip  is a model parameter representing the probability of ignition within one time 
interval. Based on our judgment, we used a default ignition probability within one 
minute, kIp  equal to 1% for Propane, and 0.05% for Gasoline. The estimated cumulative 
ignition probabilities using these default values are shown in Figure 5-9. The estimated 
































Figure 5-9: Estimated Gasoline and LPG cumulative ignition probabilities based on release duration 
 
 
Table 5-6: Estimated Gasoline and LPG cumulative ignition probabilities for short and long release 
durations 
Substance Release duration (min) 
Cumulative Ignition 
probability 
Gasoline 10 0.05 
Gasoline 120 0.45 
LPG 10 0.1 
LPG 120 0.7 
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5.2.3 Consequences calculation of Flammable Cloud Ignition 
In case of ignition of a flammable cloud, exposure to flame and heat radiation will 
result in injuries or fatality. The time of exposure to heat radiation will affect the level of 
injury; however, the time element in the heat exposure is very short and was insignificant 
in our analysis. In modeling flash fire consequences, people caught in the fire boundaries 
are generally assumed to die and those outside the flame will likely survive (Rew et al. 
1996). Accordingly, a lethality level of 100% is assumed within the vapor cloud and 0% 
outside of it.  At time tij, consequences of the flammable cloud at point j when response is 
























is the hazard area within the LFL at time tij determined from gas dispersion 
modeling using ALOHA 
popj is the population density at node j. 
 
5.3 Consequences of Release of Flammable Liquids 
Gasoline and other liquids are usually transported at atmospheric temperature and 
pressure. When Gasoline is released, the liquid partially evaporates and forms a 
flammable cloud above the released surface. For the modeling of Gasoline consequences, 
the released material is assumed to spread forming a pool with a depth of one centimeter 
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(US Environmental Protection Agency 1999). The discharge rate to air is estimated as the 
rate of evaporation from the pool. 
 
The evaporated cloud may spread to the downwind direction depending on 
atmospheric conditions. When the flammable cloud reaches an ignition source, it will 
ignite and propagate backwards resulting in a pool fire. Although a pool fire is the final 
outcome once a Gasoline release has been ignited, the hazard area is not limited to the 
area of the pool, but instead expands to the flammable cloud area above the pool. As in 
the case of LPG flash fire, a lethality level of 100% within the vapor cloud and 0% 
outside of it are assumed.  
 
We modeled the evaporation of Gasoline and the formation of a flammable cloud 
above the released pool using ALOHA. Gasoline is not part of ALOHA hazardous 
material library; however, it was added to the ALOHA chemical library manually. 
Ignition probabilities and consequences estimates were carried out according to sections 
5.2.2 and 5.2.3. 
 
5.4 Environmental Impact 
QRA models commonly use the number of fatalities and injuries as a measure of 
consequences (see Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 2004 and 
Health and Safety Executive 1991). Moreover, the assumption is usually made that other 
consequences will be in proportion to the number of fatalities and injuries. However, 
many historical accidents indicate that this assumption might be incorrect. Depending on 
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location and conditions at the time of release, discharged material could destroy wildlife 
and vegetation, escape to nearby waterways and drainage systems, penetrate the soil, and 
contaminate ground water and wells. Thus, the impact of HazMat releases into the 
environment can be horrendous as was the case of the 1991 California train derailment 
that spilled approximately 20,000 gallons of pesticide into the Sacramento River 
(Anderson 1991).  
 
However, assessing the effects of HazMat releases into the environment is difficult 
to say the least. Data is usually limited and the factors affecting the outcomes of a release 
are complex.  In many cases establishing the final and complete impact of Hazmat 
releases on the surrounding environment is not possible. Thus, in such circumstances, 
assessing the likelihood of identified concentrations of concerns occurring in the air, 
water, and soil may be more appropriate (Nicolet-Monnier and Gheorghe 1996).  
 
Models for HazMat environmental impact consequence analysis are usually site 
specific, where detailed information about site topography, soil characteristic, distance to 
groundwater, and distance to nearby waterways can be obtained. However, in case of 
HazMat road transport, accidents can occur at any point on the network, and thus 
accident locations, and hence site specific information, are not known. For this reason, 
such site specific environmental risk assessments were deemed unsuitable for use with 




This section is aimed at a preliminary investigation of the environmental impact of 
HazMat releases and is not meant to be a detailed evaluation of environmental impact. 
Instead, the following research functions as an initial investigation on what the impact 
might be. In general, environmental impacts of HazMat releases are assumed to be 
proportional to the amounts released. For our module, a simple approach is used to 
evaluate the environmental impact of HazMat releases, where the impact on the 
environment is assumed to be linearly related to the amount of HazMat released. 
Moreover, an environmental impact index was used as an environmental consequence 
measure. This index is meant to represent impact on existing vegetation and wild life, 
long-term effects, and clean-up as well as rehabilitation costs.  Finally, different weights 
were assumed for different HazMat types depending on their perceived impact.  
 
Defining krijREnv  as the environmental risk from a release type r of HazMat type k 








ij EnvCsqFrqREnv *=  (5-9) 
Where  
kr
jFrq  is the frequency of release of HazMat type k and releases rate r at 




ijEnvCsq   is the environmental consequence at node j due to release type r of 









ij WtDREnvCsq **=  (5-10) 
 
Where: 
krDR  is the discharge rate of release type r for HazMat type k in kg/min (Table 
3-6) 
ijt   represents response time from HazMat teams at node i to the release site at 
node j,  in minutes 
kW   represents weight of the  environmental impact of release of one ton of 
HazMat type k 
 
Finally, the environmental risk at node j when response is initiated from HazMat 





ijij REnvREnv   (5-11) 
 
Values of kW  for different types of HazMat were judged according to their 
perceived environmental impact. Different types of HazMat will have different impact 
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severities on the environment within the vicinity of the release site. In general, fire 
hazards are of less relevance to the environment in comparison to the acute and chronic 
toxicity impacts from the release of toxic materials, while the ignition of flammable 
substances results in destruction of vegetation and wild life within the hazard area. The 
analysis of flammable hazard is limited to fire due to the HazMat within the LFL 
concentration. The case of forest fires, as a result of HazMat ignition expanding beyond 
the hazard area, will not be considered.  
 
Toxic gas releases destroy wild life and affect vegetation, and their cloud area is 
much larger than that for flammable gases. While gases evaporate upon release, resulting 
in no permanent residue in surrounding ground or nearby waterways, released liquid 
HazMat can penetrate the soil, escape to nearby waterways and affect the surrounding 
environment for much longer periods of time. Among different HazMat types, toxic 
liquid releases affect the environment the most. 
 
Table 5-7 shows assumed weights for environmental impacts of release of different 
HazMat for each ton released. These values were based on our judgment and may not 
reflect the actual environmental impacts of HazMat releases.  
 
Table 5-7: Environmental risk impact weight for different types of HazMat 
HazMat type Weight of environmental 
impact 
Flammable gases 1 
Toxic gases 5 
Flammable liquids 10 





Locating HazMat teams based solely on environmental risk is unrealistic. 
However, combining human fatality and environmental risks is not an easy task. Nicolet-
Monnier and Gheorghe (1996) suggested that public health risk should be assessed 
separately from environmental risk. Consequently, given the fact that the absolute value 
of quantitative risk estimates is highly questionable, trying to combine human fatality 
estimates and environmental impact estimates is practically meaningless. Therefore, these 
two measures will be considered separately.  
 
5.5 Summary 
Consequence modeling of considered HazMat types was discussed in the chapter 
with the considered release outcomes for various HazMat releases as follows: toxic cloud 
for an Ammonia release, flash fire for a Propane release, and ignition of the vapor cloud 
above the pool for a Gasoline release. A simple environmental impact index is suggested 




CHAPTER 6: CASE STUDY 
This Chapter describes a case study to illustrate the relevance of the risk-based 
HazMat team location optimization model as a tool in emergency response planning. In 
this case study, part of the southwestern Ontario region (shown in Figure 6-1) will be 




Figure 6-1: Southwestern Ontario area covered by case study 
 
The optimal location solution for a given number of HazMat teams is defined as the 
solution which gives the minimum total network risk while ensuring that maximum 
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response time to any node on the network does not exceed a preset threshold. For this 
case study a maximum response time threshold of 60 minutes was used. The problem to 
be solved is minor in scope; hence complete enumeration was used to achieve the 
solution. The model is run for the whole location solution domain to reach the optimal 
location solution.  
 
6.1 Case Description and Input Data  
The study area covers a total of 1040.274 km of highways and has a total annual 
truck traffic of 2,147,274 truck-km. The road network is represented as a directed graph 
with nodes and links. A simple network that consists of 32 nodes and 92 links is used to 
illustrate how to use different aspects of the developed model with the following node 
attributes included: node ID, longitude, latitude, population density (inhabitance/ km), 
host Fire station (0=no, 1=yes), and within urban area (0 = no, 1 = yes). Link attributes 
include parameters such as link ID, head node ID, tale node ID, length (km), posted 
speed (km/hr), and average annual daily traffic (AADT).  
 
Figure 6-2 illustrates the model representation of the road network, fire stations, 
HazMat team locations, links and nodes on the considered region. Numbers on the graph 
represent node numbers.  
 
Digital representation of the road network is provided by the “Atlas of Canada,” 
Natural Resources Canada. The data is downloaded from the GeoGratis (2004) web site: 
National Atlas Base Maps. Base map components are available in five scales and in a 
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Figure 6-2: The HazMat location model representation of the case study area 
 
Data for the case study area was extracted from National Atlas Base Maps files 
and processed to a text file format compatible with the requirements of our model. 
 
6.1.1 Existing Locations of Fire Stations and HazMat Teams 
There are a total of 520 fire departments in Ontario, 167 of which are full time 
fire departments with the remaining 353 classified as volunteer. The twelve full time fire 
departments within the study area are located at Paris, Brantford, Oakville, Burlington, 
1 2
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Milton, Hamilton, Drumbo, Cambridge, Kitchener, Guelph, Mississauga, and 
Woodstock. Of these twelve fire departments, only four have HazMat teams, namely 
Mississauga, Hamilton, Burlington, and Cambridge9.  
 
Mississauga Fire and Emergency Services have three crews that are trained at the 
technician level and one specialty vehicle equipped to carry all HazMat team tools and 
supplies. The Cambridge Fire Department presently has ten fire fighters trained at the 
technician level, six of which are certified to deliver training to the operations level. The 
department has two apparatus which carry equipment related to a HazMat response and is 
also presently involved with the Kitchener and Waterloo fire departments in developing a 
cooperative assistance response for the area of Waterloo Region. The Hamilton Fire 
Department has been providing HazMat response since the mid 70's.  The present team is 
made up of 40 members with a minimum of seven members of the team trained at the 
Technician Level and continuously on duty.  The team members staff two vehicles and 
have provided regional emergency response since the early 80's.  
 
Although there are differences in the level of available HazMat response 
capabilities among these fire departments, for the purpose of this research the assumption 
is made that all of them carry the same capabilities. In addition to the previous HazMat 
teams the Brantford, Oakville and Guelph fire departments provide some level of HazMat 
response. However, because of the low level of HazMat response available at these 
locations, they we not considered in the case study.  
 
                                                 
9 Personal communication(email)  with different fire departments  
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6.1.2 Response Time 
In this research, response time is defined as the time elapsing from release 
occurrence until mitigation measures are applied at the scene. Following this definition, 
response time has three components: dispatch time at the station, travel time from the 
station to the site, and mitigation time. Response to a release on the road network is 
assumed to come from the nearest HazMat team with response time to different nodes 
obtained using fastest route calculations. 
 
Emergency vehicles travel time is a function of various factors including, but not 
limited to, travel distance, the layout of the region, weather conditions, road and traffic 
conditions. Emergency vehicles may experience a delay especially in the case of a highly 
congested network, highway closure due to an accident, or while passing through a town 
at a posted lower speed.  Several methods of representing travel times on links were 
investigated with the following options considered: 
 
• Using free flow travel time assuming that emergency vehicles would have the right of 
way and would experience no delays while traveling on the road network. 
• Using average travel time assuming that emergency vehicles would travel at the same 
speed as other vehicles. 
• A compromise of the previous two assumptions, where the emergency vehicles are 





For the case study, the emergency vehicles are assumed to be delayed by a certain 
percentage of the free flow travel time (called the “delay factor”).  Free flow travel time 
is calculated using posted speed and link length. Using a delay factor of “1” will result in 
travel times equal to the free flow travel time. As a result, the higher the delay factor, the 
longer calculated travel times on links will be. Moreover, emergency vehicles were 
assumed to experience a delay at each intersection node either due to passing through an 
urban area, changing direction, or getting onto or off ramps. Intersection delay time is 
assumed to have a linear relationship with population density at each intersection node 
with a maximum default value of 2 minutes for heavily populated areas such as 
Mississauga and Hamilton (population density of 700 inhabitant/km2). The model allows 
investigation of different input parameters but default values are set to a 1.2 delay factor, 
3 minutes for assembly time, 5 minutes for mitigation time, and 2 minutes for maximum 
intersection delay.  
 
6.1.3 Meteorological Conditions 
The atmospheric dispersion of vapor clouds depends on the meteorological 
conditions at the time of release. Wind speed and atmospheric stability are the primary 
factors that influence dispersion. Average wind speed values and direction for the case 
study area were obtained from Environment Canada (2004), and the weather network 
(2004) websites. After investigating the norms for different weather stations within the 
region, winds of 17.5 km/hr blowing from the west were found to best represent average 
conditions over the whole region. Figure 6-3 shows the mean wind speed for southern 
Ontario (Energy Educators of Ontario 1993). Other assumptions include D wind stability, 
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ground roughness equivalent to open country, partly clouded skies, and an air 
temperature of 21 C. Table 6-1 summarizes different default parameters used in the 




Figure 6-3: Mean wind speed map for southern Ontario (wind in km/hr) 
 
6.1.4 Population Distribution 
Population density distribution over the region was obtained from Canada 
2001Census data (Statistics Canada 2003). Population densities are given at Census 
Subdivisions level. Figure 6-4 shows southern Ontario population distributions for 1996 




Table 6-1: Assumed model parameters 
Response time  
  
Dispatch time 3 minutes 
Travel time assumed travel times on 
links as 120% of free-flow 
travel times (20% to 
account for delays) 
Mitigation time 5 minutes 
Intersection delay Maximum of 2 minutes 
  
Weather conditions   
Wind speed 17.5 km/hr 
Wind direction West 
Wind stability class D 
Air temperature 21oC 
Relative humidity 50% 
Cloud cover 50% 
 
 




6.1.5 HazMat types and Discharge Rates 
Four HazMat types are considered for the TDQRA module, namely toxic 
liquefied gases (represented by Ammonia), flammable liquefied gases (LPG represented 
by Propane), flammable liquids (represented by Gasoline), and toxic liquids. For each 
HazMat type, two release types are considered—spill and leak—and two release 
quantities are considered: large and small. Discharge rates estimated from DGAIS data 
(Table 6-2) are used for this case study. Estimation of these values were discussed in 
Section 3.3.  
 
Table 6-2: Discharge rate for different scenarios (kg/min) 
 Discharge rate (kg/min) 








Ave small spill  4.7 9 12.7 6.3 15 
Ave large spill  645.3 336 626 717.1 15 
Ave small leak  0.6 0.06 1.9 0.9 60 
Ave large leak  121 35 92 98.2 60 
 
6.1.6 HazMat Traffic Volumes 
Estimates of HazMat traffic volumes were based on available truck Average 
Annual Daily Traffic (AADT). Moreover, total HazMat movements were assumed to 
constitute a fixed percentage of the total truck AADT on links.  The truck AADT for the 
considered network was obtained from the Ontario freight transportation system study 
(Ray Barton Associates et al. 2000). Furthermore, traffic volumes for different types of 
HazMat were assumed to be proportional to the overall representation of these types in 




Estimates of the share of HazMat movements in total truck traffic for different 
HazMat classes were based on the “1995 Road Side Survey” data (Canadian Council of 
Motor Transport Administrators coordinates 2002). Using the “1999 National Roadside 
Study” we estimated 9.85% of the total truck movements in Canada to be HazMat 
related. Percentages of different HazMat types transported in Canada as obtained from 
Transport Canada (2002) are shown in Table 6-3. Applying these estimates to the truck 
Annual Average Daily Traffic (AADT) on individual links gives the HazMat traffic 
volumes by HazMat type. 
 
Table 6-3: Percentage of different HazMat types transported by road (by tonnage) 
HazMat type Percentage of total HazMat  
Flammable liquids (Gasoline) 64.61% 
Toxic liquids 14.62% 
Flammable liquefied gases (Propane) 3.58% 
Toxic liquefied gases (Ammonia) 0.98% 
 
 
6.1.7 Estimates of Release Probabilities 
Table 6-4 lists release probabilities for different release scenarios. Values in this 
table were calculated from Button’s (1999) conditional release probability estimates 






Table 6-4: Release probabilities (%) given an accident has occurred 
HazMat type Ammonia Propane Gasoline Toxic liquids 
large spill 0.87 1.09 1.34 0.56 
small spill 0.44 0.55 0.73 0.28 
large leak 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.05 
small leak 0.19 0.24 0.30 0.12 
total 1.58 1.98 2.49 1.02 
 
Accident rates were obtained for large tanker trucks using the Ontario Accident 
Data system (ADS) for the years 1988 to 1992 (Saccomanno et al. 1998). These rates 
expressed on per MVKm bases are summarized in Table 6-5 for three types of highways.  
 
Table 6-5: Truck accident rates (accident/MVKm) 
Highway type Urban Rural Arterials Overall  
Accident rate 
(accident/MVKm)  1.023 0.549 1.003 0.924 
 
For this case study we used an overall truck accident rate of 0.924 accident/MVKm 
for all types of highways. Combining release probabilities from Table 6-4with the 
accident rates from Table 6-5 yields the frequency of release on a per MVKm bases.  
 
6.2 Sensitivity Analysis 
The developed HazMat location model includes a large number of parameters and 
input variables that are uncertain and cannot be predicted precisely. A range of values or 
a probability distribution might exist for each input parameter due to the lack of sufficient 
data, precise values or an uncertainty in the HazMat release process itself because of 
system variations over time and space. One common treatment of such variations in 
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values is to use the mean value of each parameter or variable, assuming that the impact of 
uncertainty on the final solution is negligible. However, using average values might 
introduce a significant error to the evaluation process. For example, using an average 
wind speed value of 17.5 km/hr blowing from the west might result in significantly 
different results compared to the modeling of a wind rose with different probabilities for 
different wind speeds and directions. When values are averaged within a rather narrow 
range, errors due to averaging are small enough to ignore. However, when values are 
significantly different the average error might become substantial.  
 
In this Section we investigate the effects of uncertainty in input parameters on the 
performance of the developed model. We also examine different values for each input 
parameter and how the resulting HazMat locations change. 
 
6.2.1 Accident Frequency 
In the developed model, an overall average truck accident rate of 0.924 
accidents/MVKm was assumed for all links. Under such an assumption, uniform change 
in accident rate values for all links will have no effect on the choice of the optimal 
solution since risk estimates are linearly related to the point estimate value of the accident 
rate.  
 
In this section, simulation is used to assess the impact of accident rate variation for 
different links on the choice of optimal HazMat team location. Accident rate on each link 
was assumed to follow a normal distribution with a mean value  equal to 0.094 
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accidents/MVKm, and a standard deviation .  Different values for the variation of 
accident rates on links (/) were assumed by varying the standard deviation, .  Using 
different / values, we generated different accident rates on links and ran the model to 
determine how many times the current optimal solution would hold its position. Figure 
6-5 shows that a 25% variation in the truck accident rate demonstrated almost no change 
in the choice for an optimal solution, while a variation of 50% caused a 6.6% change in 
the choice for an optimal solution. As the variation of accident rate increases to 75%, the 
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Figure 6-5:  Variation in optimal location results with variation in truck accident rates on links 
  
6.2.2 Release Probabilities 
The model uses default release frequencies shown in Table 6-6. These values 
were derived from Button’s (1998) estimates of conditional release probabilities, as 
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illustrated in section 4.3. In this section, we will compare results using the default values 
to results using earlier estimates by Saccomanno et al. (1989). Their estimates of different 
release type probabilities given a release and the probability of a release given an 
accident were combined. The resultant release probabilities given an accident for 
different release types are shown in Table 6-7.  
 
 
Table 6-6: Default release probabilities for different HazMat types and different release scenarios (%) 
HazMat type large spill small spill large leak small leak total 
1 (Chlorine) 0.872 0.438 0.077 0.194 1.582 
2 (LPG) 1.091 0.546 0.096 0.243 1.976 
3 (Gasoline)  1.342 0.729 0.119 0.299 2.489 
4 (Toxic liquids) 0.560 0.280 0.050 0.125 1.015 
 
 
Table 6-7: Release probabilities given an accident (%) by release type, based on Saccomanno et al. 
(1989) estimates 
   P (release type | accident) 
Instant Continuous 
 
high medium low High medium low 
total 
Chlorine 0.288 0.352 0.496 0.192 0.128 0.144 1.6 
LPG 0.37 0.74 0.74 0.148 0.592 1.11 3.7 
Gasoline 4.8 0 7.2 0 0 0 12 
 
 
In the developed TDQRA, HazMat releases are classified into large and small 
only. Therefore the release probabilities in Table 6-7 needed to be adjusted in order to be 
used in our model. We assumed “instant” and “continues” releases would represent 
“spills” and “leaks,” respectively. “High” and “low” releases would be equivalent to 
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“large” and “small” releases, respectively. Half of the “medium” release probability was 
assigned to the “high” release, while the other half was assigned to the “low” release.  
The adjusted “high” and “low” release probabilities were assumed to be equivalent to 
large and small release probabilities, respectively. Table 6-8 shows the adjusted 
percentage of probability of release for different release types.  
 











1 (Chlorine) 0.464 0.672 0.256 0.208 1.6 
2 (LPG) 0.74 1.11 0.444 1.406 3.7 
3 (Gasoline)  4.8 7.2 0 0 12 
 
 
We ran the model for both release probability estimates in Table 6-7 and Table 
6-8. The risk and location results in Table 6-9 show a substantial difference in risk 
estimates using the different release probability estimates. Total network risk using 
Saccomanno et al. (1989) estimates are more than double the estimates using model 
default values, while the difference in maximum risk estimates is even higher. However, 
no change in the optimal locations of HazMat teams may be found. Also, ranking of 








Table 6-9: HazMat teams optimal locations and total risk results for different release probabilities 
estimates 







Model defaults  6 14 22 27 0.0372 0.0067 50 
Saccomanno et al. (1989) 
values 6 14 22 27 0.0914 0.0170 50 
 
 
Results show that while varying accident and release rates uniformly for the 
whole network affect estimated risk values, they do not affect the choice of optimal 
solution and have no or minimal effect on the ranking of current solution among different 
alternatives.  
 
6.2.3 Response Time 
Response time consists of three components: dispatch time at the team location, 
travel time to the release site, and mitigation time at the release site.  Default values for 
dispatch and mitigation time are set at three and five minutes respectively. Change in 
response time for two different ways is investigated: change by a constant value and 
change by a certain percentage. Change by a constant value is applicable to estimates of 
dispatch and mitigation times, while change by certain percentage is applicable to delays 
in travel times.  
 
  Four values of combined dispatch and mitigation time were tested: the default of 
8 minutes, along with 15, 20, 30, and 60 minutes respectively. Results are shown in 
Figure 6-6 and Table 6-10. The results show that total risk on network increases with the 
Chapter 6 
 123 
increase in dispatch and mitigation time. The increase is almost linear for values up to 
about 25 minutes and levels off for larger dispatch and mitigation time values. However, 
this outcome was expected as a maximum spill time of 30 minutes and a maximum leak 
time of 2 hours were established for the case study. Higher values of response time will 
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Figure 6-6: Change in total network risk for different dispatch and mitigation times 
 
Table 6-10: Location and risk results for different dispatch and mitigation times 
Dispatch and mitigation 
time 








8 min 6 14 22 27 0.0372 0.0067 50 
15 min 6 14 15 27 0.0472 0.0072 71 
20 min 6 14 15 27 0.0523 0.0074 76 
30 min 6 14 22 27 0.0576 0.0074 72 





For combined dispatch and mitigation time values of 15 and 20 minutes, the 
optimal solution was found to favor high population locations (node 15), while for 
smaller and larger values, locations towards the geographical center of the region are 
more favorable (node 22). Furthermore, for dispatch and mitigation times of 15 and 22 
minutes, the current solution was found to be less favorable, ranking 68 and 115 among 
the best alternatives (down from 52nd with 8 minutes dispatch and mitigation time). 
However, for longer dispatch and mitigation times the current solution again becomes 
more favorable, ranking 46th among best alternatives for 60 minutes of dispatch and 
mitigation time.   
 
In addition, emergency vehicles are assumed to be delayed by a certain 
percentage of the free flow travel time (called “delay factor”).  Using a delay factor of 
“1” will result in travel times equal to the free flow travel time. Moreover, the higher the 
delay factor is, the longer the calculated travel times on links will be.  The sensitivity of 
the risk estimates and the location solution to the value of the delay factor is examined by 
running the model for different values of the delay factor. As a result, the total risk was 
found to increase with the increase in the delay factor as shown in Figure 6-7, while 
results in Table 6-11 show that optimum HazMat team locations differ for larger delay 
factors. Node 15 (Mississauga) becomes more favorable than node 22 (Cambridge) for 
delay factor values over 1.4. Moreover, from Figure 6-7 we noticed that the relationship 
between risk estimates and the delay factor is linear for the same location solution with 
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Figure 6-7: Effect of change in the delay factor on total risk on the network 
 
Table 6-11: Location and risk results for different delay factors 







1 6 14 22 27 0.0354 0.0061 43 
1.2 6 14 22 27 0.0372 0.0067 50 
1.4 6 14 22 27 0.0387 0.0071 56 
1.6 6 14 15 27 0.0397 0.0063 82 
1.8 6 14 15 27 0.0405 0.0066 90 
2 6 14 15 27 0.0413 0.0069 99 
 
6.2.4 Variations in Travel Times on Links 
The HazMat team locations model uses deterministic travel times on links. In this 
section we use simulation to study the effect of variation in real links travel time on the 




Real travel time on each link was assumed to follow a normal distribution with a 
mean value  equal to free-flow travel time multiplied by the delay factor, and a standard 
deviation .  Different values for the variation of travel times on links (/) were 
assumed by varying the standard deviation, .  Using different / values, we generated 
different travel times on links and ran the model to determine how many times the current 
optimal solution would hold its position. Figure 6-8 shows that for variation in travel 
times of 10% there was slight change in the choice of the optimal solution in 0.3% of the 
times and for a variation of 15% there was a 3.2% change in the choice of the optimal 
solution. As the variation in travel time reached 25% there was a 14.4% change in the 
choice of the optimal location.  
 
Variation in optimal location results with the variation in 
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Figure 6-8: Variation in optimal location results with variation in travel time on links 
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6.2.5 HazMat Volumes  
Due to lack of data, major assumptions have been made for HazMat volumes and the 
routes on which these volumes are transported. HazMat volumes are assumed to 
constitute a certain percentage in the total truck traffic on links. For Canadian highways, 
a value of 9.85% HazMat traffic in the total truck movements was obtained using the 
commercial vehicles road side survey (1995)10. Sensitivity of the model to variation in 
HazMat volume on links is examined by simulating HazMat volumes as a normal 
distribution. Results in Figure 6-9 show that for a variation of up to 30% in the HazMat 
volumes, there is a slight change in the choice of the optimal solution and as the variation 
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Figure 6-9: Variation in optimal location results with variation in HazMat volumes on links 
 
                                                 
10 commercial vehicles road side survey (1995) 
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6.2.6 HazMat Routes  
In the southwestern Ontario case study, detailed data about actual HazMat routes 
was not available. Thus, the assumption was made that HazMat are being transported on 
all links in proportion to truck movements. However, a different assumbtion could be that 
all HazMat are transported on the two main corridors in the region, namely 401 and QEW 
(and part of 403 between Mississauga and Hamilton). Highway 401 is a main 
transportation corridor while QEW carries most of the shipments from eastern Canada to 
the USA cross-border at Niagara Falls. 
 
The model was used to investigate results sensitivity to the different routing 
assumption.  
 
Table 6-12 shows that the effect of different routing methods on total risk 
estimate is relatively small; however the location of the optimal solution differs for the 
two routing methods. Thus, if all HazMat movements are routed through 401 and QEW, 
HazMat team locations at Burlington (node 12) and Mississauga (node 15) become more 
favorable than Hamilton (node 6) and Oakville (node 14).  
 
 
Table 6-12: Four HazMat teams optimal locations for the 2 different routing strategies 





Optimal location for HazMat 
movements on all links 6 14 22 27 0.0372 0.0067 50 
Optimal location for HazMat 






6.2.7 Level of Aggregation 
Aggregating accident and release frequencies on links to adjacent nodes 
introduces an error to the risk estimates and, hence, to the choice of the optimal HazMat 
team locations. This section is aimed at investigating and illustrating such errors and how 
they might influence the location process.  Figure 6-10 shows the network representation, 
node aggregation, and link lengths used initially as well as the current and optimal 
solutions. The network contains long links with the longest (32 km in length) running 
between node 2 and 3.   
 
The maximum aggregation error on the network is introduced by the longest link 
(link 2 between node 2 and 3).  However, adding a hypothetical node on link 2 to divide 
it into two shorter links with lengths of 16 km each and re-running the model gives 
significantly different results. The new optimal solution (Figure 6-11) puts less emphasis 
on the southeastern part of the considered case study area and favors the further to the 
north-east location of Mississauga (node 15) over Oakville (node 14) and the further to 
the north location of Kitchener (node 29) over Cambridge (node 22) with a total network 






Figure 6-10: Current and optimal location solutions using initial network with 32 nodes (network 1) 
 
 
Figure 6-11: Current and optimal location solutions when adding hypothetical node 33 (network 2) 
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This solution is the optimal solution for a maximum response time of 60 minutes; 
however, notwithstanding the maximum response time constraint, the risk minimizing 
solution is at nodes 12, 15, 27, and 29 with a lower total network risk of 0.0366 and a  
maximum response time of 63 minutes.  
 
 
Figure 6-12: Location solution for a less aggregated network with 48 nodes (network 3) 
 
To further investigate the effect of level of aggregation on location solution, more 
hypothetical nodes on long links were added to refine the initial network as shown in 
Figure 6-12. Using the less aggregated network with 48 nodes resulted in the same 
optimal solution as the initial network of 32 nodes with slightly higher estimates of total 
network risk than network 1.  
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Table 6-13: Comparison of risk and location results using different levels of aggregation 







Current solution  6 12 15 22 0.0390 0.0063 62 
Optimal solution for network 1*   6 14 22 27 0.0372 0.0067 50 
Risk minimizing solution for 
network 2** 12 15 27 29 0.0366 0.0050 63 
Optimal solution for network 2** 6 15 27 29 0.0371 0.0050 58 
Optimal solution for network 
3*** 6 14 22 27 0.0379 0.0037 63 
*Network 1: initial network representation with 32 nodes 
**Network 2: adding one hypothetical node on the longest link 
***Network 3: less aggregated network with 48 nodes 
 
It should be noted that a suitable level of aggregation differs for different problems 
depending on the network characteristics, available data, as well as the spatial scope of 
the analysis. For the application of the model, investigating different levels of 
aggregation using the problem in hand is recommended in order to assess the impact the 
aggregation level might have on the HazMat team location decision. 
   
6.3 Input Parameters 
Sensitivity analysis show that while variation in some input parameter might have a 
great effect on risk estimates and the choice of the optimal solution; other parameters 
have no or little effect on the model performance. Input values that highly affect the 
model performance are:  
HazMat volumes and routs: HazMat traffic data is not readily available and rather 
usually obtained as aggregated values or only on origin-destination bases. The model 
proved to be sensitive to the routes and volumes of HazMat in the region. If possible, 




Accident and release frequencies: the developed model can estimate different release 
frequencies for different highway and link types depending on different accident outcome 
probabilities. However, lack of such specific accident outcomes data for the considered 
case study area prevented the illustration of the model full features in this area. A detailed 
link-specific accident and release data that is dependant on the link characteristics would 
enhance the model performance.  
Weather conditions: it is anticipated that considering a distribution of weather 
conditions at different nodes would improve the model performance.  
Assumed time elements: assumed values for the maximum release duration, the 
maximum acceptable response time, the dispatch and the mitigation times affects the 
choice of the optimal solution. Better realistic estimates of such values will help enhance 
the model performance.  
 
It was found that uniform input parameter values are of low significance on location 
decisions. Using uniform values for all links of parameters such as accident rates, traffic 
volumes, and weather conditions could introduce error to the risk estimate and the 
HazMat teams’ optimal location solution. It was also found that level of node aggregation 
will have an effect on the risk and location results; however it should be assessed on case-
by-case bases.  
 
6.4 Summary 
This Chapter introduced a case study to illustrate the risk-based HazMat team 
location optimization model features. Different model input parameters were introduced 
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and a sensitivity analysis was carried out to examine how sensitive the developed model 
is to the change in different input parameters. As expected, risk estimates were found to 
differ for different input parameters. Change in certain parameters uniformly for the 
whole network, in most cases, results in a linear change in risk estimates; however these 
changes do not affect the choice of optimal solution. In contrast, parameters that have 
different change patterns for different parts of the network (e.g. different HazMat routes 




CHAPTER 7: MODEL APPLICATION 
This chapter will use the case study of the southwestern Ontario region (shown in 
Figure 6-1) as an example to illustrate the features and potential applications of the 
developed model. A number of issues will be investigated including, 
 
1. Assessing Risk Implication of the Current and the Optimal HazMat Team 
Location Solutions. 
2. Regionally Planning HazMat Emergency Response to Determine Suitable 
Number and Locations of HazMat Teams. 
3. Examining the Effectiveness of the Current System as Compared to a System 
Comprising of Fewer HazMat Teams. 
4. Investigating Effect of Locating HazMat Teams to Any Node on the Network. 
5. Assessing the Effect of Different HazMat Routing Strategies on HazMat 
Emergency Response Planning. 
6. Investigating Emergency Response Requirements for Different HazMat Types. 
7. Investigating Environmental Impact.  
 
7.1 Assessing Risk Implication of the Current and the Optimal HazMat 
Team Location Solutions 
This section illustrates the use of the HazMat team location model in assessing the 
risk implication of the current locations of four HazMat teams within the study region. 
The HazMat team location model then compares the risk implication of the current 
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solution to the optimal solution for locating the same four teams so as to minimize total 
network risk subject to a maximum response time threshold of 60 minutes to any node on 
the network.  
 
 
Figure 7-1: Current and optimal locations for four HazMat teams 
 
Currently there are four HazMat teams located at nodes 6, 12, 15 and 22 (Figure 
7-1) with a total region risk of 0.0412 fatalities/year and a maximum response time of 50 
minutes. Figure 7-2 shows that flammable liquids contribute the greatest to the total 
network risk (60%).  Toxic gases are the second greatest offenders, with a 34% 
contribution to total network risk, while flammable gases contribute only 6% to total 
network risk. The high percentage of flammable liquids risk is due to its large volume of 
movement on the network (64% of all HazMat).  Although movements of volumes of 
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toxic liquefied gases are small, they still have a substantial impact on total network risk 






flammable liquef ied gases
toxic liquef ied gas
 
Figure 7-2: Different HazMat types contribution to total risk on the network 
 
Optimally locating four teams, the solution resulting in the minimum total 
network risk while ensuring that response time to any node on the network does not 
exceed 60 minutes would be at node 6, 14, 22 and 27 as shown in Figure 7-1. The 
optimal solution would result in a total network risk of 0.0372 fatality/year, about 10% 
lower than the current solution. Table 7-1 summarizes the total network risk, maximum 
node risk, and maximum node response time estimates for the current and optimal 
solutions of all four HazMat teams. The four nodes suggested by the optimal solution 
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differ from the current location (two nodes in common). Both location strategies have a 
maximum response time of 50 minutes.  
 
Table 7-1: Risk and maximum response time results for current and optimal locations of 4 HazMat teams   










locations 6 12 15 22 0.0412 0.0063 50  
Optimal 
locations 6 14 22 27 0.0372 0.0067 50 9.8%  
 
Figure 7-3 illustrates the relationship between all possible location solutions and 
total network risk in an increasing order. The optimum solution, by definition, gives rise 
to the lowest network risk. About 10% of all possible solutions give lower total network 
risk than the current solution (i.e. node 6, 12, 15, 22).  
 
For this case study, results fall within a fairly narrow band: the best location 
solution gives a reduction in total network risk of only 0.4 fatalities/100 years compared 
to the current solution, and only 2 fatalities/100 years less than the worst solution at 
nodes 1, 3, 30, and 32. However, as discussed earlier in Section 2.6, given the inherent 
uncertainties in the QRA analysis, the absolute values of the risk estimates are less 
significant than the relative values. Compared to the current solution, the optimal solution 
gives a reduction of 10 % in total network risk, and about a 34 % reduction in total 

































Figure 7-3: Relationship between locations and total risk in the region (based on exhaustive search) 
 
7.2 Regionally Planning HazMat Emergency Response to Determine 
Suitable Number and Locations of HazMat Teams 
This section details how the model can be used to regionally plan HazMat 
emergency response for transport related HazMat incidents. For the purposes of 
illustration, our case study region is assumed to lack any HazMat emergency coverage. 
As planners, we would like to find out the appropriate number and locations of HazMat 
teams needed to efficiently cover the considered region.  
 
To find out the relationship between total network risk and number of HazMat 
teams, we ran the model for optimally locating only one HazMat team, to locating 
HazMat teams at all fire stations (total of 12). Figure 7-4 shows the relationship between 
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total network risk and the number of HazMat teams on the network for optimal HazMat 
location solutions with a maximum response time threshold of 60 minutes. Under the 60 
minutes maximum response time constraint, there is no feasible solution for locating one 
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Figure 7-4: Relationship between total risk and number of HazMat teams on the road network with 60 
minutes restriction on maximum allowable response time 
 
As expected, increasing the numbers of HazMat teams results in a decrease of 
total network risk. The rate of reduction in network risk is highest for up to five HazMat 
teams, after which the relationship flattens out. Four to five teams would reflect the 
higher reduction rate in total network risk per additional team than for a higher number of 
teams. Thus, if the number of HazMat teams is a reflection of cost, we would suggest a 
number of four to five teams for this case study region. The following sections discuss 




• Locating one HazMat team 
Assuming one HazMat team is to be located, the best risk minimization location is 
Oakville (node 14) which results in the lowest total risk in the region of 0.0492 
fatalities/year. However, this location solution does not satisfy the maximum response 
time restriction of 60 minutes for some marginal nodes. For example, the response time 
for Woodstock, node 7, is 94 minutes. Figure 7-5 shows the minimum total risk solution 
for one HazMat team notwithstanding the maximum response time constraint.  
 
When we consider the maximum response time as the selection criterion, the best 
location is Hamilton (node 6, near the geometric center of the network). This choice 
results in a total network risk of 0.0547 fatalities/year. The maximum response time for 
this decision is 65 minutes for node 31 which is still unacceptable. Furthermore, for a 
one-team case, no solution exists that will yield a maximum response time less than 60 
minutes, which means there is no feasible solution under the maximum response time 
constraint. Results show that the optimal solution, not withstanding maximum response 
time restriction, favors densely populated areas (node 14), while restricting maximum 






Figure 7-5: Minimum risk solution of locating one HazMat team 
 
• Locating two HazMat teams 
If two HazMat teams are available for allocation, the risk minimization solution is 
Hamilton (node 6) and Oakville (node 14) which yields a total network risk of 0.0444 
fatalities/year and a maximum response time of 66 minutes.  Given our maximum 
response time standard of 60 minutes, this solution is unacceptable; however, moving 
these two HazMat teams to other nodes can result in an acceptable two-team solution. For 
example, moving the HazMat team from Hamilton (node 6) to Cambridge (node 22), as 
shown in Figure 7-6, results in a total risk of 0.0458 fatalities/year, a10% increase from 
the risk minimization solution, and a maximum response time of 50 minutes. By 
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solution yielded the lowest network risk subject to the 60 minutes maximum acceptable 
response time.  
 
 
Figure 7-6: Two-team solution for minimum total risk subject to 60 min. maximum response time 
 
 Results confirm that for limited HazMat coverage, relaxing the maximum response 
time restriction favors locations at high populated areas (node 6 and 14), while imposing 
this restriction results in a solution which still services highly populated areas through 
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• Locating three HazMat teams 
The risk minimization solution of three HazMat teams is at Oakville (node 14), 
Hamilton (node 6), and Milton (node 27). This solution yields the lowest network risk of 
0.0403 fatalities/year. The maximum response time for this solution is still unacceptable 
at 64 minutes; however, again moving the HazMat team from Milton (node 27) to 
Cambridge (node 22), as shown in Figure 7-7, results in an acceptable maximum 
response time of 50 minutes. This solution is achieved, however, at a higher network risk 
of 0.0411 fatalities/year.  
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• Locating four HazMat teams 
When the total number of teams to be located is increased to four, the risk 
minimization solution is also a feasible solution under the maximum response time 
constraint. As shown in Figure 7-8, the optimal solution is to locate teams at Oakville, 
Hamilton, Milton, and Cambridge with a total network risk of 0.0372 fatalities/ year and 




Figure 7-8: Current and optimal four HazMat teams solution 
 
A comparison of the location solutions of one to four HazMat teams is given in 
Table 7-2. In this table we have included, for comparison purposes, the current four-team 
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Cambridge (node 22). The application of the model produces a four HazMat team 
solution that yielded a 10 % reduction in risk.  
 
Table 7-2: Comparison of minimum total network risk solutions for 1, 2, 3, and 4 teams 










1    14 0.0492 0.0067 94 
2   6 14 0.0444 0.0067 66 
3  6 14 27 0.0403 0.0067 64 
4 6 14 22 27 0.0372 0.0067 50 
Current locations  6 12 15 22 0.0412 0.0063 50 
 
Maximum response time for current locations is 50 minutes. Thus, if planners are willing 
to accept a maximum response time of 64 minutes, the number of HazMat teams could be 
reduced to three, keeping node 6, relocating 15 and 22 to 14 and 27, and closing the team 
at 12. The resultant total network risk is 0.0372 fatalities/year (lower than the current 
solution at 0.0403 fatalities/year). 
 
7.3 Examining the Effectiveness of the Current System as Compared to a 
System Comprising of Fewer HazMat Teams  
This section investigates the possibility of closing certain HazMat teams and how 
such a decision will affect the total risk estimate. Assuming a decision is made to reduce 
the current HazMat teams to three teams only, the question of which one to close arises. 
 
We ran the model for four runs, each time removing one HazMat team and keeping 
the other three. Table 7-3 shows a comparison between the locations of the current four 
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and the proposed three-team locations. Accordingly, best location to close was found to 
be node 6, a decision that would result in the lowest increase in total network risk of 
3.2%. Baring in mind that node 6 represents the city of Hamilton and, over-and-above 
responding to transport related HazMat accidents on the road network, the HazMat team 
at Hamilton is responsible for responding to other non-transport related HazMat incidents 
within the city, closing the HazMat team at node 6 is somewhat impractical. Thus, the 
next choice is to close the team at node 12, Burlington, with an increase in total risk of 
5.2 % from current value. In this case, given the population involved, we would probably 
recommend the closure of Burlington instead of Hamilton with the recommendation of 
further evaluation of the non-transport related HazMat incidents at Burlington. It should 
be noted, however, that closing of HazMat team at Mississauga (node 15) will result in 
the greatest increase in network risk of 15 %.  
 















locations 6 12 15 22 0.0412 0.0063 50  
close 6  12 15 22 0.0425 0.0063 50 3.2 
close 12  6 15 22 0.0433 0.0063 50 5.2 
close 22  6 12 15 0.0444 0.0063 66 7.8 
close 15  6 12 22 0.0473 0.0074 50 14.9 
 
While deciding on a HazMat team closure, planners might be willing to relocate 
one of the remaining teams in order to maintain total network risk at its current level. 














Total risk (%) 
6 12 15 22 0.0412 0.0063 50 
Current 
locations 
 12 15 27 0.0417 0.0058 73 1.2 
 6 15 27 0.0424 0.0058 64 2.9 
 12 15 22 0.0425 0.0063 50 3.2 
 6 15 22 0.0433 0.0063 50 5.2 
 6 12 14 0.0434 0.0067 66 5.3 
 12 22 27 0.0440 0.0067 50 6.7 
 15 22 27 0.0442 0.0058 50 7.2 
 12 15 29 0.0444 0.0063 57 7.8 
 6 12 15 0.0444 0.0063 66 7.8 
 12 15 31 0.0446 0.0063 53 8.3 
 6 22 27 0.0448 0.0067 50 8.7 
 6 15 29 0.0452 0.0063 57 9.7 
 12 15 32 0.0453 0.0063 63 9.8 
 12 15 30 0.0453 0.0063 69 10.0 
 6 15 31 0.0454 0.0063 48 10.2 
 6 12 27 0.0458 0.0067 64 11.0 
 6 15 32 0.0461 0.0063 62 11.7 
 6 15 30 0.0461 0.0063 64 11.9 
 6 12 22 0.0473 0.0074 50 14.9 
 15 22 31 0.0476 0.0063 50 15.6 
 15 22 32 0.0477 0.0063 46 15.8 
 15 22 30 0.0479 0.0063 50 16.3 
 15 22 29 0.0479 0.0063 50 16.3 
 12 22 31 0.0481 0.0074 50 16.7 
 12 22 32 0.0482 0.0074 47 16.9 
 12 22 30 0.0484 0.0074 50 17.4 
 12 22 29 0.0484 0.0074 50 17.4 
 6 22 31 0.0490 0.0074 57 18.9 
 6 22 32 0.0491 0.0074 57 19.2 
 6 12 29 0.0492 0.0074 57 19.4 
 6 22 30 0.0493 0.0074 54 19.6 
 6 22 29 0.0493 0.0074 57 19.7 
 6 12 31 0.0494 0.0074 48 19.9 
 6 12 32 0.0501 0.0074 62 21.5 
 6 12 30 0.0501 0.0074 64 21.6 
 
Results in Table 7-4 show that the closest solution to the current level of total 
network risk would be keeping the teams at node 12 and 15, closing the team at 6, and 
relocating 22 to 27.  The proposed solution will result in an increase of 1.2 % in total 
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network risk, correspondent to a total risk of 0.0417 fatalities /year; however the 
maximum response time of this solution is 73 minutes.  
 
The best alternative that satisfies the 60 minutes maximum response time threshold 
would be to close the HazMat team at node 6 (Hamilton) without the need to relocate any 
other team. This solution results in a 3.1 % increase in the total network risk and a 
maximum response time of 50 minutes. Considering the desirability of maintaining the 
HazMat team at node 6, the next alternative is to close the HazMat team at node 12 
without the need to relocate any other teams. This solution gives an increase of 5.2% in 
total network risk 
 
7.4 Investigating Effect of Locating HazMat Teams to Any Node on the 
Network  
HazMat teams are usually allocated to existing fire stations to keep initial and 
operating costs at reasonable limits. Restricting HazMat teams to existing fire stations 
results in location patterns similar to those of fire stations, i.e. locations are mainly 
associated with large populated areas. However, such a restriction not only limits the 
ability to obtain solutions that may further minimize risk, but also might result in 
improbable solutions under the maximum response time constraint, especially for remote 
areas. 
 
This potential problem is investigated in this section as well as how the relaxation 
of this location restriction might affect HazMat risks and team locations in the region. 
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Although this may not be a practical solution due to financial aspects, understanding what 
the implications would be in case such a restriction is lifted would be helpful.  
 
We ran the model to locate four HazMat teams at any node on the network with no 
limitation on the host node (i.e. with or without fire stations). The optimal solution 
results, along with results from Section 7.1 for the current and optimal four-team solution 
with the restriction of HazMat teams to fire stations, are shown in Table 7-5. Locations of 
the optimal solutions for both restricted and unrestricted cases are shown in Figure 7-9. 
As shown, the unrestricted optimal HazMat team locations solution actually favors two 
nodes with existing fire stations, node 12 and 27. 
 
 Table 7-5: Comparison of four HazMat team location strategies 










Current 6 12 15 22 0.0412 0.0063 50  
Restricted to fire 
stations 6 14 22 27 0.0372 0.0067 50 9.8 
No restriction 12 21 23 27 0.0354 0.0043 56 14.2 
 
For the considered case study, the optimal solution of either the restricted or 
unrestricted location strategies yields a reduction in total network risk.  As expected, the 
lowest risk is associated with the unrestricted location of HazMat teams, with a reduction 
in total network risk of 14.2% as compared to the current location solution, and a 
reduction of 4.4% as compared to the fire station restricted solution. The unrestricted 
strategy appears to be especially desirable with respect to the maximum risk measures 





Figure 7-9: Optimal solutions of 4 HazMat teams for both fire station restricted and unrestricted 
locations. 
 
Not withstanding the fact that the unrestricted strategy yields the lowest risk, 
practical issues exist as to whether placing HazMat teams at locations that do not have 
fire stations is possible. Based on this consideration, we would recommend adapting a 
restricted four HazMat team location strategy for this region.  
 
7.5 Assessing the Effect of Different HazMat Routing Strategies on 
HazMat Emergency Response Planning 
The developed model was used to estimate the risk implications of two routing 
strategies. Under the first routing strategy, HazMat are to be transported on all links in 
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movements on the 401, a main transport corridor, and the QEW (and part of 403 between 
Mississauga and Hamilton) which carries most of the shipments from eastern Canada 
across the USA border at Niagara Falls. 
  
Table 7-6 lists the risk results of the two assumed strategies for the current HazMat 
team locations. Results show that the second strategy of routing all HazMat movements 
on the two main corridors in the region (and subsequently through highly populated 
areas) results in a slightly higher total network risk than the first routing strategy.  
 
Table 7-6: Risk results for the two different routing strategies for the current HazMat team locations 





Strategy 1* 0.0412 0.0063 50 
Strategy 2** 0.0416 0.0094 50 
*Strategy 1: routing HazMat movements to all links 
**Strategy 2: routing HazMat movements to 401, 403, and QEW highways 
 
Furthermore, optimal HazMat team location solutions were compared for the two 
different routing strategies ( 
 
Table 6-12). The results show that the effect of different routing strategies on the 
total network risk estimate is relatively small. However the location of the optimal 
solution differs for the two routing policies, as shown in Figure 7-10. Thus, if all HazMat 
movements are routed through 401 and QEW, Burlington (node 12) and Mississauga 




Figure 7-10: Four locations solutions for two different routing policies 
 
Table 7-7: Four HazMat teams optimal locations for the 2 different routing strategies 





Strategy 1  6 14 22 27 0.0372 0.0067 50 
Strategy 2 12 15 22 27 0.0365 0.0088 50 
 
7.6 Investigating Emergency Response Requirements for Different 
HazMat Types 
Release of different HazMat types requires different response and mitigation 
measures. Each HazMat type requires different training levels, body protection, and 
containment and decontamination equipment. For example, body protection equipments 
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This section investigates whether or not optimal HazMat team locations differ for 
different HazMat types. Each type of HazMat was considered individually when 
searching for the optimal HazMat team locations that would minimize total network risk 
for that type of HazMat. We anticipated that different HazMat type would require 
different HazMat team locations; however Table 7-8 shows that for this case study, 
optimal solutions are the same for all types of HazMat as well as for all HazMat types 
combined.  
 
Table 7-8: Optimal HazMat teams location for different types of HazMat 





Flammable liquid 6 14 22 27 0.0220 0.0041 50 
Flammable liquefied gas 6 14 22 27 0.0020 0.0004 50 
Toxic liquefied gas 6 14 22 27 0.0132 0.0021 50 
 
 
7.7 Investigating Environmental Impact of HazMat Releases 
In this section we investigate the environmental impact of HazMat releases as 
discussed in Section 5.4. The impact of the HazMat release on the environment is 
assumed to be linearly related to the amount released. Furthermore, an environmental 
impact index was used as an environmental risk measure. This index is meant to 
represent impact on existing vegetation and wild life, long-term effects, as well as clean-
up and rehabilitation costs.  Different weights were assumed for different HazMat types 




Table 7-9: Environmental risk impact weights for different types of HazMat 
HazMat type Weight of environmental 
impact 
Flammable gases 1 
Toxic gases 5 
Flammable liquids 10 
Toxic liquids 100 
 
Table 7-10 shows the environmental risk and location results for the current and 
optimal solutions.  Consequently, the current solution was found to result in an 
environmental risk index of about 363, while the optimal solution was 50 points less 
(about 15 %) than the current HazMat team solution.  
 
Table 7-10: Environmental risk and location results for the current and optimal location 







Current 6 12 15 22 364 44 50 
Optimal 6 14 27 31 317 25 48 
 
 
The optimal solution for environmental impact favors locations at Hamilton, 
Oakville, Milton, and Parkheaven—placements that differ significantly from current 
HazMat team locations. Figure 7-11 shows the optimal locations of the four HazMat 









Figure 7-12 shows the relationship between different HazMat team location 
solutions and the total environmental impact in the region. From Figure 7-12 we can 
clearly see that, in terms of environmental impact, numerous better solutions exist in 
comparison to current HazMat team locations. Figure 7-13 shows the relationship 
between environmental impact and the number of HazMat teams, illustrating that the 
total impact decreases with increase in the number of HazMat teams. Finally, the rate of 
reduction in total risks is higher for fewer HazMat teams than for larger numbers of 
HazMat teams.  
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This case study is aimed mainly at illustrating features and capabilities of the 
developed HazMat team locations model.  Consequently, the model has demonstrated 
some useful features in addressing the following questions: What are the risk implications 
of the current HazMat team locations? How many HazMat teams shall be located in a 
region? Where should they be located? Would it be beneficial to close or relocate some 
teams? What are the impacts of different routing strategies?  And, what is the 




CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS 
AND FUTURE WORK  
The transportation of HazMat poses special risks for the neighboring population 
and environment. Recent analyses as well as historical events have shown that risks 
arising from the transportation of HazMat are often of the same magnitude as those 
resulting from fixed facilities. Fortunately, providing efficient emergency response 
throughout the road network can substantially reduce HazMat transport risks. However, a 
systematic approach has yet to be developed to determine where regional HazMat teams 
should be placed. Currently, planning HazMat emergency response is carried out at the 
local level with no standardized method for the planning process.  
 
8.1 Conclusions  
This thesis introduces a risk-based HazMat team location optimization model to 
provide decision-making support for locating emergency response facilities, specifically 
to response to HazMat transport accidents on the road network. The model provides a 
more objective set of input alternatives into the multi-criteria decision making process of 
regionally locating HazMat teams. The developed model consists of two components: 1) 
a Time-Dependant Quantitative Risk Assessment (TDQRA) module that estimates the 
risks for the network and at its specific nodes based on response time to each node, and 2) 
a location optimization module for locating HazMat teams on the network based on the 
risk involved. The model seeks to minimize total network societal risk associated with the 
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transport of a representative number of HazMat while ensuring a minimum level of 
service (maximum allowed response time) at marginal areas.   
 
This approach provides a practical platform for evaluating the trade-off between 
system costs (in terms of the number of teams located), total network risk, and risk and 
response time thresholds at individual nodes.  The model was applied to an example 
network representing the southwestern Ontario region to illustrate its major features and 
capabilities. 
 
The model makes use of a comprehensive time-dependant quantitative risk 
assessment technique that includes probabilities of accidents, accident induced releases 
for different release scenarios, emergency response time, corresponding hazard areas, and 
impacts on population (immediate health impacts). The TDQRA provides an effective 
comprehensive risk basis for deciding HazMat team locations. The model is time 
dependant in that risk consequence is dependant on the time it takes a HazMat team to 
respond to a HazMat release from the nearest location.  
 
In order to solve the problem practically, a number of representative HazMat 
types and release scenarios were considered. The following four HazMat types were 
used: toxic liquefied gases (represented by Ammonia), flammable liquefied gases 
(represented by Propane), flammable liquids (represented by Gasoline), and 
toxic/corrosive liquids. Accordingly, four release scenarios were considered, namely 
large spill, small spill, large leak, and small leak. The adopted release scenarios are meant 
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to reflect common release mechanisms associated with HazMat accidents. The TDQRA 
analysis considers only immediate health impacts for off-road population, and does not 
account for the possibility of evacuation or shelter. A preliminary investigation of the 
HazMat releases environmental impact was considered.  
 
The location module involves locating a given number of HazMat teams at a set 
of pre-defined candidate locations to meet the demand for emergency service resulting 
from HazMat accidents at different network nodes. We assumed that the demand for 
HazMat emergency response took place at nodes of a link-node transportation network. 
Moreover, the problem is relatively small and was solved using complete enumeration 
since candidate locations are limited to a pre-defined set of nodes. Nevertheless, the 
location module in this research accommodates a genetic algorithm that could be used to 
find near-optimal solutions for larger problems. 
 
The relevance of the application of the model was demonstrated through a case 
study of a southwestern Ontario regional highway network. The network consisted of 32 
node and 92 links. In addition, a subset of 12 nodes currently host fire stations and are 
assumed to be the candidate nodes for HazMat team locations.  
 
Uniform change in certain model parameters for the whole network, in most 
cases, resulted in a linear change in risk estimates, but not the choice of optimal solution. 
On the other hand, input values that have different change patterns for different parts of 
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the network, e.g. different HazMat routes and different HazMat volumes for different 
links, will likely affect the choice of optimal solution.  
 
To demonstrate the practical relevance of the model, a number of strategic 
HazMat location policies were investigated for the southwestern Ontario case study. 
Currently there are four teams in the region, with the current locations of these teams 
based on engineering judgment and not as a result of a comprehensive risk minimization 
procedure. In this thesis, the following practical issues were investigated: 
 
1. Assessing risk implication of the current and the optimal HazMat team location 
solutions. 
2. Regionally planning HazMat emergency response to determine suitable numbers 
and locations of HazMat teams. 
3. Examining the effectiveness of this system as compared to a system comprising of 
fewer HazMat teams. 
4. Investigating the effect of locating HazMat teams to any node on the network. 
5. Assessing the effect of different HazMat routing strategies on HazMat emergency 
response planning. 
6. Investigating emergency response requirements for different HazMat types. 
7. Investigating the environmental impact of HazMat releases. 
 
The model has demonstrated some useful features in resolving questions 
concerning different HazMat team location policies for the southwestern Ontario region.  
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The results of this exercise suggested that flammable liquids have the largest contribution 
to the total network risk (60%), while toxic gases place second with 34% contribution to 
total network risk. Lastly, flammable gases contribute only 6% to total network risk. The 
high percentage of flammable liquids risk is consistent with its large volume of 
movement on the network (64% of all HazMat).  Although volumes of toxic liquefied 
gases are small, they still have a substantial impact on total network risk because of their 
great consequent effect. 
 
The current number and location of HazMat teams are among the positive 
alternatives based on the risk minimization criterion. The current HazMat team location 
solution is only 10% away from the minimum total network risk solution, while the 
estimated annual total network risk of 0.04 fatalities appears to be consistent with the 
reported national average of 2 fatalities/year caused by HazMat transport accidents 
between 1997 and 2001 (Transport Canada 2002). Total risk on the network, however, 
would improve with re-location of some of the existing teams, but the reduction in total 
risk (10 %) may not be enough to overcome the costs of relocation.  
 
The analysis has suggested that for the southwestern Ontario region, four or five 
HazMat teams provide the highest reduction in risk for an incremental increase in the 
number of HazMat teams. Moreover, results show a tradeoff between the number of 
HazMat teams, total risk, and maximum risk. Thus, the current use of four HazMat teams 




Results also show that for a limited number of HazMat teams, the risk 
minimization solution, not withstanding maximum response time restriction, favors 
densely populated areas, while restricting maximum response time results in locations 
more toward the geographical center of the region. However, with enough coverage, in 
terms of the number of HazMat teams, the model demonstrated the ability to assess the 
risk contribution from different nodes and to choose the best solution based on risk 
optimization.  
 
Current HazMat team locations unfortunately result in a high environmental impact 
of HazMat releases. Thus, increasing the number of HazMat teams to six and relocating 
them to different locations will dramatically decrease the environmental impact of 
HazMat releases.  
 
Lastly, it should be noted that the findings of this case study are limited to the 
considered region only. However, while these findings are not suitable for deducing any 
general conclusions, the proposed methodology and the developed mode could be applied 
to any other geographical areas. 
 
8.2 Recommendations and Future Work  
The following items represent suggested areas of improvement that would enhance 





a) Enhancement to the developed TDQRA 
• Using link-specific HazMat accident and release rates. HazMat accident rates 
and release probabilities depend on a number of features, such as road type and 
conditions, posted speed, topographical and environmental condition. However, 
estimates of HazMat accident rates and release probabilities are normally based 
on characteristics of broad classification or road type (e.g. urban verse rural). 
Thus, utilizing other factors, such as number of lanes, posted speed, and 
probability of overturn/collision, is recommended in estimating link-specific 
accident and release probabilities. Such link-specific estimates would enhance the 
choice of HazMat team locations.  
• Incorporating gas dispersion modeling directly into the TDQRA: In 
developing the TDQRA, we used results from the gas dispersion model ALOHA 
to calculate concentration levels and doses for releases of different HazMat. 
Incorporating a gas dispersion modeling into the TDQRA will allow the 
consideration of a wider range of discharge rates, release times, and weather 
conditions. 
• Improving modeling of exposed population. Expanding the developed TDQRA 
to consider HazMat risk imposed on the on-road population (road users) is 
recommended as well as taking into account shelter and evacuation as mitigation 
procedures. Moreover, examining the use of a population distribution instead of 
average population density for off-road population modeling is also recommended 
since improving modeling of the exposed population would contribute to a more 
realistic risk measure. 
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• Considering uncertainty in input estimates. Uncertainty in the risk assessment 
process arises from two aspects: the imprecision in estimating input parameters 
due to insufficient data, and the uncertainty in the HazMat release process itself 
due to system variations over time and space. Thus, we recommend that future 
research account for uncertainty in the TDQRA through the use of probability 
distributions for input parameters, such as accident and release rates, instead of 
single value estimates.  
• Enhancing Environmental risk assessment. The developed environmental 
impact index could be improved by considering different relevant parameters, 
such as proximity to water bodies, ground water, conservation areas and other 
ecologically sensitive areas. 
 
b) Enhancements for the developed location optimization module  
• Using Geographical Information System (GIS) to integrate spatial 
information into the developed model. Preparing spatial data in a format 
compatible to the developed model could be time consuming and might result in 
errors. In contrast, integrating spatial data into the model would help manipulate 
data, save time, and help reduce the occurrence of errors.   
• Considering the hieratical aspect of HazMat emergency response. Emergency 
response services, including HazMat response, are hierarchal in nature. Not all 
HazMat teams have the same level of response capabilities: a lower level team 
with less response capabilities is usually available for quicker response than a 
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higher level team. Thus, considering interaction among different levels of 
response would enhance the performance of HazMat emergency planning.  
• Model monetary costs of establishing new HazMat teams or relocating 
existing ones. So far HazMat team costs have been expressed in terms of the 
number of teams. As a result, a more accurate representation of team costs that 
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APPENDIX A: REVIEW OF HAZMAT MOVEMENTS AND 
ACCIDENTS IN CANADA 
HazMat are transported in great amounts on our transportation system and with it 
comes the great potential of high-risk to both humans and environment. Table A-1 shows 
approximate Canadian annual number of HazMat shipments and tonnage by mode of 
transportation (Transport Canada 2002). According to Transport Canada 1998 annual 
report, every year over 27 million HazMat shipments are transported across Canada.  
About 25 million of them (92.55%) are made by road with total tonnage of over 128 
million ton.  
 
Table A-1: Canadian annual number of HazMat shipments and tonnage by mode 
Mode Shipments Tonnage 
Air 1,490,000 5.52% 92,000 0.04% 
Marine (no 
bulk) 
10,000 0.04% 71,300,000 31.00% 
Rail 510,000 1.89% 29,900,000 13.00% 




Table A-2 shows the HazMat road tonnage by province (Transport Canada 2002). 









Table A-2: Road tonnage by province 
 leaving entering intra 
NF 0.12% 0.09% 1.16% 
PE 0.01% 0.34% 0.18% 
NS 1.35% 0.73% 6.02% 
NB 1.44% 2.10% 3.07% 
QC 8.51% 5.63% 16.50% 
ON 8.11% 9.68% 27.83% 
MB 2.04% 3.35% 4.29% 
SK 3.83% 3.69% 6.40% 
AB 10.30% 4.70% 32.80% 
BC 3.74% 5.28% 12.06% 
NT 0.10% 0.73% 1.51% 
YK 0.01% 0.35% 0.06% 
US 4.49% 7.38% 0 
 
 
The transportation of HazMat by air, marine, rail and road is regulated under the 
federal “Transportation of Dangerous Goods Act”, 1992. Also the “Transportation of 
Dangerous Goods Regulations” establishes the safety requirement for the transportation 




HazMat Incidents in Transport 
Transport Canada statistics (Transport Canada 1998) shows that between 1989 and 
1997 the number of reported HazMat road accidents ranges between 103 to 239 per year 
with an average of 156 (Table A-3). Number of deaths and Injuries Caused by HazMat at 





Table A-3: Reportable accidents involving HazMat by mode of transport 
Reportable Accidents Involving HazMat by Mode of Transport, 
1988 - 1998 
In Transit  





1988 155 11 0 1 323 490 
1989 192 29 3 3 334 561 
1990 183 17 2 0 194 396 
1991 155 27 4 2 251 439 
1992 140 25 0 1 228 394 
1993 103 25 1 0 113 242 
1994 114 30 1 0 145 290 
1995 109 19 3 0 205 336 
1996 239 35 9 1 237 521 
1997 166 16 6 1 194 383 
Average 156 23 3 1 222 405 
1998 184 14 4 0 234 436 
 
*The TDG program does not cover HazMat transported in bulk on ships or by pipeline. 




Table A-4: Number of deaths and number and severity of injuries 
Deaths and Injuries Caused by HazMat at Reportable Accidents, 1988 - 
1998 





Major Moderate Minor Total 
1988 6 - - - 65 
1989 3 21 50 13 84 
1990 0 8 42 0 50 
1991 1 9 9 21 39 
1992 0 3 3 34 40 
1993 18* 1 2 14 17 
1994 0 0 3 29 32 
1995 0 3 58 2 63 
1996 1 2 10 16 28 
1997 2 15 14 4 33 
Average 3.1 6.9 21.2 14.8 45.1 
1998 2 1 19 8 28 
 
*All 18 deaths are from the same bus-truck collision, Lac Bouchette (Quebec) 
- Minor injuries refer to those injuries that require first-aid treatment, moderate injuries 
require emergency hospital treatment, and major injuries require overnight hospitalization 
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Table A-5 shows calls to CANUTEC that resulted in an emergency by province from 
1991 till 1999. As shown in Table A-5, Ontario comes first in number of reported 
HazMat incidents that has resulted in an emergency, with (in some years) more than 
double the number of calls of the second province (Quebec). 
 
Table A-5:  Calls to CANUTEC that resulted in an emergency 
Location 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 
British-Columbia 86 127 123 172 168 27 161 188 193 
Alberta 92 115 135 101 133 105 99 101 97 
Saskatchewan 22 34 26 29 28 29 21 27 26 
Manitoba 30 38 42 38 52 35 39 40 35 
Ontario 331 387 324 377 411 344 316 338 311 
Quebec 202 188 193 183 172 129 121 154 111 
New-Brunswick 26 26 33 28 25 36 32 74 55 
Nova-Scotia 26 28 26 28 31 21 32 19 28 
Prince-Edward-
Island 2 3 0 2 1 0 2 1 3 
Newfoundland 0 7 8 8 12 12 9 14 10 
Northwest Terr. 1 0 5 1 0 1 3 0 1 
Yukon Terr. 3 0 0 0 3 0 2 4 0 
U.S.A. 34 46 37 23 23 24 14 28 12 
International 0 5 2 4 6 1 2 1 0 
 
 
Due to different requirements by Transport Canada in reporting a HazMat related 
accidents, the number of reportable accidents according to Transport Canada differs from 
the number of calls to CANUTEC. The difference represent accidents which were filed as 
voluntary accident reports falling outside the accident reporting threshold requirement by 
TDG regulations.  
 
Figure A-1 shows the number of Transport Canada reportable accidents involving 





Figure A-1: Number of reportable accidents involving HazMat between 1989 and 1998 (Transport 
Canada 1998 annual report) 
 
References  
Transport Canada. 2002. Statistics on Dangerous Goods Transported.  
<http://www.tc.gc.ca/tdg/info/flowstats_e.htm>. The Transport Dangerous Goods 
Directorate. Last updated: 2001-12-10. Accessed 2002 
Transport Canada. 1998. Transportation in Canada 1998 Annual Report. 
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APPENDIX B: HAZMAT TEAM 
The National Fire Protection Agency (2004) defines the hazardous material team as 
an organized group of trained response personnel, operating under an emergency 
response plan and appropriate standard operating procedures, who handle and control 
actual or potential leaks or spills of hazardous materials requiring possible approach to 
the material. The team members respond to releases or potential releases of hazardous 
materials for the purpose of control or stabilization of the incident. HazMat teams are 
equipped with special personal protective equipment as well as containment and 
decontamination equipments.  
 
The HazMat team can engage in many activities during an incident, mainly, 
identification, confinement, and /or containment of the hazardous material. Special 
personnel training is needed for to response to hazardous materials incident. NFPA 
defines the following five levels of training for responding to HazMat incident (US 
Federal Emergency Management Administration 1998, National Fire Protection Agency 
1997): 
 
1. First Responder Awareness–Individuals likely to witness or discover the release 
of a hazardous material. Trained to initiate the appropriate response and take no 
further action. 
2. First Responder Operations–Respond to releases or potential releases of 
hazardous substances as part of the initial response. Expected to take defensive 
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actions without trying to stop the release, for the purpose of protecting persons, 
property, and the environment.  
3. Hazardous Materials Technician–Respond to a hazardous materials incident for 
the purpose of stopping the release. These individuals are often members of a 
HazMat team. 
4. Hazardous Materials Specialist–Respond with and support hazardous materials 
technicians. Possess specialized knowledge of chemical hazards or container 
characteristics. 
5. On-scene Incident Commander–Assume control of the incident beyond the first 
responder awareness level. This individual must possess minimum training at the 
first responder operations level with additional knowledge of state, local, and 
federal response plans. 
 
Personal protective equipment provided to shield or isolate a responder from the 
chemical, physical, and thermal hazard that can be encountered at a hazardous material 
incident. Personal protective equipment includes both personal protective clothing and 
respiratory protection. Adequate personal protective equipment should protect the 
respiratory system, skin, eyes, face, hands, feet, head, body, and hearing. An example of 
personal protection equipment is shown in Figure B-1. 
 












Figure B-2: HazMat emergency response vehicle 
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Figure B-2 and Figure B-3, A & B show HazMat emergency response vehicle and 




















Figure B-3: Emergency response team at work 
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Lesak (1999) defined the following HazMat response goals: 
1. Isolation 
 
a) Perimeter establishment 
b) Zoning (zone establishment) 
c) Initial public protection 





a) Establish communication links 
b) Request assistance 
c) Incident level identification 




a) Recognition and identification 
b) Data retrieval 
c) Interview 







a) Secondary public protection 
b) Personal protection equipment 
c) Decontamination 
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d) Pre-entry briefing 
e) EMS and fire assessment 
f) Safety assessment 
g) Pre-entry medical monitoring 
h) Reassess zones 
 
5. Spill Control 
 
a) Gas/air releases: Ventilation, Dissolution, Dispersion, Diversion 
b) Liquid/surface releases: Diking, Diversion, Retention, 
Adsorption, Neutralisation, Absorption 
c) Liquid/water releases: Damming, Diverting, Booming, 
Absorption 
d) Solid/surface releases: Planking 
 
6. Leak control 
 
a) Direct leak control: Plugging, Patching, Overpacking, Crimping, 
Product transfer, Valve actuation 
b) Indirect leak control: Remote shut-offs, Emergency shut-offs, 
Product transfer, Product displacement 
 
7. Recovery/ 
      termination 
 
a) Operation recovery: Oversight of cleanup, Oversight of product 
transfer, Oversight of container righting and handling, 
Demobilization 
b) Administrative recovery:  Inventory control, Restocking, 
Financial restitution 
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Local authorities bare the responsibility of providing enough HazMat emergency 
response for the community. HazMat teams are usually hosted within fire stations. 
HazMat teams respond to HazMat incidents onsite as well as in transit. However, many 
industries have their own HazMat response capabilities. There are also some privately 
owned and operated HazMat teams.  Transport Canada (2004) lists various Emergency 
Response Contractors and associations located across Canada offering different services 
for various types of HazMat and offer different levels of response capability. Some of 
these contractors may have a national response capability.  
 
The Ontario Fire Service Section 21 Committee issued Guidance Note #26 in March, 
1997, dealing with fire department responses for hazardous materials. This guidance note 
states that regardless of the level of response offered by a fire department, all responding 




Lesak, D. M. 1999. Hazardous Materials Strategies and Tactics. Brady/Prentice Hall. 
National Fire Protection Agency. 1997. NFPA 472 Standard for Professional 
Competence of Responders to Hazardous Materials Incidents. Available from: 
<http://www.tnema.org/Library/Misc/472.pdf>.  Accessed May, 2004. 
National Fire Protection Agency. 2004. NFPA Glossary of Terms. Available from 
National Fire Protection Agency website: 
<http://www.nfpa.org/PDF/definitions.pdf?src=nfpa>. Accessed May, 2004. 
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Transport Canada. 2004. Emergency Response Contractors and associations. Webpage. 
Available at: <http://www.tc.gc.ca/tdg/erc/contractor.asp>. Accessed May 2004. 
US  Federal Emergency Management Agency. 1998. Guide to developing effective 
standard operating procedures for fire and EMS departments. US fire 







APPENDIX C: ALOHA 
ALOHA is an air dispersion model to evaluate hazardous chemical release scenarios 
and predict dispersion. ALOHA stands for the Areal Locations of Hazardous 
Atmospheres. It is a computer modeling tool for estimating the movement and dispersion 
of hazardous chemical gases. ALOHA is intended primarily for rapid deployment by 
responders, as well as for use in emergency preplanning. 
 
ALOHA can predict the rates at which gases may escape into the atmosphere from 
broken gas pipes, leaking tanks, and evaporating puddles. Then, it can predict how a 
hazardous gas cloud might disperse in the atmosphere after an accidental chemical 
release. It incorporates source strength, as well as Gaussian and heavy gas dispersion 
models and an extensive chemical property library.  
 
ALOHA requires different parameters for modeling gas dispersion such as HazMat 
type, discharge rate, release duration, immediate dangerous to health and life (IDHL) 
level for toxic materials (or Lower Flammability Level for flammable materials) weather 
and terrain conditions. ALOHA uses the information about type of HazMat released, rate 
of release, and weather conditions. 
 
ALOHA gives output is in both text and graphic form, and includes a "footprint" plot 
of the area downwind of a release, where concentrations may exceed a user-set threshold 
level. ALOHA can accept weather data transmitted from portable monitoring stations and 
requires the following input meteorological and topographical data: mean wind speed, 
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wind direction, and air temperature; ground roughness length (user can choose between 
"open country" and "urban or forest," or can enter a specific value); cloud cover in tenths; 
and relative humidity.  
 
ALOHA can model gas dispersion as Gaussian puff and plume, as well as heavy gas 
dispersion. Based on the following dispersion Algorithms: 
  
(1) Modified time-dependent Gaussian equation, based on:  
(a) Hanna, S.R., Briggs, G.A., and Hosker, R.P., Jr., 1982, "Handbook on 
Atmospheric Diffusion," Report DOE/TIC-11223, Oak Ridge Technical  
Information Center, U.S. Department of Energy. 
(b) Palazzi, E., DeFaveri, M., Fumarola, G., and Ferraiolo, G., 1982, "Diffusion 
from a Steady Source of Short Duration," Atmospheric Environment 16 (12): 2785-
2790. 
(c) Beals, G.A., 1971, "Guide to local diffusion of air pollutants." Technical 
Report 214, U.S. Air Force Weather Service, Scott Air Force Base, IL. 
 
(2) Heavy gas dispersion model based on: 
Havens, J.A., and Spicer, T. O., 1985, "Development of an Atmospheric 
Dispersion Model for Heavier-Than-Air Gas Mixtures," Volume I, Report CG-D-
22-85 to U.S. Coast Guard, Washington, D.C., Office of Research and 





ALOHA can predict the area within which a person might experience an immediate serious 
health impact from contact with more than a certain concentration of a toxic gas. This 
concentration is called the level of concern, or LOC. ALOHA can also be used to predict the area 
where a flammable gas may explode. ALOHA uses the physical characteristics of the released 
chemical and the real-time circumstances of the release scenario to predict the dispersion of a 
hazardous gas cloud. 
 
ALOHA was developed as a response tool in 1982 by The National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration or NOAA. Over the years, several academic institutions and 
response organizations helped in its development and refinement. Its use by emergency 
responders increased as the benefits of its ease of use and speed of calculations were 
demonstrated. Since late 1987 ALOHA has been co-developed with US Environmental 
Protection Agency, Chemical Emergency Preparedness and Prevention Office. In January 
1991, a completely rewritten ALOHA was distributed. It included new calculations to 
estimate source strength discharge rate and to predict the dispersion of heavier-than-air 
gases. ALOHA continues to be refined. 
 
ALOHA could be downloaded free of charge from the US Environmental Protection 
Agency website 
 http://www.epa.gov/ceppo/cameo/aloha.htm 
Further information and technical details about ALOHA could be found in “ALOHA 
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Ghada Hamouda and University of Waterloo make no warranty, expressed or implied, to 
users of the programs included in this HazMat teams Risk-based Location Optimization 
Model (HazMat-RiskLOM), and accept no responsibility for its use. User of the HazMat-
RiskLOM assume sole responsibility for determining the appropriateness of its use in any 
particular application, for any conclusions drawn from the results of its use, and for any 
action taken or not taken as a result of analyses performed using this model. Users are 
warned that this HazMat-RiskLOM is intended for use only by those competent in the 
field of HazMat risk assessment and emergency response planning, and is intended only 
to supplement the informed judgment of the qualified user.  
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WELCOME TO HAZMAT-RISKLOM 
Welcome to HazMat-RiskLOM. This manual is relative to version 1.0 of a software 
package written by Ghada Hamouda as part of a PhD research. This work has been 
performed under the supervision of professors F Saccomanno and L. Fu from University 
of waterloo. It has been funded partly by The Ontario Graduate Scholarship Program 




HazMat-RiskLOM (HazMat team Risk-Based Location Optimization Model) is a 
Windows-based computer program designed especially for use by HazMat emergency 
response planners. HazMat-RiskLOM was developed to be a decision support tool to 
investigate different options in planning transport-related HazMat emergency response. 
HazMat-RBLOM can be used to plan HazMat team locations on a road network and to 
investigate different HazMat emergency response policies.  
 
HazMat-RiskLOM’s Scope 
The HazMat-RiskLOM is limited to the following: 
1) The model can locate up to 12 HazMat teams simultaneously.   
 
2) Risk modeling is limited to four HazMat types representing four classes of HazMat 
and four release events. The four HazMat types (k) are: 
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1. Toxic liquefied gases: represented by Ammonia 
2. Flammable liquefied petroleum gases (LPG): represented by Propane  
3. flammable liquids: represented by Gasoline 
4. Toxic/corrosive liquids 
The four release events (r) are: 
1. Large spill 
2. Small spill 
3. Large leak 
4. Small leak 
Table 1 lists considered release scenarios.  





Release type  
(r) 
1 1. Ammonia 1. Large spill 
2 1. Ammonia 2. Small spill 
3 1. Ammonia 3. Large leak 
4 1. Ammonia 4. Small leak 
5 2. Propane 1. Large spill 
6 2. Propane 2. Small spill 
7 2. Propane 3. Large leak 
8 2. Propane 4. Small leak 
9 3. Gasoline 1. Large spill 
10 3. Gasoline 2. Small spill 
11 3. Gasoline 3. Large leak 
12 3. Gasoline 4. Small leak 
13 4. Toxic liquids 1. Large spill 
14 4. Toxic liquids 2. Small spill 
15 4. Toxic liquids 3. Large leak 





3) The HazMat-RiskLOM allows the user to directly provide the HazMat truck traffic 
volume for a certain HazMat type k on link l.  By giving users the capability of 
defining traffic volumes for specific HazMat types on certain links, users can utilize 
the model to study:  
• Certain type of HazMat on certain route (links) 
• Combination of different types of HazMats on certain routes 
• All types of HazMats on the whole network 
In situations that detailed data on HazMat movements are not available, the users 
can estimate HazMats traffic volumes using one of several option provided by the 
model. 
 
Basic program organization 
To use HazMat-RiskLOM, the user will typically perform the following basic steps: 
1. Prepare road network data files in a compatible format to be used by the model. 
2. Determine values for different input parameters (if different from model defaults) 
3. Request the model to calculate fastest paths and associated risks 
4. Enter information about number of HazMat teams to be located and number of 
best solutions you want to review 
5. Request the model to locate teams either to minimize human risk or minimize 
environmental impact 
 
Through a number of menus and pop-up windows, the user is asked to define available 
HazMat, movements, accidents, and releases data. The model uses the defined data to 
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determine correspondent risk and HazMat team locations.  The user can change different 
input parameter values and investigate the change in network risk or HazMat team 
locations. 
 
Basic HazMat-RiskLOM operation menu is shown in  (Figure 1) which include two top 
menu items: 
1) Import Data: Choose items from the Import Data menu to enter information 
about road network nodes and links.  
2) Network: Choose items from the Network menu to: 
a) Calculate response times using fastest path algorithm 
b) Calculate risks at network nodes 
c) Sit HazMat teams at certain locations 
d) Fined best risk-minimization HazMat team locations 
e) Find Hazmat teams locations using Genetic Algorithms for large problems 
f) Delete the existing network to be able to import a new network 
 
 





Install the HazMat-RiskLOM package by copying the HazMat-RiskLOM.exe file as well 
as example data files and folders to your computer. 
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LEARNING THE BASICS 
 
This Chapter contains a step-by-step illustration on how to use HazMat-RiskLOM as a 
emergency response planning tool.  
 
Preparing input Files  
The HazMat-RiskLOM requires that data is represented in two input files: 1) the network 
nodes file, and 2) the network links file. The files should be in text format with input 
fields separated by tabs.  
 
Nodes represent major population concentrations and major intersections on the network 
as well as intermediate points on long arcs.  The following seven attributes are needed for 
the node file: 
 
1. Node_ID A unique number that identifies each node. The assigned 
Node_IDs for different nodes must run sequential from 1 to total 
number of nodes, nd. 
2. Xcor Longitude position of the node. 
3. Ycor Latitude position of the node. 
4. PopulationDenst Population density at the node. One value that represent the 
average population density for the region represented by the node. 
5. FireStation Dummy variable  
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= 1 if the node hosts fire station,  
=0 otherwise.  
Nodes with firs stations are considered candidate node for HazMat 
team locations.  
6. Urban Integer, = 1 if node is within urban area, = 2 if the node within 
rural area, and = 0 if unknown. 
7. Intersection Dummy variable  




roads are represented as directed links. Every road segmant on the road network is 
represented by 2 links, one for each traffic direction. The following data fields (8 to 20) 
represent different link attributes: 
 
8. Link_id A unique number that identifies each link. Link_id can take 
any integer number. 
9. Hnode_id Node_ID of Link’s head node (node from which traffic 
entering the link).  
10. Tnode_id Node_ID of Link’s tale node (node to which traffic exiting 
the link). 
11. L_Length Link length in km. 
12. L_PostedSpeed* Posted speed on link (km/hr). 
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13. L_TravelTime* Emergency vehicles actual travel time on Link (minutes). 
The user has the option of directly providing estimates of 
emergency vehicles travel time on links; otherwise, posted 
speed and link length will used to calculate free flow travel 
time on links.  
14. L_AllVehiclesAADT** Link average annual daily traffic for all vehicles 
(vehicles/day) 
15. L_TruckAADT** Link average annual daily traffic for trucks (vehicles/day) 
16. L_AllDGsAADT** Link average annual daily traffic for HazMat movements 
(vehicles/day) 
17. L_FlamLqdAADT** Link flammable liquids average annual daily traffic 
(vehicles/day) 
18. L_ToxcLqdAADT** Link toxic liquids average annual daily traffic 
(vehicles/day) 
19. L_FlamGasAADT Link flammable liquefied gases average annual daily traffic 
(vehicles/day) 
20. L_ToxcGasAADT** Link toxic liquefied gases average annual daily traffic 
(vehicles/day) 
*Either 12 or 13 is needed  










Start the program 
As you use HazMat-RiskLOM, you’ll enter information on a series of popup windows 
and dialog boxes to describe your problem. Start by running the file “HazMat-
RiskLOM.exe”. After a splash screen, an “Input options” window will open (Figure 2). 
Choose between two options for travel time estimation: 
 
• Directly providing user estimates of emergency response vehicles on links 
• Provide posted speed on links for the model to estimate travel times.  
 
Choose one of the four presented options for HazMat movements calculations: 
• HazMat AADT on links by HazMat type 
• Total HazMat AADT on links 
• Truck AADT on links 











After selecting input options press “OK” button. The main program window “HazMat-
RiskLOM’ will open (Figure 3). Select “Node data” from the “Input data” menu and 
using the dialog box, navigate through the files and folders to choose and open the node 
file. To import links data, select “Link data” from the “Input data” menu. From the dialog 
box, select and open the node file. The model uses nodes and links information and 
displays a representation of the network. 
 
 





Response Time and Risk Calculations 
Response times calculations 
From “Network” menu select “Calculate response time”. The “Response Time” popup 
window (Figure 4) allows you to provide user-defined values for the dispatch time, 
mitigation time, maximum delay at intersection nodes, and delay factors on links.  
 
 
Figure 4: “Response time” window 
 
Thesis values along with travel times on links are used to calculate response times for 
different network nodes using fastest path algorithm. You can change input parameters in 
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For risk calculations, you will need to provide a run-time input data regarding HazMat 
traffic, accident and release rates. Default values for Ontario, Canada are provided, 
however, user defined values could be substituted. To calculate risk for different node 
network select “Calculate risk” from “Network” menu. Several popup windows will be 
displayed with default input parameters values used in risk calculations.  
 
Traffic volumes representation and calculations: 
The user has the option of providing any one of the following four movement data: 
 
1) Detailed HazMat traffic movement for each HazMat type k on every link l, 





In this case, link attributes 14, 15, and 16 should not be presented.  
 
2) Total of all HazMats’ traffic volumes on every link (16. L_AllDGsAADT). In this 
case, link attributes 14, 15, and 17-20 should not be presented. The specific 
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HazMat type volumes on links are estimated according to the fraction of that 
HazMats type in the total HazMat traffic according to the following equation:  
AllDGsAADTLTRFCHazMat kkl _*_ α=  
Where kα  is the fraction of HazMat type k in the whole HazMats traffic.  
Table 2 shows estimates of kα  for different HazMat types transported by road 
reported by Transport Canada11. These values are provided in the TDQRA model 
as default values, however the user has the option of providing his/her own 
estimates of kα . 
 




Shipping name percent Total percent 
kα  
Gasoline 22.97 
Fuel Oil 17.53 
Tars 7.82 
Petroleum Crude Oil 6.69 
Ethanol 2.92 
Aviation fuel 1.58 
Flammable Liquids preparations 1.51 
Flammable Liquids n.o.s. 1.36 
Paint 0.92 
Resin Solutions 0.88 
Flammable liquids 








Corrosive Liquids n.o.s. 10.44 
Caustic Soda 2.18 
Sulphuric Acid 1.60 
Corrosive liquids 





Petroleum Gases 1.15 





Toxic liquefied gases Ammonia 0.98 0.98 
Total 83.79 
Other HazMat material (do not fall under 
the previous 4 classification of HazMat 
and/or transported in small amounts) 
  16.21 
  
 
                                                 
11 Transport Canada http://www.tc.gc.ca/tdg/info/flowstats_e.htm 
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3) Total truck traffic volumes on every link, L_TruckAADT. In this case, link 
attributes 14, 16, and 17-20 should not be presented. Using a certain percentage 
lβ  as the fraction of HazMats volumes in the whole truck volumes on link l, the 
model estimates the total HazMats volumes on links L_AllDGsAADT according 
to the following equation: 
TruckAADTLAllDGsAADTL _*_ β=  
 
Having an estimate of L_AllDGsAADT, the model then estimates 
k
lTRFCHazMat _ as described in the previous option 2. The following equation 
combines the 2 steps:  
TruckAADTLTRFCHazMat kkl _**_ βα=  
 
We estimated a Canadian default value for β  using Commercial Vehicles Road 
Side Survey (1995) data. The survey collected data at 148 survey sites spread 
across the 25,600 kilometers of the Survey Highway System (SHS). Two types of 
information were collected at each site:  
• a 7 day count of trucks passing the site, classified by day, time and truck 
type 
• interviews of a random sample of the passing trucks (80 questions in 
interview). 




We extracted an estimate of the percentage of HazMat movements by ton for 
different HazMat classes from the “1995 Road Side Survey” data using 
“WesVarPC2.02” software12. 
 
Table 3 shows that HazMats accounts for 9.85% of all truck movements by ton on 
the survey roads. Although these estimates are based on truck movements on the 
survey roads, we can generally assume they are applicable for all truck traffic in 
Canada. So, generally we can assume a value of 9.85% for “ β ” factor. 
 












Cargo includes dangerous goods, but 
unable to determine class 1.12 
Total HazMat 9.85 
Total Non-HazMat 90.15 
Total  100.00 
 
Again, this estimated value for the parameter β is provided as a Canadian default 
value and the user has the option of providing his/her own estimate.  
 
                                                 
12 Developed by Westat, Main Campus 1650 Research Boulevard, Rockville, MD 20850, 301.251.1500 
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4) Total vehicle traffic volumes, L_AllVehiclesAADT. In this case, link attributes 
15, 16, and 17-20 should not be presented.  This final option should be used only 
when there is absolutely no available data other that the total traffic volumes for 
all vehicles. In such case, total HazMat traffic are assumed to be a certain fixed 
percentage of the total vehicles traffic. Previous options are then carried out to 
estimate different HazMat traffic on links. 
 
In this exercise we are estimating the different types of HazMat movements using truck 
AADT on links assuming HazMat movements constitute a certain percentage of all truck 
movements (option 3).  The “Calculate HazMat Traffic Volumes from Truck AADT” 
window (Figure 5) asks for the percentage of HazMat movements in total truck traffic on 
links, β , and the “% of HazMat types in Total HazMat Traffic” window (Figure 6) asks 









Figure 6: “% of HazMat types in Total HazMat Traffic” window 
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Accident and release rates  
In the “HazMat accident rates” window (Figure 7), default values for accident rates on 
Ontario highways are provided. The next popup window is the “Release probabilities and 
discharge rates” window shows Ontario default values of release probabilities for 




Figure 7: “HazMat Accident Rates” window 
 
Using the provided input files and different run-time parameters, the HazMat-RiskLOM 
calculates risk estimates at different network nodes associated with different HazMat 




Figure 8: “Release probabilities and discharge rates’ window
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Assessing Specific HazMat Team Locations 
The HazMat-RiskLOM could be used to assess the risk implications of a given HazMat 
team location solution. To sit HazMat teams at given locations select “Set HazMat team 
locations” from the “Network” menu. On the “Sit HazMat teams” window (Figure ) 
select the node number at which you want to set a HazMat team and click the “Sit 
HazMat team” button. The node number will be added to the “HazMat team list” and you 
will be asked whether you want to sit another HazMat team or continue with calculations. 
When you finish siting all HazMat teams proceed with calculations.   
 
The program calculates and displays total network risks, maximum risk, and maximum 
response time at marginal node for the specified HazMat team locations (Figure 9). 
 
Locate HazMat Teams According to Minimizing Total Risk Criterion 
To find the best total network risk minimization solution select “Find HazMat team risk 
minimization locations” from the ‘Network” menu. On the “Find Best Risk Minimization 
Solutions” window (Figure 10) determine the number of HazMat teams you would like to 
locate and the number of best solutions you want to view. You can either locate the 























The last item on the “Network” menu is the “Delete network” item. It allows you to 









In this example, part of southwestern Ontario region (shown in Figure 11) is used to 
illustrate the features and potential applications of the model. A simple network that 
consists of 32 nodes and 92 links is used. 
 
 
Figure 11: Example southwestern Ontario area  
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Importing data 
1) Start the program and choose the input options. In this example, the link length and 
posted speed are used to calculate travel time on links. HazMat traffic volumes are 
estimated using truck AADT.  
 
2) Choose “Node data” from the “Import data” menu. Using the dialog box, navigate to 
open folder “2_3 Example linklength_trucks”, then select and open the node file 
“Nodes long lat.txt”. to import link data, select “Link data” from the “Import data” 
menu.  From folder “2_3 Example linklength_trucks” open “Links_2_3.txt” file.  
Node attributes include: node id, longitude, latitude, population density, host fire 
station, urban or rural, and intersection and population center. Link attributes include: 
link id, head node, tale node, length, posted speed, truck AADT. 
 
 
The model uses nodes and links information and displays a representation of the network 
(Figure 12). Nodes that host a fire station are represented by red circles, while other 
nodes are represented by black circles.   
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Figure 12: HazMat-RiskLOM example network representation 
 
Response Times and Risk Calculations 
 
1) From “Network” menu select “Calculate response time”. Keep the default values in 
the “Response Time” popup window (Figure 4). 
2) Select “Calculate risk” from “Network” menu to calculate risk for different node 
network. Several popup windows will be displayed with default input parameters 
values used in risk calculations. Follow the popup windows, keeping default input 
values. When risk calculations are complete you will be alerted with a notification 
massage.  
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Finding HazMat Teams Risk-Minimization Locations 
1) Select “Find HazMat Team Risk Minimization Locations” from the “Network” menu.  
2) Type “4” in the number of HazMat teams text box. Keep the number of best solutions 
to view at the default “20”. 
3) Click on “Find best locations according to risk to human” button. 
4) The program calculate the best 20 human risk minimization HazMat location 
solutions and displays them in a text file (Figure 13). The first four values represent 
node numbers of HazMat team locations. The subsequent values represent total 
network risk, total frequency of release on network, maximum risk at marginal node, 
and maximum response time at marginal node respectively.  
 
 
Figure 13: Results for best 20 human risk minimization HazMat location solutions 
 
 
